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This Thesis is a study on the law and practice of international cooperation and 
responsibility sharing for refugees, both as it is and as it should be, with a strong 
focus on the latter.  Despite the existence of a general duty of states to cooperate 
to protect refugees in international law, there is no subsequent positive obligation 
of responsibility sharing, namely any assistance to overwhelmed refugee host 
countries remains at the discretion of states.  This has been widely acknowledged 
to constitute a normative gap of the Refugee Convention.  In practice, this gap has 
been responsible for the arbitrary allocation of refugee protection responsibilities 
between states on the basis of accidents of geography.  This arbitrary allocation is 
further exacerbated by the existence of a virtual ‘Great Wall’ built of sophisticated 
non-entrée measures and interstate arrangements that seek to deter refugees and 
confine protection in the Global South, where the majority of refugees originate 
and is hosted.   
The thesis argues that the normative gap of the Refugee Convention cannot 
be satisfactorily addressed without a codified responsibility sharing obligation in 
international law.  In moving towards responsibility sharing obligations, the thesis 
takes guidance from recent global refugee policy instruments that implicitly 
engage with the language of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC), a concept and a principle of international 
environmental law.   
As a way of unlocking the true potential of a CBDRRC-guided framework, 
the thesis studies the principle and the logic of differentiated responsibilities in 
international environmental law, in order to understand the concept and draw 
insights from its operationalisation in the international climate change law regime.  
The parallel study of international environmental law is illuminating.  On a 
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theoretical level, international environmental law has gone the furthest in relation 
to a fairness debate and has sought to balance conflicting interests and existing 
inequities between states within legal arrangements.  On a technical-legal design 
level, these multilateral responsibility sharing regimes are facilitative and flexible, 
reducing the sovereignty costs of entering into a binding agreement and therefore 
appealing to states.  Crucially, the study of the international legal regime on 
climate change has revealed that the heterogenous interests of states can be 
accommodated in international law under the right architecture.  To this end, 
fairness considerations have a structural role to play in the legal design process. 
In light of these findings, the thesis proposes the adoption of a protocol on 
responsibility sharing that would put in place a principled yet pragmatic legal 
framework that would codify a light package of minimalist and differentiated, 
responsibility sharing obligations implemented bottom up.  Focusing on questions 
of legal design, the thesis explores in detail the nature of the legal obligations that 
would best suit responsibility sharing in international refugee law. 
All this is done through adopting an ‘enlightened positivist’ methodology 
to the study of international refugee law.  This softer form of legal positivism 
claims that the protection of refugees reflects a community interest in international 
law which is served by the Refugee Convention.  Enlightened positivism provides 
the international lawyer with the methodological tools to put forward de lege 
ferenda arguments for the development of international refugee law without 
however losing sight of the international system of sovereign but unequal states 
in which the international refugee regime operates.  Finally, since international 
law can only be part to the solution of the refugee challenge, the study concludes 
with ways to build the necessary sustained political will required, towards a 
challenging but worthwhile undertaking.  
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“As the earth is formed as a globe, its inhabitants cannot 
disperse infinitely, but are compelled to meet sooner or 
later”.   
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Part I 
 
1 Responsibility Sharing for Refugees, The Challenge, the 
Debate and the Study1 
 
1.1. The gap in the international refugee law regime 
The international refugee law regime is predicated upon the idea that states have 
a collective responsibility to protect refugees.2  Indeed, since the establishment of 
the United Nations in 1945, shortly after the Second World War, the management 
of refugees acquired salience and the refugee problem was recognised by the 
General Assembly as international in scope and nature.3  The brutal excesses of a 
war that left Europe with millions of refugees, led to the establishment of a 
temporary, at the time, UN body, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).4  It was not too long after the international community came 
to realize that the refugee problem was not going to be a temporary one.5   
The international law regime on refugee protection consists of two main 
legal instruments; the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (together the Refugee 
Convention), which removed the geographical and temporal limitations of the 
 
1 As a matter of note, any law, policy and relevant events referred to in this thesis will be 
current as up to 20 September 2020. 
2 Agnès Hurwitz ‘Norm Making in International Refugee Law’ (2012) 106 American Society 
of International law Proceedings 430, 431. The term ‘refugee’ is used in the thesis as defined 
in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 
1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137.  (Refugee Convention). 
3 UNGA Res (8) I (1946) Question of refugees GAOR First Session.  
4 UNGA Res 428 (V) of 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. (UNHCR Statute). 
5 Laura Barnett ‘Global Governance and The Evolution of the International Refugee Regime’ 
New Issues in Refugee Research (2002) Working Paper No. 54, 6.  
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Convention.6  These two are further supplemented by regional refugee and human 
rights instruments7 and, together with the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), complete the architecture of the so-called international 
refugee law regime. 
On one hand, the international refugee law regime has been praised for its 
enduring relevance and resilience throughout the years.8  It has indeed been a 
unique human rights protection framework for individuals around the world 
fleeing persecution and has managed to stay relevant today, where new causes of 
flight have been added to the complex nature of forced displacement.  On the other 
hand, it has also been heavily criticised for the gap in relation to responsibility 
sharing.  The collective responsibility to protect refugees that the very regime is 
predicated upon, is met with neither a concomitant legal obligation nor a formal 
structure that ensures that protection responsibilities are fairly shared among 
states.9   
The premise of this thesis is that the widely acknowledged10 gap of the 
international refugee law regime in relation to responsibility sharing is 
 
6 Refugee Convention. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, 
entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 (Protocol). Together in the thesis (Refugee 
Convention). 
7 Supranational refugee instruments include the Organisation of African Unity Convention 
Regulating the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (adopted 14 September 1969) 
(entered into force 20 June 1974) UNTS 14691, (OAU Convention). The 1984 Declaration 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection 
of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama held at Cartagena, Colombia from 19-
22 November 1984. (Cartagena Declaration) 
8 Jane McAdam, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ (2017) 29 
International Journal of Refugee Law Editorial 1. Volker Türk, Madeline Garlick, ‘Prospects 
for Responsibility Sharing in the Refugee Context’ (2016) 43 Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 45, 47.  
9 James C Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’ (2018) 30 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 591. 
10 Indicatively only, Guy S Goodwin Gill, ‘International refugee law – yesterday, today but 
tomorrow?’  Working Paper No. 16 (2016) Refugee Law Initiative Working Papers 16 – 22. 
Terje Einarsen and Marthe Engedahl, ‘The universal asylum system and the 2016 New York 
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normative.11  It is normative because the Refugee Convention does not provide for 
a codified obligation of responsibility sharing, whereby states are bound to provide 
assistance and solutions to refugees in the territories of other states.12  In the 
absence of a codified obligation of responsibility sharing, the distribution of the 
collective responsibility to protect refugees between states is determined by 
‘accidents of geography’,13 or by proximity.14  What is more, Northern states have 
strategically deployed deterrence measures that seek to confine the locus of 
refugee protection and refugees predominantly within the Global South.15  As a 
result, Southern countries in close proximity to refugee producing regions, are the 
ones which receive the refugees first, and which assume the prima facie 
responsibility for asylum, namely protection from non-refoulement. 16   David 
Owen has eloquently put this: 
 
 
Declaration: towards an improved ‘global compact’ on refugees?’ Working Paper No. 17 
(2016) Refugee Law Initiative Working Papers 16 – 22. Claire Inder, ‘The Origins of ‘Burden 
Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime’ (2018) 29 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 523-554. McAdam, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ 
4. Volker Türk, 66th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner’s Programme, Geneva, 21-24 June 2016. Agenda item 2: International 
Protection. Statement by Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner (Protection) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/admin/dipstatements/576d41877/66th-meeting-standing-committee-
executive-committee-high-commissioners.html . 
11 Volker Türk and Rebecca Dowd, ‘Protection Gaps’ in Elena Fiddian - Qasmiyeh and others 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook for Refugees and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford University 
Press 2014), 283-284. Meltem Ineli-Giger, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees and Burden 
Sharing: Will the Compact Address the Normative Gap Concerning Burden Sharing?’ (2019) 
38 Refugee Survey Quarterly 115. 
12 Alexander Betts Protection by Persuasion, International Cooperation in the Refugee 
Regime (Cornell University Press 2009) 2, 3.  
13 Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 596. 
14 Mathew J Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum Liberal Democracy and the Response 
to Refugees (Cambridge University 2004), 240. Betts, Protection By Persuasion, 34. 
15 Mathew J Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’ (2015) 14 European Journal of 
Political Theory 448, 452.  
16 Refugee Convention, Article 33. 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 20 
It is worth recalling that the lack of fair apportionment of refugee 
protection is a key contributor to the reluctance of states to admit refugees 
for whom, in virtue of the principle of non-refoulement, they thereby bear 
sole responsibility for what often amounts to indefinite protection.17  
 
In effect, the powerful normative dominance of the principle of non-refoulement 
over the principle of responsibility sharing, given that non refoulement is a well-
established legal duty in international refugee law, negatively impacts on the 
quality of international protection and durable solutions.18   
With respect, to the terms ‘Global North’ and’ Global South’, these emanate 
from the concept of a gap between states, in terms of levels of development and 
wealth.  At the risk of appearing oversimplistic, countries of the Global North are 
mainly found in the Northern hemisphere, with the exception of Australia and 
New Zealand.  Causes for the disparities between countries vary and include 
natural resources, different levels of health and education, levels of 
industrialisation and even a country’s vulnerability to natural hazards and climate 
change.19  Having said this, the two terms are not accurately capturing realities on 
the ground, as they obfuscate important differences between countries seemingly 
part of the North and South groups.20  Mindful of this caveat, and given that 
refugee scholarship has popularise the use of the terms,21 this thesis uses the terms 
 
17 David Owen, ‘Refugees and Responsibilities of Justice’ (2018) 11 Global Justice: Theory 
Practice Rhetoric 23.  
18 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, 240. 
19 Royal Geographical Society A 60 Second Guide to the Global North/Global South Divide, 
available at https://www.rgs.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?nodeguid=9c1ce781-9117-4741-
af0a-a6a8b75f32b4&lang=en-GB  
20 Dimiter Toshkov, ‘The ‘Global South’ is a terrible term. Don’t use it!’ Research Design 
Matters (November 6 2018). Available at http://re-design.dimiter.eu/?p=969  
21 Bhupinder S. Chimni, 'The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South' (1998) 
11 Journal of Refugee Studies 350. Alexander Betts, ‘North-South Cooperation in the 
Refugee Regime: The Role of Linkages’ (2008) 14 Global Governance 157. 
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to frame the challenge of international cooperation and responsibility sharing 
along a North-South divide. The next section includes some key figures that 
contextualise and enhance the argument that the responsibility sharing gap 
negatively impacts upon the quality of refugee protection. 
 
1.2. Facts and figures 
Arguably, the most-cited percentage in refugee scholarship in recent years is the 
one published every year by the UNHCR on the number of refugees hosted in 
developing countries.  Although statistics do not always reflect the qualitative 
differences between refugee situations - and can occasionally cause ‘statistics 
fatigue’- the fact that 85% of the world’s refugees in 2019 are hosted in developing 
countries speaks for itself.22  Of these 85%, 27% are hosted by the least developed 
countries.23  Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees worldwide, the 
second being Colombia, hosting the majority of the Venezuelans displaced.24  To 
contextualise the accidents of geography argument further, in 2019, 73% of 
refugees fled to neighbouring countries and only 27% to countries further afield.  
It has been a decade of protracted refugee situations UNHCR reports25 and 
complex refugee emergencies with only a fraction of them having any prospects 
for solutions.26   In response to the global health crisis of COVID-19, which 
suddenly hit the world in late 2019 and early 2020, and which at the time of 
writing, has impacted the lives of millions, border closures and travel restrictions 
 
22 UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019.  
23 Defined by the United Nations as low-income countries confronting severe structural 
impediments to sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to economic and 
environmental shocks and have low levels of human assets. 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html  
24 UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019. 
25 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees 
from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given 
asylum country. UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019. 
26 UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019, 12. 
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have been imposed by states.  According to IOM’s global mobility restriction 
report of June 2020 27 , 219 countries imposed ‘a total of 64,571 movement 
restriction measures’, with reports stating that many of these measures did not 
make any exception for refugees and asylum-seekers.28  UNHCR reports that 
hundred countries closed borders without making an exception for those seeking 
asylum, crippling the right to seek international protection.29  A direct result of 
the pandemic has also been the temporary suspension of refugee departures for 
the purposes of resettlement in March 2020,30 a first in UNHCR’s history.31  At 
the time of writing this thesis, travel for refugee resettlement purposes has been 
resumed but resettlement places have significantly dropped.32  Even before the 
coronavirus pandemic the scale of resettlement was profoundly insufficient 
against global refugee needs. 
According to the World Bank’s income classification index, the Global 
North in 2019 hosted only 17% of refugees.33  Taking heed of the fact that the 
 
27 DTM COVID-19 Global Mobility Restriction Overview (04 June 2020)  available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/dtm-covid-19-global-mobility-restriction-overview-04-june-
2020  
28 UNHCR, ‘Key Legal Considerations on access to territory for persons in need of 
international protection in the context of the COVID-19 response’, (March 2020). See also 
Kaldor Centre Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 




29 Remarks by Ms. Gillian Triggs, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection during the 8th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme (7 July 2020). 
30 ‘IOM, UNHCR announce temporary suspension of resettlement travel for refugees’ 
UNHCR Press Release, (17 March 2020). 
31 Remarks by Ms. Gillian Triggs, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection during the 8th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme (7 July 2020). 
32 UNHCR ExCom ‘Resettlement and Complementary Pathways’, Standing Committee 78th 
Meeting EC/71/SC/CRP.10 (3 July 2020), paragraph 3. 
33 UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019, 25. 
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European Union and western countries34 provide 89%35 of UNHCR’s budget 
through voluntary donations, it becomes clear that the preference of the North is 
to fund refugee assistance programmes rather than hosting refugees in its 
territories. 36  When it comes to hosting refugees, the statistics are declaratory of 
the inequities between the Global South and the Global North.  The hosting of 
refugees carries with it important social and economic capital for Southern host 
countries, which adds to the developing countries’ existing developmental 
challenges. The fact that these countries assume a disproportionate to their 
capabilities share of refugee protection, negatively impacts on the wider North-
South relations, creating what Betts has described as ‘North-South impasse’ 
which is addressed next.37   
 
1.3. The international refugee law regime and interstate relations 
It has been argued that the normative dominance of non-refoulement over 
responsibility sharing is a by-product of the weak institutionalisation of the 
responsibility sharing norm. 38   Contrary to the norm of asylum, where the 
Refugee Convention institutionalises it under an international legal regime of 
rights and duties of states vis-à-vis the refugees, responsibility sharing is viewed 
by states as inherently political, and therefore, as largely discretionary. 39  
 
34 The top nine donor countries to UNHCR for 2019 was the U.S., the European Union, 
Germany, Sweden Japan, the UK, Norway, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands.  
https://www.unhcr.org/donors.html  
35 UNHCR Global Appeal 2020-2021. 
36 Türk and Garlick ‘Prospects for Responsibility Sharing in the Refugee Context’, 46.  
37 Betts, Protection By Persuasion, 13. 
38 Alexander Betts, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change’ (2018) 
30 International Journal of Refugee Law 623. 
39 Alexander Betts, Cathryn Costello, Natascha Zaun, ‘A Fair Share; Refugees and 
Responsibility Sharing’ Delmi (The Migration Studies Delegation) Report 2017:10, Available 
at https://www.delmi.se/en/news/text . (Delmi Report, A Fair Share). 
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The negotiating history of the Refugee Convention highlights how states at 
the time viewed responsibility sharing as a matter of domestic policy that had 
consequently no place in a treaty on the rights and duties of states with respect to 
refugees in their territories.40  Nonetheless, the drafters had envisaged that some 
states, at times, would be disproportionately affected by refugee flows more than 
others, due to their geographic proximity to refugee producing regions.41  The then 
Secretary General and the French delegation sought to remedy this imbalance, 
that would be caused in situation of large numbers of refugees, by suggesting a 
provision on responsibility sharing in the operative part of the draft Convention.  
Draft Article 3 proposed by the Secretary General read:  
 
[T]he High Contracting Parties shall to the fullest possible extent relieve the 
burden assumed by initial reception countries (..). They shall do so, inter alia, 
by agreeing to receive a certain number of refugees in their territories. 42   
 
In the commentary that followed the draft provision, the rationale was fleshed out 
further:  
 
Owing to their geographical position and liberal traditions, some States are 
destined to become the initial reception countries for refugees. It is but just 
that other countries should not allow these to bear the whole burden and by 
agreeing to admit a certain number of refugees to their territory should 
assume their equitable share.  
 
40 UNHCR The Refugee Convention 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a 
Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis (1990). (Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul 
Weis) 
41 Ibid. 
42 UN Secretary General: Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, ‘Status 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Memorandum by the Secretary-General (3 January 1950) 
UN Doc E/AC.32/2, Chapter II Admission, Article 3 para (2). 
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Interestingly, the Secretary General added: 
 
Clearly no binding and precise obligations can be imposed on Governments 
- for example by specifying the extent to which they must agree to receive 
refugees on their territory. It is for this reason that the Article includes the 
deliberately vague form of words: ‘a certain number of refugees’. 43 
 
The provision was, however, not welcomed by the negotiating parties, which 
made clear that the Refugee Convention was about the rights and the duties of 
states vis-à-vis the refugees. 44   France insisted that the words ‘international 
cooperation’ should remain in the Preamble of the Convention, as it did, because 
‘the protection of refugees’, when a state is faced with a mass influx ‘becomes a 
problem of assistance and if there is no international cooperation, the refugee 
problem cannot be solved’.45  Yet again, the French delegate was cautious to stress 
that the factual acknowledgement of the challenge the refugee problem places 
upon certain countries could not translate into a legal obligation for the 
international community to provide assistance.46  China openly objected to the 
proposed provision that ‘it was not in the position to accept refugees from other 
countries’. 47   The Canadian representative submitted that the distribution of 
 
43 UN Secretary General: Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, ‘Status 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Memorandum by the Secretary-General (3 January 1950) 
UN Doc E/AC.32/2 Chapter II Admission, Article 3 para (2) and following commentary. 
44 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 15.  
45 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 30. 
46 France’s advocacy on the inclusion of a refugee redistribution clause in times of crisis had 
as a purpose to safeguard its own liberal asylum policies at the time and the smooth 
application of the Convention in practice. Due to its geographical position, France had been 
historically a haven for many refugees at the time.  Travaux Preparatoires & Commentary, by 
Dr. Paul Weis, 19. 
47 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 18. 
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refugees should not even be in the Preamble, as the draft Convention provides for 
legal obligations towards refugees and thus ‘an acceptance of a decision on high 
policy was therefore unsuited to form part of a preamble to a convention 
conferring specified rights on specified categories of refugees’. 48   The U.S 
representative agreed with France that there should be in principle some sort of 
international cooperation for overwhelmed asylum countries, however, such a 
provision should not be included in the preamble of a legally binding instrument.49   
These extracts from the Travaux Preparatoires of the Refugee Convention 
demonstrate the then state of affairs -very much the same today- where 
responsibility sharing for refugees, in particular the admission of refugees into 
territories, is to be left at the discretion of each state and should not become a 
matter of international regulation.   
In addition, responsibility sharing faces practical challenges similar to other 
areas of global governance.  Betts uses the ‘suasion game’ analogy, an analytical 
tool from game theory to further exemplify the cooperation challenge between 
states.  The current power asymmetries between the Global South that hosts the 
refugees and the Global North that is relatively insulated from large refugee flows 
due to geography and the non-entrée measures mise en place reduces the 
incentives of the latter for increased participation in responsibility sharing.50  In 
addition, the absence of an obligation of responsibility sharing, allows the main 
financial contributors to refugee protection, i.e. the Northern states, to under-
contribute to protection and overcontribute towards border control. 51   The 
challenge is further aggravated by the increasing earmarking of any financial or 
 
48 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 18. 
49 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis,26. 
50 Betts, Protection by Persuasion, 14. Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’ 31. 
51 Jeff Crisp, ‘A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalisation, Migration and the Uncertain Future 
of the International Refugee Regime’ (2003) New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper 
No. 100 (Geneva UNHCR). 
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development assistance given to the Global South in accordance to donor states’ 
priorities and interests.52 
As a matter of international refugee law, developing host states have a strong 
obligation to provide protection to refugees in their territory, whilst assistance 
from the other parties of the refugee regime remains entirely discretionary.  53 
In light of this, it can be argued that the international refugee law regime is 
characterised by a structural unfairness on the way refugee responsibilities are 
shared between states. This further exemplifies the existing inequities between the 
Global North and the South, and negatively impacts on the quality of refugee 
protection. Hurwitz has also stressed the interdependence between fairness in 
interstate relations and the quality of refugee protection.  
 
 Because refugees do not, by definition, enjoy the protection of their state of 
origin, their protection falls upon the international community. The issue is 
not only important in terms of inter-state relationships and ensuring greater 
fairness in terms of the costs of hosting refugees, it is also crucial in order to 




52 Betts, Protection by Persuasion, 14. 
53 Alexander T Aleinikoff, Steven Poellot, ‘The Responsibility to Solve: The International 
Community and Protracted Refugee Situations’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 195, 213. 
54 Agnes Hurwitz ‘Norm-making in international refugee law’, (2012) 106 American Society 
of International Law Proceedings 430, 431. 
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1.4. Fairness ideas and the emergence of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ in recent global refugee policy 
instruments 
Facts and figures on the state of refugee protection outlined above, reveal how 
interstate relations and the quality of refugee protection are negatively impacted 
by having only a handful of states physically protecting the majority of the world’s 
refugees, without meaningful and equitable assistance by the international 
community.  
The implicit engagement of the New York Declaration in 201655 with ideas 
of fairness56 and the language of international environmental law’s principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, sparked 
the idea of this doctoral research, which started as an apory on the concept’s 
origins as well as an opportunity to address the perennial responsibility sharing 
gap of the international refugee law regime.   
In 2016, the international community of states adopted the New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which sought inter alia to identify ways 
to balance inequities in the way refugee protection responsibilities are shared and 
to meet the increasing assistance needs of the Southern host states.57  The adoption 
of the Declaration was hailed as a key moment in the recent history of global 
refugee protection,58 negotiated and endorsed by 196 States, setting inter alia the 
direction for global refugee policy in relation to responsibility sharing.   
 
55 UNGA Resolution ‘New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants’ UNGA A/RES/71/1 
71st session (19 September 2016). (New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants). 
56 David J Cantor, ‘Fairness Failure and the Refugee Regime’ (2019) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 627. 
57 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. 
58 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 19 September 2016, UN Headquarters. 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit  
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The Global Compact on Refugees followed and was adopted in 2018.59  
Interestingly, the Compact was originally intended to be titled ‘Global Compact 
on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees’, but in order to secure the widest 
consensus and, hence, adoption, the words ‘responsibility sharing’ were dropped 
from the title.60  Although non-binding,61 the Compact establishes certain political 
commitments with an objective to inter alia achieve ‘a more equitable and 
predictable burden and responsibility sharing with host countries and 
communities.’62   
Crucially for this thesis, the New York Declaration brought to the forefront 
of global refugee policy debates at the UN level, for the first time,63 the concept 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDRRC). Although the Declaration does not explicitly pronounce it, paragraph 
68 reads: 
 
We underline the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee 
protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of 
 
59 UNGA Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Part II Global 
Compact on Refugees (2 August 2018) RES A/73/12. (Global Compact on Refugees). 
60 See Zero Draft of the Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees, 30 June 
2016, http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/578369114/zero-draft- global-compact-
responsibility-sharing-refugees.html. The Compact was adopted with two objections by the 
United States and Hungary and two abstentions by Eritrea and Libya.  Filippo Grandi, ‘The 
Global Compact on Refugees: A Historic Achievement’ (2019) 57 International Migration 
UN IOM, 23. 
61 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 4. 
62 Global Compacts on Refugees, paragraph 4 and 15.   
63 The link to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC) of international environmental law in the language of New York 
Declaration and the Global Compact on Refugees has also been noted by Rebecca Dowd and 
Jane McAdam. Rebecca Dowd, Jane McAdam, ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility 
Sharing to Protect Refugees: What, Why and How’ (2017) 66 International and 
Comparatively Law Quarterly 863, 885. Rebecca Dowd and Jane McAdam, ‘International 
Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat Climate Change: Lessons from 
International Climate Change Law’ (2017) 18 Melbourne Journal of International Law 180.  
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refugees place on national resources, especially in the case of developing 
countries. To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we 
commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for 
hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of 
existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among 
States.64 
 
The language of CBDRRC made it into the Global Compact on Refugees.  In its 
opening statement the Compact reads: 
 
There is an urgent need for more equitable sharing of the burden and 
responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking 
account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources 
among States. Refugees and host communities should not be left behind.65  
 
The Compact is further operationalised by voluntary contributions to protection 
and solutions which they will be further determined: 
 
by each State and relevant stakeholder, taking into account their national 
realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national 
policies and priorities.66 
 
CBDRRC is a concept and principle of international environmental law, which 
guides and frames the responsibility sharing arrangements within multilateral 
 
64 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, para 68. Emphasis added. 
65 Global Compact on Refugees, para 1. 
66 Global Compact on Refugees, para 1 and 4. 
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environmental agreements. 67   It is said to be an application of fairness in 
international law,68 exemplified in the context of resource and benefit allocation 
between states of the Global North and the Global South as well as a tool that 
brings states together to cooperate in solving international problems in 
solidarity.69 It draws from the logic of differentiated commitments towards a 
common goal and objective.  
It is too early to assess the normative impact of the Global Compact on 
Refugees as a of soft law instrument on the development of international refugee 
law with respect to responsibility sharing.70   With the coronavirus pandemic 
having negatively impacted every phase of refugee protection, - from early 
assistance to asylum and solutions71 - the normative impact of the Compact will 
take considerably longer to assess.   
What can be said, however, is that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
CBDRRC is an inchoate concept of international refugee law and policy debate 
in the Global Compact era, 72  despite refugee scholars’ experimentation and 
engagement with the concept for the past thirty years.73  Even in light of the 
 
67 CBDRRC was first formulated as Principle 7 in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and 
Development, Annex I Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNGA 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (August 1992). See Chapter 4. 
68 Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Andriana Fabra, Ruth Mackenzie Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press 2018) 
69 Philippe Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of 
Inter-State Relations’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 549, 578. 
70 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen ‘The Normative Impact of the Global Compact on Refugees’ 
(2018) 30 International Journal of Refugee Law 605. 
71 World Economic Forum Message on 2020 World Refugee Day, A look at how COVID-19 
is affecting refugees and asylum seekers. Available at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/world-refugee-day-refugees-asylum-seekers-
coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-response/  
72 Dowd and McAdam, ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Protect 
Refugees: What, Why and How’, 888. 
73 James Hathaway and Alex Neve first introduced the idea of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ in refugee law scholarship in the 1990’s in their proposal for reforming the 
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Global Compact’s adoption and the laudable effort to operationalise responsibility 
sharing under new modalities, the central challenge of responsibility sharing 
remains unaddressed: this is the lack of a global responsibility sharing strategy 
and structure, as Aleinikoff describes it,74 and the absence of a codified obligation 
of responsibility sharing in international law. 
 Despite the weaknesses, it will be argued in this Thesis that the Global 
Compact on Refugees can indeed be seen as a step closer towards legal obligations 
on responsibility sharing. It can be seen as a stepping stone towards the de lege 
ferenda development of international refugee law to ultimately address the 
responsibility sharing gap.  This is for two reasons.  Firstly, ideas of fairness are 
prominently present in the global refugee policy instruments and debates for the 
first time.75  Secondly, the implicit engagement with the concept of CBDRRC 
both in the New York Declaration and the Global Compact cannot be overlooked. 
The concept thus warrants explicit discussion and conceptualisation in terms 
of what it entails for responsibility sharing.  Further clarification as to the precise 
nature of differentiation in states’ responsibilities is thus required.76  As argued by 
Gibney, fairness between states is an important normative goal of the international 
refugee protection regime. 77   A nexus between the need for fairness in 
responsibility sharing and the logic of CBDRRC has been made, albeit implicitly, 
 
international refugee law regime.  James C Hathaway and Alexander Neve, ‘Making 
International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution 
Oriented Protection’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115. See Literature Review 
1.6. below.  
74 Alexander T Aleinikoff, ‘The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees’ 
(2018) 30 International Journal of Refugee Law 611, 613. 
75 Cantor, ‘Fairness Failure and the Refugee Regime’ (2019) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 627. 
76 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Protect 
Refugees: What, Why and How?’, 888. 
77 Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’ 461.  It is be noted that Gibney uses the 
word justice instead of fairness. For a discussion on justice, fairness and equity and and their 
synonymous meaning international law, See Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
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in the Global Compact on Refugees. The thesis takes the challenge of making this 
nexus explicit by fleshing out an idea of fairness between states in the sharing the 
responsibility to protect refugees and by exploring how the principle of CBDRRC, 
adapted to the refugee context, can structure the long resisted responsibility 
sharing obligation in international law. 
 
1.5. Research Questions and Methodology 
Two main questions frame the research, which are further underpinned by sub-
questions.  
1. To what extent does international refugee law provide for a duty of states 
to cooperate to protect refugees? (Part I) 
a. How can the methodology of enlightened positivism inform the study 
of international cooperation and responsibility sharing in international 
refugee law? 
 
2. How can international refugee law expand and institutionalise a legal regime 
on refugee responsibility sharing? (Part II) 
a. What is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDRRC) in international environmental law, and 
what does it mean for the global responsibility sharing regime on climate 
change? 
b. How can the principle of CBDRRC be adapted to international refugee 
law? 
c. What legal design and what obligations would best suit an instrument on 
responsibility sharing? 
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1.5.1. Theorising Refugee Law 
This study adopts an enlightened positivist approach to the study of responsibility 
sharing in international refugee law.  Before laying out the details of what 
adopting an enlightened positivism methodology entails, it is considered 
important to begin with some preliminary remarks on refugee law scholarship and 
the various approaches to the study of refugee law.  
The way in which refugee scholars ‘theorise refugee law’78 is a first step 
before making a conscious choice on methodology.  Methodology is crucial too, 
as it lays bare, to quote Klabbers, ‘the set of assumptions each international lawyer 
has on what the world is like, and more specifically, what international law is 
like’.79   
A number of methodologies were considered for this research.  Some of them 
failed to convince, while some others were harder to dismiss. 80   Starting from the 
less convincing and moving on to the ones that could have potentially addressed 
the research questions, I will explain why enlightened positivism is the chosen 
methodology for this study. 
Traditionally, refugee law scholarship, like international law scholarship, has 
been dominated by the jurisprudence of legal positivism. 81   Under legal 
positivism, international refugee law is a self-contained regime of rules, 
objectively identified and applied by states and international organisations.82  In 
 
78 Helene Lambert, ‘Dominant and Emerging Approaches in International Refugee Law’ in 
Armstrong, D. (ed.) Routledge handbook of international law (London Routledge 2009) 344-
354. Emphasis in the original.  Harvey also observes that ‘[i]t is surprising that there has not 
been more thought given to the law in refugee law’.  Colin J Harvey, ‘Talking about Refugee 
Law’ (1999) 12 Journal of Refugee Studies 101, 108. Emphasis added in the original. 
79 Jan Klabbers International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017, second edition) 3. 
80 For an extensive overview of the various methodological approaches to international law 
more generally, See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Steven Ratner, ‘Symposium on Method in 
International Law, Appraising the Methods of International Law, A Prospectus for the 
Readers’ (1999) 93 The American Journal of International Law 291-302. 
81 Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies, a View from the South’, 352.  
82 Lambert, ‘Dominant and Emerging Approaches in International Refugee Law’, 344. 
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fact, legal positivism combined with a human rights approach to refugee law - 
with human rights denoting that the focus is on sources, and the content of rules 
and their enforceability83 - has been the dominant approach to the study of refugee 
law; at least the kind of scholarship undertaken by the majority of refugee 
lawyers.84  Under the human rights paradigm, international human rights law 
reinforces refugee protection providing a rights-based framework, thus giving full 
meaning to the ‘right to seek and enjoy asylum’ in international law.85  
Unsurprisingly, the positivist tradition to refugee law has not gone 
unchallenged by scholars of the critical legal studies.86  Amongst the critics, 
Chimni a proponent of the Third World Approaches (TWAIL) school of thought 
has criticised legal positivism for its ‘over reliance on the sources of law to 
validate a claim’ and its state-centered focus, ‘which eschews any engagement 
with politics’.87  TWAIL scholars contend that international law has developed to 
serve a ‘neo-liberal western vision of the world’ and, therefore, it is ‘playing a 
crucial role in helping legitimize and sustain the unequal structures and 
processes’.88  Specifically to the refugee context, it has also failed to articulate a 
 
83 Ibid.  
84 Legal positivism remains the main theoretical approach in the practice of international law 
taken by international lawyers. Robert Cryer, Tamara Harvey, Bal Sohki-Bulley, Alexandra 
Bohm, Research Methodologies in European and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 
38. 
85 Lambert ‘Dominant and Emerging Approaches in International Refugee Law, 348. The 
right to seek and enjoy asylum is explicitly provided in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 
1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
86 The term ‘critical legal studies’ is used here rather loosely. I do not distinguish between the 
various schools of critical studies, namely ‘post modernism’, ‘new stream’ and ‘Critical’ 
scholarship. For a detailed appraisal of the critical legal studies in international law, See 
Slaughter, Ratner, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law’ 291 and Andreas L Paulus, 
‘International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law? 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 727. 
87 Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South’ 353. 
88 Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South’, 369. 
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more comprehensive and humane response to the contemporary refugee problem 
through dialogue with the Third World.89  What is more, the positivist tradition to 
refugee law has been complicit to the justification of strategies of non-entrée 
measures and asylum restriction. 90   From the vantage point of critical legal 
studies, international law is not equipped to address the normative gap of 
responsibility sharing because positive international law ‘does not possess the 
means to respond to the tension between the right of the sovereign states to specify 
admission rules and the needs of people whose life and freedom are at risk’.91  
It is indeed true that legal positivist scholarship has contributed to a narrower 
conception of protection that does not recognise a right to be granted asylum.92  It 
is also true that the refugee regime faces various challenges in today’s forced 
displacement context; one of them being the reluctance of Northern states to 
welcome refugees in their territories in the first place.  No doubt, the critiques are 
essential and constructive.  Don’t they, however, reflect a rather pessimistic view 
on the project of international refugee law?93  Against a genuine disbelief of the 
potential of international law,94 critical approaches place ‘too much emphasis on 





92 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007), 414. 
93 Rosalyn Higgins poses the same question in the wider context of international law. Rosalyn 
Higgins, Problems and Process International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 
1995), 9.  
94 Paulus poses the following question: ‘Is the postmodern critique of any help ‘in a world 
grappling with terrorism, religious intolerance, social injustice, numerous human rights 
violations, (..)?’ Paulus, ‘International Law After Postmodernism’, 747. 
95 Harvey, ‘Talking about Refugee Law’, 104. 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 37 
summarized this eloquently: ‘They are all far better at identifying what is wrong 
in international law than providing a theoretical grounding for the way forward’.96  
Moving on, there is another discerning methodology, known as the policy-
oriented approach or the New Haven School.97  The policy-oriented approach was 
also considered a potential lens to approach the responsibility sharing gap, 
particularly because it makes explicit in its conception of law the existence of 
values,98 offering a prescriptive lens to the study of international refugee law.99  
Classic positivism has always dispensed with the social context and has insisted 
on the ‘separability thesis’, according to which, values and morals are irrelevant 
to law and to legal analysis.100  In response to ‘hard’ positivism, the policy-
oriented approach to international law, rooted in liberal political science that is 
normatively driven,101 places value considerations within the international legal 
process.102  It is committed to an analysis of international law as ‘an authoritative 
decision-making process, a system harnessed to the achievement of common 
values’ that as Rosalyn Higgins writes, ‘speak to us all’ unlike a body of 
objectively identified rules. 103 
 
96 Steven Ratner, ‘Ethics and International Law: Integrating the Global Justice Project(s)’ 
(2013) 5 International Theory 1, 9. 
97 Established by Harold Laswell and Myres McDougal in New Haven, Yale around the 
1940s. For a defence of this approach see, Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free 
Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (Martinus Nijhoff 1992). 
98 Higgins, Problems and Process, 9. 
99 Lambert, ‘Dominant and Emerging Approaches in International Refugee Law’, 345 
100 This thesis is expressed in Austin’s doctrine under which ‘the existence of law is one 
thing; the merit and demerit is another’. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (1832) Ed. W.E. Rumble (Cambridge University Press 1995),135. 
101 Onuf commented on the New Haven policy-oriented school of thought that ‘[b]y definition 
of course the critical movement is normatively driven. So too was the New Haven School and 
openly so.’ Nicholas Onuf, ‘International Legal Theory Where We Stand’, (1995) 
International Legal Theory 2, 3. 
102 Higgins, Problems and Process, 5. 
103 Higgins, Problems and Process, 9.  
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Certain risks identified with a policy-oriented approach to the study of 
refugee law were, however, hard to dismiss.  Firstly, if the purpose of refugee law 
is to serve and be driven by certain values as per the policy approach, then it begs 
the question of what values should be granted priority and guide the law and 
decision-making process in the refugee context?  What values should dominate 
the decision-making process in international law, where there is ample evidence 
of competing values and interests between states?  To use Koskenniemi’s 
argument, a policy-driven approach turns international law ‘into an uncritical 
instrument for the foreign policy choices of those whose power and privilege has 
put into decision making positions’. 104   As Hathaway contends, the policy–
oriented school of thought depletes international refugee law of the certainty 
required for ‘minimum at least accountability’ and ‘equates law with whatever 
norms are of value to the dominant states’.105  Rosalyn Higgins, draws her support 
and commitment to the policy-based school through legal positivism’s failure and 
inability to ‘respond in situations when there is a question of lacunae in law’.106   
International legal positivism has, over the years, softened significantly.  To 
use a vivid quote, legal positivism is not anymore equated with ‘old fashioned, 
conservative, continental European nineteenth century views - naïve ideas of dead 
white males on the objectivity of law and morals’.107  The next section introduces 
 
104 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protests too Much Kosovo and the Return to Ethics 
in International Law’, (2002) 54 The Modern Law Review 159. 
105 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees in international Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2005), 20. 
106 Higgins, Problems and Process,10. 
107 This fascinating answer was given in the introductory paper co-authored by Bruno Simma 
and Andrea Paulus when invited to present their own positivist view at the Symposium on 
Method in International Law. Bruno Simma, Andreas L Paulus, The Responsibility of 
Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist’s View (2004) 36 
Studies of Transnational Legal Policy 23. 
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‘enlightened’ positivism, a modern and softer version of legal positivism, 
developed by Bruno Simma and Andrea Paulus.108  
 
1.5.2. Enlightened positivism   
Positivism like, any other epistemological method, has undergone considerable 
development since 19th century, when it first emerged and established itself as the 
dominant jurisprudential school.109  Having to respond to the rapid developments 
of international law in 20th century, legal positivists reinvented their approach to 
international law. 110   Modern versions of legal positivism espouse a more 
progressive view of the role of international law, whilst eschewing the 
deficiencies of the classic legal positivism highlighted by its very critics.  They 
all share the premise that ‘contemporary international law cannot any more claim’ 
or, better afford, to be value free.’111  This is evident in the role of international 
human rights law and, in particular, the issue of the extraterritorial application of 
human rights, where positivists view the state as a ‘guardian’ of cosmopolitan 
 
108 Simma and Paulus ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts: A Positivist’s View’, 25. 
109 Cristian J Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Use of Force’ in Jean D’Aspremont, Jorg 
Kammerhofer (eds) International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (CUP 2014), 507.   
110 Tams & Tzanakopoulos, ‘Use of Force’ 512.  My intention is not to trace the evolution of 
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seek to defend that legal positivism, despite its criticisms for being state centric and rigid has 
evolved to a dynamic methodology relevant to frame contemporary international law and 
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methodology of legal positivism today, See Kammerhofer & Jean D’Aspremont, 
International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World. 
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values.112  Over the years, modern positivists began to engage, even if implicitly, 
with certain aspects of morality.113   
In the scholarship of Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, one comes across a 
discernible version of modern positivism, which reflects the thesis that 
international law, is not, and cannot be independent of the political and social 
context in which it operates.114   Throughout his scholarship, Simma has put 
forward and defended the argument that an international community of states 
exists with shared values and interests and that community ‘comprises not only 
States, but in the last instance of all human beings’.115  He argues that it is this 
awareness of community interests ‘has begun to change the nature of international 
law profoundly’.116  This argument can be said to reflect a cosmopolitan thinking 
in international law, even if fortified behind the veil of legal positivism.117  Hart 
for instance, a proponent of legal positivism, recognises that determining the 
actual state of the law, the moral views of states are a relevant consideration.118  It 
is this enlightened, softer form of positivism, that  that offers the refugee law 
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scholar with both a descriptive and prescriptive lens to the study of the law - the 
latter particularly useful to the study. 
 
1.5.3. The use of enlightened positivism in this thesis – From lex lata to lex 
ferenda 
The realisation of the existence of community interests in international law 
prompts to consider whether refugee protection, and as a result international 
refugee law, indeed reflect a community interest.   Simma has defined community 
interests as 
 ‘a consensus according to which respect for certain fundamental values is 
not to be left at the free disposition of States individually or inter se but is 
recognised and sanctioned by international law as a matter of concern to all 
States’.119   
 
If refugee law reflects and serves, and this is a claim that will be pursued in the 
thesis, a community interest, then responsibility sharing is one pathway of 
realising the effective protection of this community interest.  As mentioned 
earlier, responsibility sharing has been predominantly viewed by states as an issue 
of exclusive discretion, particularly with respect to physical sharing that entails 
physical relocation and admission of refugees.  The inherent political nature of 
responsibility sharing as it has been rightly described,120 therefore shapes and 
dictates responses.  A direct result of this acknowledgment is that the hard lines 
between international law and international politics begin to blur.  If fairness 
between states constitutes a critical element of international refugee law and a 
normative goal of the Refugee Convention as Gibney argues, responsibility 
 
119 Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’, 236 -237. 
120 Delmi Report ,‘A Fair Share’, 18. 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 42 
sharing is thus essentially a process of marshalling states’ competing interests121 
against an idea of fairness, however elemental.   
The enlightened positivist is comfortable, if not eager, to explore the extent 
to which the protection of refugees manifests the existence of a community 
interest as well as engage with an idea of fairness for responsibility sharing, that 
will ultimately shape the rules or principles that can realise the community 
interest.122  This is where the prescriptive lens of the enlightened positivist toolkit 
becomes useful.  To be sure, the enlightened positivist distinguishes in the 
analysis of the law between what the law is (lex lata) and what the law should be 
(lex ferenda).  The ‘enlightened positivist’ approach to the study of responsibility 
sharing does not, however, end with the description of what the law is.  Having 
said this, identifying the state of international refugee law with regard to 
responsibility sharing is the first logical step.  When faced with a lacuna, in this 
case the normative gap on responsibility sharing, the enlightened positivist goes 
further, into lex ferenda undertakings, studying how the law should be like and 
how it could look like.  As one international environmental lawyer writes: 
 
The day has passed, however, when any lawyer seriously thinks that his or 
her task is simply to describe the law as it is. Domestic lawyers play an 
important role in developing new legislation, and international 
environmental lawyers play a comparable role in negotiating treaties. 
Questions of legal design are prescriptive rather than doctrinal in character 
but are of central concern to international lawyers.123  
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To this end, this study consciously switches from the descriptive lens in Part I that 
identifies and rigorously discusses the current state of international refugee law 
on responsibility sharing, to the prescriptive lens of exploring de lege ferenda, a 
CBDRRC framework and a legal design that can effectively structure the missing 
responsibility sharing partnership between states. 
The de lege ferenda part of the thesis begins with a detailed study of the 
principle of CBDRRC in environmental law.  In the words of Thomas Franck, 
international environmental law ‘is a field of much normative and institutional 
creativity, making it an enlightening illustration of the fairness problematique in 
contemporary international law’. 124   In addition to illustrating the fairness 
problematique in contemporary international law, the study of international 
environmental law is an integral part of the thesis’ methodology and serves 
towards the de lege ferenda development of international refugee law.  
International environmental law is a prominent area of international law where 
community interests are manifested in its legal regimes. Its parallel study serves 
to gain a well-rounded understanding of the CBDRRC principle’s rationale, 
conceptual elements and limitations.  It serves also an understanding as to why 
and how fairness considerations between states are inherent to responsibility 
sharing and instrumental to the realisation of the community interests 
international law reflects.   
  
1.5.4. Sources 
The primary international law sources used in the study are international 
conventions, international custom and general principles of law. 125   Further 
 
124 Thomas Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford University Press 
1995), 355. Footnote omitted.  
125 Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945), Article 38. (ICJ Statute) 
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pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
secondary sources such as judicial decisions and the teaching of publicists are also 
relied upon to supplement the legal analysis.126  
The interpretation of all the relevant legal provisions faithfully abides by 
the rules enshrined in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.127  A textual approach is adopted, where a good faith interpretation of 
all relevant provisions is made in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to terms in light of the instrument’s object and purpose.128  
The study also draws upon soft law principles as an aid to the interpretation 
of certain legal provisions.  Soft law principles, for example, the principle of 
responsibility sharing or the principle of solidarity in international refugee law, in 
contrast to rules that prescribe certain conduct, are open-textured in their 
formulation.129  However, they are capable of producing certain legal effects in 
international law,130 deriving their authority from the continuous endorsement of 
states before various fora.131  International environmental law has an abundance 
of soft law principles, which progressively, either became part of customary 
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127 Vienna Convention Law of Treaties (3 May 1969) (Entered into force on 27 January 1980) 
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international environmental law, 132  or were codified in legally binding 
instruments.133   
Soft-law instruments are also used in the legal analysis.  Despite their non-
legally binding form, they can affect legal perception. 134   The 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development not only codified existing 
international law, but sought to provide new law.135  For example, at the time of 
writing, the Global Compact on Refugees plays a norm-preserving role within the 
international refugee regime, which might turn into a norm-creating role in 
future. 136   For instance, if general state practice followed by opinio juris is 
crystallized. 137  Soft law instruments like UN General Assembly Declarations and 
Resolutions, the ECOSOC resolutions 138  and the UN Security Council 
Resolutions interpret and amplify the UN Charter,139 and can represent reflections 
of states’ collective opinio juris over certain matters.  In international refugee law, 
the UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection and the Conclusions of its 
Executive Committee are all relevant to the identifying and interpreting the law 
 
132 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in its Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States and Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect 
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persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion Order of 1 
February 2001) page 41, para 135. 
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the 1992 Rio Declaration. See further Chapter 4. 
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as they reflect states’ collective opinio juris over matters of international 
protection.  Broadening the scope of the legal analysis to include soft-law 
instruments and norms does not automatically turn these into international law 
per se.  It rather accepts these documents as either, reflecting existing law or being 
capable of developing into law, depending on the case. 
 
1.6. Literature review and contribution to knowledge 
The responsibility sharing gap has been very well-documented in refugee law 
scholarship.  Goodwin-Gill and McAdam refer to it as a ‘responsibility deficit’ 
of the Refugee Convention, 140  Hathaway sees it as an ‘implementation or 
operational gap’ of the international refugee law regime,141  and Betts as a 
‘systemic and longstanding gap’.142  Scholarship from International Relations 
(IR) on forced migration has also contributed to the better understanding of the 
challenges faced in responsibility sharing, particularly when these are viewed 
within the wider North – South relations.  Hans, Suhrke and Einarsen for 
instance, have put forward accounts for refugee responsibility sharing in the 
likes of a collective insurance scheme.143  Meanwhile, Suhrke, Betts and Noll 
have applied game theory and accounts of global public goods in their analysis 
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of the challenges inherent in international cooperation and responsibility 
sharing, such as the problem of free riders and non-compliance.144   
The focus of this review is on the major scholarly works on responsibility 
sharing that have sought to fill the responsibility sharing gap by proposing either 
implicitly or explicitly the idea of differentiated responsibilities to refugee 
protection as contributions to responsibility sharing.  These proposals range 
from formal to informal and propose legal and non-legal ways for improving 
responsibility sharing in refugee matters.  Importantly, the objective of the 
review is not to present all academic work on responsibility sharing – such a 
task would need a study of its own - but rather to identify the shortcomings in 
the knowledge of refugee law scholars in relation to proposals on CBDRRC and 
position the thesis within the wider academic responsibility sharing debate in 
the new ‘Global Compact era’. 
Scholarly proposals to remedy the responsibility sharing gap date back to the 
1960’s.  The preeminent international refugee law scholar Grahl-Madsen who also 
served as a Special Consultant in the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees in 1962-63, was the first to focus on responsibility sharing and to 
suggest his own model in the form of a plan for the redistribution of refugees.145  
His thesis was that the Refugee Convention should not be amended to 
accommodate provisions on the sharing of refugees, as such effort would lead to 
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unintended and undesirable outcomes.146  For the problem of the overburdened 
first asylum countries in Europe at the time, he called for enhanced solidarity from 
Western European states, achieved via a regional agreement between the Member 
States of the Council of Europe that would commit them to accept pre-determined 
national quotas of asylum seekers for each calendar year.147  In his ‘Plan for 
Distribution of Refugees’, aiming at relieving the unduly heavy burden upon 
countries of first asylum, Grahl-Madsen suggested a distributive key for the 
national quotas of the Member States parties to the Plan.  The suggested key was 
the gross national product (GNP), which according to him was indicative of a 
country’s size and absorptive capacity.148  He encouraged states to adopt liberal 
policies on admissions for resettlement purposes in the form of agreements that 
would define the proportional basis for a regional distribution.149  Grahl-Madsen’s 
thesis was that predetermined binding refugee quotas at the regional level would 
be the best way to tackle disproportionate refugee distribution.150   
BS Chimni also proposed pre-allocated quotas on the basis of objective 
criteria such as total land mass and population density.151  Gibney too in his 
account on how to realise justice between states in the way protection refugee 
responsibilities are allocated suggested  the adoption of criteria such as a state’s 
integrative capabilities that can measure a fair share against objective metrics of 
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different criteria, essentially embrace the logic of differentiation that would result 
in states’ differentiated contributions to refugee protection. 
Hathaway has published a series of articles on responsibility sharing since 
1991 - one of them co-authored with Alexander Neve - in which the authors 
submitted a detailed proposal for a holistic reform of the international refugee law 
regime.153  The 1997 proposal was the result of almost six years of research, that 
culminated from prominent international refugee scholars, social and political 
scientists, policy makers, and international conferences.154  Hathaway still today 
reiterates and defends his thesis, which remains unchanged in its major themes. 
For this reason, this study discusses it holistically.  
 Hathaway and Neve were the first scholars to explicitly introduce a 
framework of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 155  to guide the 
responsibility sharing effort in international refugee law.  The major failing of the 
Convention, according to the authors, had been ‘the absence of a common 
operational mechanism, in particular one that would ensure that protection 
burdens and responsibilities are fairly shared among states.’156   
The core thesis is a legally binding UN administered allocational system 
developed upon a notion of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. 157  The 
authors argue that this much needed operational mechanism would ensure that 
protection burdens and responsibilities are fairly shared among states.158  Under 
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their proposal, states in refugee regions of origin would provide asylum for the 
duration of risk, whilst northern states outside the region, would be legally bound 
to support the system through funding and development assistance.159  Beyond 
funding, northern states would additionally provide resettlement for those 
refugees, who after five years in the country of asylum cannot be repatriated or 
locally integrated.160  The main responsibility sharing task of the Northern states 
would therefore be resettlement only – ‘a common, but differentiated, 
responsibility’.  Hathaway and Neve explained that their framework caters for 
prima facie inequities in responsibility sharing allocations,161 striking a balance 
between meeting the responsibility to protect and shouldering the costs of 
protection.162   
In their proposal, the authors do not engage with an idea of fairness nor do 
they flesh out a normative rationale for such differentiation, despite their proposed 
framework seeking to allocate responsibilities between states in a fair manner.  
They also do not engage with questions of legal design, namely what would be 
the nature of the legal obligations codified and what legal architecture would 
better suit the operational mechanism proposed.  Hathaway only, in a recent 
critique of the Global Compact on Refugees in 2019, explained that his proposal 
would entail the conclusion of a binding legal instrument, in the likes of an 
optional protocol, ‘that would come into force as soon as a critical mass of 20 or 
30 States were on board’.163  
 Hathaway’s proposal despite its fond critics,164 was innovative at the time 
and remains relevant too to current responsibility sharing debates given that an 
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idea of CBDRRC is found in the language of the Global Compact on Refugees.  
Interestingly, Hathaway does not seem to detect the language of international 
environmental law’s concept in the Global Compact on Refugees.  This is, 
perhaps directly linked to the premise of Hathaway’s ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ theory, which is distinct to the principle of CBDRRC of 
international environmental law.  As a result, he does not engage with the 
sophisticated fairness debates surrounding CBDRRC and the way it frames 
environmental protections as a matter of Global North and South responsibility 
sharing. 
Another detailed proposal on refugee responsibility sharing that implicitly 
calls for a logic of differentiated responsibilities to refugee protection belongs to 
Schuck.  Schuck suggested a regional or subregional, consent-based scheme of 
responsibility sharing that would seek to institutionalise and strengthen ‘the 
manifestly weak responsibility sharing norm’.165  An international agency would 
calculate a worldwide total sum of refugees who require protection and permanent 
resettlement and then allocate those totals to participating states by assigning 
binding quotas to each of them.166  States receiving the quotas on the basis of their 
national wealth would either implement them and provide protection or 
resettlement, or if wanted, transfer them to another state willing to assume them 
in exchange for compensation and other commodities. 167   Shuck does not 
explicitly pronounce on the language of CBDRRC either, although his proposal 
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essentially advocates for differentiated contributions on the basis of each state’s 
national wealth and capabilities.   
Naturally, the interests of refugee scholars and policy makers in 
responsibility sharing ebbs and flows. A renewed interest on the subject matter 
emerged after the Syrian exodus that resulted in large numbers of Syrian refugees 
in immediate need of international protection and assistance. The interest in 
responsibility sharing responses was strengthened during the large-scale arrivals 
of migrants and refugees from Africa to Europe in 2015-2016.  In 2015 and 2016, 
refugees arrived at European shores, so the need for allocating responsibility for 
those arriving became a priority to European national and supranational agendas.  
These events, combined with the fact that attention turned to the negotiations for 
the conclusion of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants at UN 
level, had as a result, responsibility sharing to become even more politicised.  
As a result of the need for urgent policy and planning at the UN level, 
academic interest grew following the adoption of the New York Declaration on 
Migrants and Refugees. The Declaration, as already mentioned, aimed inter alia 
at addressing the responsibility sharing gap of the Refugee Convention.  
 Catalan-Flores, building on Hathaway’s reformulation proposal explores the 
theoretical and practical reformulation of the notion of responsibility sharing 
throughout the years using the doctrine of CBDRRC as the lens for assessing past 
responsibility sharing arrangements.168  His conclusion is that CBDRRC due to 
its focus on contextual differentiation is a well-suited tool to address the practical 
issues raised by responsibility sharing schemes of the past.169 
Dowd and McAdam, in two journal articles have turned to international 
environmental law and the legal regime on climate change for lessons and insights 
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for international cooperation to protect refugees.  The authors compare and 
contrast the concepts of international cooperation and responsibility sharing in the 
two fields of law through the perception of individual states .170  Their objective 
is to provide a unique insight into the meaning of these two terms ‘from the 
perspective of individual states, which cannot be gleaned from collective 
statements or formal instruments’ at the UN or regional fora.171  As a result, they 
do not put forward a concrete proposal for filling in the responsibility sharing gap.  
Rather, they caution refugee law scholars to fully explore the principle of 
CBDRRC and encourage its further conceptualisation and adaptation in 
international refugee law.172  In their view: 
 
It is fair to say that the concept of CBDRRC is far more nuanced than some 
international refugee lawyers may appreciate, and its intricacies have not yet 
been explored in the protection context. Indeed, it tends to be invoked in a 
very rudimentary and literal way - namely, that because states' capacities 
vary, so, too, should their contributions to global refugee protection. 
Precisely what this might look like, and how it would (or would not) reflect 
the much more sophisticated iterations of the principle in the climate change 
context, is a long way from being debated, let alone determined. 
 
This thesis takes up this challenge of adapting CBDRRC to the specificities of 
refugee protection and suggests how it might be formulated and implemented in 
international refugee law. 
For the sake of completeness, the proposals of two scholars whose research 
has been contemporaneous to the thesis are worth mentioning in the review.  
 
170 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’,186. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., 199. 
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Harley has proposed moving towards legal commitments with regard to 
resettlement and refugee financing.173  This would gradually replace the current 
ad hoc and voluntary nature of the current contributions to responsibility sharing.  
In terms of refugee finance, he recommends a binding arrangement that would 
secure humanitarian funding for refugees through the amendment of UNHCR’s 
Statute, or through the creation of a global refugee fund where states would 
contribute in accordance with their capacities to pay. 174   With regard to 
resettlement, Harley submits that an obligation to resettle would be best reflected 
in an additional protocol on resettlement or another instrument on resettlement 
that would allocate quotas to states based on agreed fairness indicators.175  He 
suggests addressing the financial and physical components of responsibility 
sharing separately, as there is a relatively clear normative understanding between 
states on the scope and meaning of resettlement in contrast to other forms of 
physical responsibility sharing.176   
Wall has developed an innovative proposal on addressing the responsibility 
sharing gap of the Refugee Convention through the adoption of a ‘Framework 
Convention on Responsibility Sharing’. 177   In his proposed Convention, the 
responsibility sharing norm would be expressed through a redrafting of 
international environmental law’s CBDRRC principle as the latter is posited in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).178  
Wall proposes the following wording: 
 
173 Tristan Harley, ‘Innovation in Responsibility Sharing for Refugees’, World Refugee 
Council Research Paper No. 14 (May 2019), 1. 
174 Ibid., 12. 
175 Ibid., 13. 
176 Ibid., 13. 
177 Patrick Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’ (2017) 2 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 201, 220. 
178 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted May 1992, entered 
into force March 1994) UNTS 1771. Article 4. 
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States should share the responsibility for providing adequate protection to 
and durable solutions for the world’s refugees, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.179 
 
Wall’s proposal was contemporaneous to the negotiations of a Global Compact 
on Refugees, and in the same spirit of voluntarist framework, he refrains from 
suggesting the codification of legal obligations of responsibility sharing.  
Although he heavily draws, like this thesis, on international environmental law 
and the legal regime on climate change, he does so from a different angle.  His 
focus is on the framework convention as a model architecture and as a legal design 
for incremental regime building.    Wall’s proposed Framework Convention does 
not codify any legal obligation for the parties offering very low barriers to entry.180  
Indeed, the only obligation of the parties -which does not appears to a legal one- 
would be 'to participate in good faith in the meetings of the conferences of the 
parties, including by indicating the contribution that they are willing to make and 
reporting on the action they had taken to fulfil that commitment’.181  A framework 
convention would provide a formal institutional structure for responsibility 
sharing and a permanent forum of discussion.182  While I do share the need for a 
formal institutional structure and a bottom-up approach to responsibility sharing, 
as the only realistically feasible way of bringing responsibility sharing within 
international law,  I do also believe that a treaty on responsibility sharing should 
codify a light package of minimum legal obligations.  Alternatively, the structure 
 
179 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 220. 
180 Ibid, 230. 
181 Ibid,230. 
182 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 220. 
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that the international refugee law regime vitally and urgently needs, something 
that Wall rightly stresses, risks being left without substance. 183 
 
1.6.1. Contribution to knowledge 
To summarise, academic proposals on the responsibility sharing gap have 
proposed various legal and non-legal mechanisms, formal and informal structures 
and have either, implicitly or explicitly engaged, with the logic of differentiated 
commitments to refugee protection and solutions.  
What seems to be missing from academic proposals that put forward de lege 
ferenda arguments, is an explicit engagement with a notion of fairness between 
states which is integral to responsibility sharing as well as a concrete way of 
demonstrating practically how a CBDRRC framework might look like.  
International environmental law’s principle of CBDRRC is normatively rooted on 
fairness and carries within a sophisticated distributive justice problematique that 
regrettably has not made it to refugee law scholarship.184   
In their majority, scholars trace CBDRRC in international climate change 
law, overlooking the fact that the logic of differentiated legal obligation permeates 
many international law regimes from international trade to human rights law.185  
Furthermore, with the exception of Wall’s proposal, the study on CBDRRC in 
international environmental law opens up various innovative ways to 
institutionalise responsibility sharing in international law.  Here too, questions of 
legal design have not been sufficiently explored.  Even when scholars advocate 
or imply legal obligations of responsibility sharing, they do not sufficiently 
engage with how these obligations would be best designed and structured.  What 
 
183 Wall’s proposal is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
184 I emphasize on the refugee law as there are scholarly accounts on justice and refugee 
protection in the Ethics, Political Science and International Relations scholarship and which 
are discussed in the thesis.  We Lawyers, however, tend to engage only incidentally with 
concepts of fairness. 
185 See further Chapter 4. 
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would the nature of these obligation be in order to secure consensus?  Equally 
important, would implementation of responsibility sharing obligations be bottom-
up, inducing flexibility, or top-down, opting for prescription?  From a 
methodological point of view, questions of legal design are prescriptive but 
equally doctrinal and of central importance to de lege ferenda proposals. 
Beyond normative considerations of fairness, practical considerations as to 
whether there can be a universal agreement between states on the fairness 
indicators, such as for example macroeconomic metrics remains an open 
challenge. 
This study aims to remedy the afore-identified shortcomings.  The thesis’ 
contribution to the discourse is an explicit discussion and adaptation of the 
principle of CBDRRC to international refugee law, and a proposal for its 
operationalisation under a hybrid legal architecture that best suits the nature of 
responsibility sharing as an inherently political and complex matter.  It is also an 
attempt to introduce enlightened positivism to the study of international refugee 
law and frame refugee protection as a community interest as well as explore what 
the implication of that framing are.   
 Finally, the study contributes with offering a proposal on how to address 
these compelling fairness considerations within questions of legal design and 
through the medium of international law.  Lastly, I would say that this study is 
part of an emerging trend in refugee law scholarship that experiments and cross-
fertilises with international environmental law since the adoption of the New York 
Declaration on Migrants and Refugees.  
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1.7. Outline 
Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) is a doctrinal exploration of the international and regional 
instruments on international cooperation and responsibility sharing for refugees.  
Chapter 2 identifies and discusses the primary international law sources relevant 
to refugee protection, so as to explore to what extent international refugee law 
provides for a legal duty of states to cooperate in order to share responsibility for 
refugees.  Chapter 2 also discusses key regional refugee protection instruments 
that have institutionalised responsibility sharing, in legal and non-legal ways 
because they shed light on the nature of responsibility sharing in refugee 
protection.  The regional international protection frameworks of Africa, Latin 
America and the European Union complement, and have contributed to the 
progressive development of international refugee law, and therefore to the legal 
nature of responsibility sharing in refugee matters.   
Chapter 3 examines responsibility sharing in the practices of states to assess 
to what extent the legal duty of cooperation in international law has been 
implemented in good faith.  To this end, it discusses the Dublin Regulation under 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the EU cooperative arrangement 
with Turkey, the bilateral arrangement between Italy and Libya, Australia’s 
offshore processing arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru 
respectively, and finally, the US - Canada Safe Third Country Agreement.  The 
said arrangements are assessed in light of the deterrence and protection elsewhere 
paradigms, implemented under the legal device of ‘safe third country’.  The 
protection elsewhere paradigm provides a critical lens when examining the 
various regional sharing arrangements from the perspective of responsibility 
sharing.  This Chapter completes the analysis with the discussion of two past 
responsibility sharing arrangements, the Comprehensive Plan of Action for 
Indochinese Refugees (CPA) and the International Conference on Central 
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American Refugees (CIREFCA).  The aim is to pull the threads that contributed 
to the overall success of these two arrangements together and draw a somewhat 
‘universal’ lesson for the future of responsibility sharing. 
Part II (Chapters 4 and 5) of the thesis embarks on a de lege ferenda 
exploration of how international refugee law ought to develop to fill in the gap of 
the Refugee Convention under a formal structure of responsibility sharing that 
codifies a responsibility sharing obligation in international law. Chapter 4 is a 
study of international environmental law’s responsibility sharing arrangements, 
where the doctrine CBDRRC has been a fundamental building block in facilitating 
regime building in areas of common concern.  This Chapter discusses various 
instances of differential treatment between states in international law, it fleshes 
out the normative rationales for differentiation which are ideas of fairness in 
international law and examines how the logic of CBDRRC has been used and 
implemented in key multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  It then turns 
to international climate change law and discusses in detail the origins and 
trajectory CBDRRC took in the legal regime.  This Chapter concludes with a 
study of the legal architecture of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, as a 
model example of architectural legal design and a binding multilateral instrument 
on responsibility sharing that unfolds true potential for the de lege ferenda 
development of international refugee law. 
 Chapter 5 builds upon and completes what has been supported in the 
previous chapters, that the normative gap of the Refugee Convention cannot be 
satisfactorily and comprehensively addressed without a formal legal structure that 
codifies a minimum of responsibility sharing obligations.  To this end, it explicitly 
discusses and adapts the principle of CBDRRC to international refugee law, and 
suggests its operationalisation under a protocol of flexibly implemented bottom-
up responsibility sharing obligations tamed against a lightweight implementation 
and review framework.  This Chapter explores what legal design best suits the 
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nature of responsibility sharing - as an inherently political and complex matter- 
and what key obligations need to be codified.  In the process, it explicitly engages 
with a modest idea of fairness for the purposes of responsibility sharing, limited 
to what international law can do and realpolitik allows.  Finally, with the view 
that a protocol on responsibility sharing can only be part of the solution towards 
a better refugee protection regime, the Chapter concludes with ways to build the 
necessary political will required to fill in what has long been the Achilles heel of 
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2 The international and regional framework on international 




This Chapter begins with a note on terminology and definitional challenges before 
moving on to identifying and discussing the international legal framework of 
international cooperation and responsibility sharing in refugee matters.  Through 
a doctrinal analysis of the primary international law sources relevant to refugee 
protection, it explores the extent to which international refugee law serves a 
community interest and provides for a duty of states to cooperate in order to share 
refugee protection responsibilities.  To further shed light into the nature of the 
duty to cooperate in refugee matters, the Chapter discusses key regional refugee 
protection instruments that have institutionalised into various degrees 
responsibility sharing in legal and non-legal ways.  The regional asylum 
frameworks for Africa,186 Latin America and the European Union complement 
the progressive development of international refugee law,187 operating altogether 
under the international refugee law regime.  
 
 
186 ‘The present Convention shall be the effective regional complement in Africa of the 1951 
United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. OAU Convention, Article VIII para 2. 
187 This has been acknowledged explicitly in the context of Latin America. See 2004 Mexico 
Declaration and Plan of Action to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees in Latin 
America, Mexico City, (16 November 2004) and 2014 Brazil Declaration on ‘A Framework 
for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of 
Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Brasilia, (3 
December 2014). 
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2.2. Terminology and definitional challenges in the discourse of international 
cooperation for refugees 
Defining terms is an important starting point for a productive discussion of most 
issues.188  In the context of international cooperation and responsibility sharing 
for refugees, there are various terms, which are used interchangeably by states, 
UNHCR, academics and policy makers in the wider discourse of international 
cooperation in refugee matters.189   
The terms ‘international cooperation’, ‘solidarity’, ‘burden sharing’, and 
‘responsibility sharing’ are not always employed by the various actors under a 
shared conceptual understanding.  Indeed, international refugee law does not 
define any of these terms.  Hence, clarifying the existing terminology is not 
without challenge.  The mere fact that there is a varied terminology deployed with 
respect to international cooperation in refugee matters, is indicative of the 
complexity and, particularly the inherent political nature of the subject matter.   
A significant part of the debate surrounding these terms revolves around the 
connotations of each term.  ‘Burden sharing’ for instance has been criticised for 
the negative and prejudicial connotation of the word ‘burden’ in the context of 
refugees.190  Some commentators however have insisted that the term ‘burden 
sharing’ is terminologically more appropriate.  Noll wrote back in 1997, that 
despite the negative connotation of the word ‘burden’, which implies that refugee 
protection is necessarily burdensome, burden sharing is preferred, since ‘[o]ther, 
better terminological alternatives, have failed to gain entry into the language used 
 
188 Benjamin Cook, ‘Method in its Madness: The Endowment Effect in an Analysis of 
Refugee Burden Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market’, (2004) 19 Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 333, 335. 
189 Inder, ‘The Origins of “Burden Sharing” in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime’ 
528.  Sukrhe ‘Burden Sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus 
National Action’, 399. Alexander Betts, Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Convention Plus as a Norm 
Setting Exercise’ (2007) 20 Journal of Refugee Studies 509, 533. 
190 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 664. 
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by the actors of international law’.191   Likewise, Inder, in a study on the origins 
of burden sharing through the Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, opts for the term ‘burden-sharing’ for the purposes of avoiding 
further terminological confusion.192 
The drafters of the 1951 Convention did not refer to ‘burden sharing’ but 
explicitly referred to ‘international cooperation’ and ‘solidarity’.193 The principle 
of solidarity permeates all areas of international law 194  and specifically with 
respect to refugees, the term appears in tandem with international cooperation in 
the Preamble to the Refugee Convention, underpinning thus the international 
refugee protection regime since its very beginning. 
 A principle of ‘burden sharing’ only began to emerge and crystallized in the 
1970’s with the onset of the Indochinese exodus.195  ‘Responsibility sharing’ on 
the other hand, enters the refugee protection discourse in the late 1990’s.196  Some 
commentators have seen this shift in terminology as ‘ill-advised’ and responsible 
for ‘obfuscating a better understanding of the normative content of burden sharing 
in practice’. 197   Yet, UNHCR, one of the biggest proponents of the term 
‘responsibility sharing’ deemed the inclusion of the term in the broader context of 
international cooperation for refugees in a positive light.  In one of its meetings 
 
191 Noll, ‘ “Prisoners Dilemma” in Fortress Europe: On the Prospects for Equitable Burden 
Sharing in the European Union’, 405, footnote 2. 
192 Inder, ‘The Origins of “Burden Sharing” in the Contemporary Refugee Protection 
Regime’, 530. 
193 Travaux Préparatoires & Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis. 
194 R McDonald, ‘Solidarity in Practice and the Discourse of Public International Law’, 
(1996) 8 Pace International Law Review 259. 
195 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No.15 ‘Refugees Without an Asylum Country’ 
(1979), para f ‘the principle of equitable burden sharing’.  
196 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 664. 
197 Inder, ‘The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime’, 
530. 
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during the Global Consultations on International Protection in 2001, UNHCR 
commented:  
 
‘The inclusion of “responsibility” along with “burden” sharing reflects a 
more positive image of refugees and a stronger framework for international 
cooperation [..]’.198  
 
Türk and Garlick further explain why ‘responsibility sharing’ is a more 
appropriate term in the refugee context.  Such wording contains an inherently 
positive value, ‘[a]s it casts refugees in a more favourable light as potential 
contributors and assets for their host societies and as the holder of rights that create 
correlating responsibilities for states’. Further, ‘ “responsibility” can be seen to 
imply legal obligations and a requirement to take positive actions.’199   
On the other hand, UNHCR has flagged the risk that extensive analysis on 
terminology, in light of the definitional imprecision, 200  if given too much 
linguistic attention, can eventually distract from substantive efforts on 
international cooperation in practice.  
 
[I]t was felt that lengthy discussions on terminology (especially on the merits 
of “burden” versus “responsibility”) at the expense of making concrete 
 
198 UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection ‘Mechanisms of International 
Cooperation to Share Responsibilities and Burdens in Mass Influx Situations’, 1st Meeting, 
EC/GC/01/7 (19 February 2001), para 1. 
199 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 665. 
200 Cook, ‘Method in its Madness, The Endowment Effect in an Analysis of Refugee Burden 
Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market’, 338. 
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progress on enhancing international cooperation in practice needs to be 
avoided.201  
 
States also have their preferences over what term they use.  Ireland’s Ambassador 
to the UN, David Donoghue, has shed light into how states made use of the various 
terms, during the New York Declaration and the Global Compact on Refugees.  
 
‘The concept of responsibility sharing is acceptable in effect to the Global 
North, it is not acceptable to states such as Russia, China, Egypt and other 
developing countries, they insist on burden sharing’.202 
 
Canada has even made use of the arguably more generous and symbolic term 
‘opportunity sharing’.203  In practice, states and UNHCR - the latter so as to appeal 
to the former - make use of the single term ‘responsibility and burden sharing’ 
before various fora,204 often for reasons of political and rhetorical expediency.205   
The recently adopted Global Compact on Refugees make use of all the 
known terms together.  As its guiding principles, the Global Compact states:  
 
 
201 UNHCR ‘International Cooperation to Share the Burdens and Responsibilities: Summary 
Conclusions’ (Expert Meeting, Amman, Jordan, 27-28 June 2011) Summary Conclusions Part 
A.  
202 David Donoghue, Closing Keynote Address at Annual Kaldor Conference ‘The Global 
Compacts on Refugees and Migration’, November 2017, available on YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCwEMmqNQHM, 8:14.  
203 Antonio Guterres, 'Closing Remarks at the Session of the 66th Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme' speech delivered on the 9th October 2015, available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/excom/speeches/562f4a5415/closing%20remarks-%2066th-
session-executive-committee-high-commissioners-programme.html  
204 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Protect 
Refugees: What, Why and How?’, 871. 
205 Inder, ‘The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime’, 
530. 
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The global compact emanates from fundamental principles of humanity and 
international solidarity and seeks to operationalize the principles of burden - 
and responsibility-sharing to better protect and assist refugees and support 
host countries and communities. 206 
 
With respect to the term ‘international cooperation’ no widely accepted agreement 
on its content in international law exists.  Although variously used and deeply 
embedded in the UN edifice and language across all areas of UN interest, the term 
and its scope remains undefined.207  Wolfrum, in his authoritative article on the 
Law of International Cooperation, defined international cooperation as ‘the 
voluntary coordinated action of two or more states under a legal regime to 
accomplish a specific objective by joint action’.208  
Given the vast spectrum of activities than can arguably fall within the scope 
of ‘international cooperation’ and given that as a concept it has been rightly 
described as ‘inherently opaque’,209  a single universal definition could prove 
difficult to agree upon.  That said, some conceptual clarity can be offered if 
‘international cooperation’ is seen as a broader concept than ‘responsibility or 
burden sharing’, the former which can also encompass cooperative action that 
results in shifting rather than sharing of the responsibility. 210   Against this 
background, ‘responsibility sharing’ or ‘burden sharing’ can be conceptually 
understood as a specific objective, one goal of international cooperation in refugee 
matters.   
 
206 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 5.  
207 ‘The term cooperation has never been defined by an international treaty or a resolution of 
an international organization’. Rüdiger Wolfrum Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, Cooperation, International law of available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1427  
208 Ibid. 
209 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 216. 
210 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’, 20. 
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As explained above, in terms of relevance, both ‘responsibility sharing’ and 
‘burden sharing’ are equally accepted and used by states and other actors in 
international refugee law and policy.  Against this background, the thesis opts for 
the term ‘responsibility sharing’ first and foremost because of the positive value 
it casts on refugees.  Secondly, for it denotes, most emphatically and succinctly, 
that states have responsibilities towards refugees, responsibilities that as Garlick 
and Turk assert, ‘imply legal obligations and positive actions’. 211   Thirdly, 
because the Global Compact on Refugees, even if non-binding, frames the 
predicament of refugees as the ‘common concern of humannkind.212 In light of 
this framing, the thesis opts for responsibility sharing, 213  understood as an 
objective of international cooperation in refugee matters, the scope of which will 
be fleshed out in the subsequent Chapters.  
 
2.3. The duty of states to cooperate under the international refugee law regime 
2.3.1. The UN Charter 
A general duty of states to cooperate is firmly rooted in the United Nations 
Charter.  The Charter, concluded in 1946, five years before the conclusion of the 
Refugee Convention, is the primary source on multilateralism, harmonisation and 
international cooperation between states.214  The UN Charter is the closest the 
international community has ever come to ‘a written constitutional document’.215  
It brings the aspirational concept of the international community from ‘an abstract 
notion to something approaching an institutional reality.’216  Simma and Paulus  
 
211 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 665. 
212 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 1. 
213 Having identified the terminology use, the Thesis proceeds with the use of responsibility 
sharing without the hyphen. 
214 Charter of the United Nations 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Article 1(4). (UN Charter) 
215 Bruno Simma & Andreas L Paulus, ‘The International Community Facing the Challenge 
of Globalization’, (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 266, 274. 
216 Ibid., 274. 
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view the Charter as a reflection of community interests in international law and 
as a manifestation of Kantian cosmopolitan elements.   
 
The UN has an important impact on the shaping of common values, be it in 
the General Assembly or in convoking international conferences on a vast 
array of topics, which bring together non-governmental actors as well as 
governments. With its human rights regime, the UN also provides an 
institutional framework for the 'Kantian' elements in the inter-state system.217 
 
Under Article 1 (4) of the Charter, the United Nations is the centre for 
harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends.218  The 
provision captures therefore the essence of multilateralism.   Further, a positive 
duty of states to cooperate is expressed in the provision of Article 1 paragraph 3 
of the UN Charter, which prescribes that, among the purposes of the Charter, is to 
‘achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character’. 219  Such is the necessity of 
international cooperation to the United Nations that the Charter has a dedicated 
Chapter on International Economic and Social Cooperation.220   
The Charter in Article 56 explicitly prescribes to its Members ‘to pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization’ 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.221  The members of the 
UN ought to cooperate with the UN as an institution, as well as between 
themselves, in a constructive way and in compliance with the good faith duty of 
implementation.222  This good faith duty arguably precludes the development of 
 
217 Ibid. 
218 UN Charter, Article 1 (4). 
219 UN Charter, Article 1 (3). 
220 UN Charter, Articles 55-60. 
221 UN Charter, Article 56. 
222 VCLT, Article 26. 
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obstructive policies.223   Joint action shall be taken, inter alia, for the higher 
standards of living, full employment and conditions for social progress and 
development; for solutions of international economic, social, health and related 
problems and for universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex and religion.224  The 
provision of Article 55 legally obligates, not only the UN as an institution ‘but 
also the member states to respect and protect human rights’. 225   It is this 
international concern for human rights that have made the relationships of states 
vis a vis its citizens and aliens on their territories and abroad the subject of 
community interests.226 
The general duty of states to cooperate with each other and with the United 
Nations in the realisation of community interests is thus firmly rooted in the UN 
Charter.  Yet the formulation of Article 55 is rather made in programmatic terms. 
‘[I]t describes purposes and not substantive obligations to be achieved by means 
of cooperation’.227  Having said this, these provisions constitute the point for 
sketching the subsequent legal frameworks on international cooperation and 
responsibility sharing in the various areas of joint action under UN Charter.228  
The United Nations General Assembly Declaration of Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States,229 while non-legally binding, reaffirms ‘the duty of 
 
223 Bruno Simma (ed) Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol II, ‘Chapter IX: 
International Economic and Social Co-operation’, Article 56, at 942. (Simma, UN Charter 
Commentary) 
224 UN Charter, Article 55 (a), (b), (c). 
225 Simma, UN Charter Commentary, Article 55, at 920. 
226 Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interests, 243. 
227 Simma, UN Charter Commentary, Article 56, at 943. 
228 Tally Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not in My Backyard, On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in 
Refugee Law’ (2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 355, 376. 
229 UNGA Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 4 
October 1970, UNGA A/RES/2625(XXV). 
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states to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter’.230  The 
Declaration also states that ‘the principles embodied in this Declaration constitute 
basic principles of international law’ that guide states’ international conduct in 
their mutual relations.231  Although the Declaration is a soft law instrument, it is 
arguably the most authoritative statement made by the General Assembly on the 
UN Charter - and thus it is endowed with added normativity, if not constitutional 
status similar to the Charter.232   
 
2.3.2. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
A duty of states to cooperate in the wider context of forced displacement is 
recalled in the 2030 Agenda for Development. 233  The Agenda consists of a 
Declaration, 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) and 169 associated targets.  
Goal 1, on eradicating poverty and building the resilience of the poor and the most 
vulnerable, is of interest to the refugee context.  Paragraph 23 of the Agenda reads:  
 
People who are vulnerable must be empowered. Those whose needs are 
reflected in the Agenda include all children, youth, persons with disabilities 
(…) refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants (..).   
 
Paragraph 29 reads:  
 
 
230 Ibid., Annex, Principle d.  
231 Ibid, 3. 
232 Ronald ST McDonald, ‘The Charter of the United Nations as a World Constitution’ ‘The 
Charter of the United Nations as a World Constitution’ in Schmitt MN (eds), ‘International 
Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green On the 
Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday’ (2000) 75 International Law Studies 263, 280.  
233 UNGA A/RES/70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’, (21 October 2015). (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). 
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We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular 
migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment 
of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced 
persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of 
communities hosting refugees particularly in developing countries.234 
 
The Declaration is non-binding in international law and hence does not impose 
any legal obligation, nor sets any concrete normative expectations.  It merely 
establishes a programme for action, strengthening the narrative of international 
cooperation in areas of UN joint action, including in the management and 
resolution of forced displacement. In this sense, the Declaration of Sustainable 
Development is very much an enlightened positivist project where joint action 
towards protection of community interests is manifested in a set of goals and 
indicators.235    
 
2.3.3. The duty to cooperate in the realization of community interests  
To this point, the reading of the relevant UN Charter provisions and UN GA 
Declarations establishes that international law provides for a general, albeit 
vaguely worded, duty of states to cooperate in the various areas of joint action 
under UN, whose more specific dimensions are further exemplified in the various 
treaty-based legal regimes. 236   
The provisions of the UN Charter in relation to international cooperation on 
human rights represent a universal consensus on the existence of community 
interests in international law.  Wolfrum elaborates on this further: 
 
234 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
235 Eyal Benvenisti, G Nolte (eds) Community Interests across International Law (OUP 2018) 
6. 
236 Rüdiger Wolfrum Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, ‘Cooperation, 
International Law of ’.  (Last updated April 2010). 
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‘It can hardly be disputed that the protection of human rights is a community 
interest, and this entails corresponding obligations. The basis for this 
statement is the reference to human rights in the UN Charter, and the near 
universality of membership in the human rights treaties’.237 
 
It can then be observed that the identification of an issue as a reflection of 
community interest in international law requires an important element. A ‘quasi-
legislative decision of the international community’ as Wolfrum defined it, to 
construct a legal regime that serves the community interest. 238 Wolfrum adds a 
further qualification to this element, which is that the multilateral legal regime 
enacted must have widespread participation and crucially must be ratified by 
‘those states which are meant to carry the burden of implementing the 
obligations’. 239 
 
2.4. International refugee law as a reflection of community interest 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is possible or even warranted to speak of 
community interests in the context of international law on refugee protection.  An 
argument can be made that the Refugee Convention reflects a community interest, 
as human rights treaties arguably do,240 that is specially identified and served 
under a multilateral legal regime with near universal participation. Moreover, 
refugee protection can even be said to fall under ‘international peace and security’, 
the primary community interest served by international law and the United 
 
237 Rudinger Wolfrum, ‘Identifying Community Interests in International Law: Common 
Spaces and Beyond’, in E Benvenisti and G Nolte (eds) Community Interests across 
International Law (OUP 2018), 29. 
238 Ibid., 20-21. 
239 Ibid., 20-21. 
240 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’ 243. 
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Nations.241 Simma refers to the mass movements of refugees as one issue of wider 
security concerns that can destabilise neighbouring states or even entire 
regions.242  The argument on the community interest nature of refugee protection 
is further strengthened by the fact that such international protection has been 
entrusted to a specialized UN body, tasked as ‘the representative of the 
international community’.243  In the words of UNHCR:  
 
‘International protection provides the basic raison d’être for the creation of 
UNHCR. It is this international protection role which gives UNHCR its 
distinctive position among the agencies of the United Nations’. 244  
 
The link between UNHCR and states therefore is ‘an institutional link that joins 
states and UNHCR in the common pursuit of solutions and the protection of 
refugee rights’.245  This institutional link is further derived and strengthened from 
the UN Charter, regional refugee instruments, UNGA Declarations, including 
UNHCR’s Executive Committee Conclusions, state practice and adjudication of 
refugee rights before judicial fora.246 
The international protection regime is predicated upon the idea that states 
have a collective responsibility to protect refugees.247  If the responsibility to 
protect refugees is thus a collective one as it has been argued248  then it needs to 
 
241 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’, 236 
242 Ibid. 
243 Goodwin Gill McAdam, 1 
244 UNHCR Note on International Solidarity and Refugee Protection EC/SCP/50 (1988), para 
16. 
245 UNHCR Note on International Solidarity and Refugee Protection EC/SCP/50 (1988), para 
20.  
246 Kritzman Amir Community Interests in International Migration and Refugee Law,352 
247 Hurwitz ,‘Norm Making in International Refugee Law’ 2012 106 American Society of 
International law Proceedings 430, 431. 
248 A Hurwitz ‘Norm Making in International Refugee Law’ 2012 106 American Society of 
International law Proceedings 430, 431. 
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be somehow shouldered and shared by the international community.249  The next 
section will explore to what extent, if at all, the Refugee Convention, a multilateral 
treaty on the responsibilities of states vis-à-vis the refugees with widespread 
participation can be said to have been constructed so as to serve a  community 
interest.  It will explore in detail the nature of the duty of states parties under the 
regime to cooperate in matters of refugee protection as well as to what extent this 
duty further crystallises into an obligation of responsibility sharing.   
 
 2.4.1. The Refugee Convention  
The international dimension of refugee protection was explicitly recognised under 
the auspices of the United Nations during the negotiations for the establishment 
of the UNHCR.250  That said, the international nature of refugee flows has been 
recognised as early as the 1920’s, under the League of Nations and the Nansen 
International Office for Refugees.251  Under the auspices of the League of Nations, 
various group-based categories of refugees were recognised and subsequent 
interstate arrangements were concluded.  Initially established to provide legal and 
political protection to Russian refugees, the Nansen Office in the years to come 
extended its mandate to include Armenians, Assyrians, refugees from the Greco-
Turkish wars and, later, the Jews fleeing Germany.252   
 
249 T Kritzman Amir Community Interests in International Migration and Refugee Law,352 
250 The UNGA Resolution establishing UNHCR recognized that international protection of 
refugees is the responsibility of the United Nations and that ‘the problem of refugees is 
international in scope and nature’. UNG A/Res/319 (IV) ‘Refugees and Stateless Persons’ (3 
December 1949). 
251 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 16. 
252 Arrangement of 12 May 1926 relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and 
Armenian Refugees League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2004. Convention of 
28 October 1933 relating to the International Status of Refugees, League of Nations, Treaty 
Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663.  Provisional Arrangement of 4th 1936 concerning the Status of 
Refugees coming from Germany 171 League of Nations Treaty Series No 3952. 
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The challenge the refugee problem poses upon the countries that provide 
asylum was explicitly recognised and acknowledged in the Refugee Convention. 
The need for international cooperation and solidarity is explicitly provided in the 
Preamble to the Convention, which further provides that the solution to an 
inherent international problem, such as the refugee requires international 
cooperation between the parties.  If therefore international cooperation between 
states is one element of the identification of community interests in international 
law, then the Preamble to the Refugee Convention serves as a manifestation of 
refugee protection as a community interest. 
 
The grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries 
and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has 
recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international cooperation.253   
 
The Preamble calls for international cooperation in two respects.  Firstly, as means 
to ease pressure upon refugee hosting states in the spirit of solidarity, namely as 
means for responsibility sharing, and secondly, as means for the resolution of the 
refugee problem as a whole.   
A more indirect call for responsibility sharing, that has received considerably 
less attention is the one found in recital 5 of the Preamble.  Paragraph 5 contains 
a political commitment on the part of the parties ‘to do everything in their power 
to prevent the refugee problem from becoming a cause of tension’ between them, 
given its social and economic dimensions.254   Thus, from the reading of the 
Preamble, it can be inferred positive cooperative action is required, so as interstate 
relations are not negatively impacted. 
 
253 Refugee Convention Preamble, Recital. 4.  
254 Refugee Convention, Preamble, paragraph 5. 
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The Preamble of a treaty is not without normative significance; it guides the 
interpretation of the treaty’s substantive provisions. 255   Pursuant to a textual 
interpretation as per Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose’.256   The Preamble of a treaty is also reflective of the drafter’s 
purposes and considerations,257 but it may be additionally relevant for the treaty’s 
interpretation shedding further light on its object and purpose.258  Feller argues 
that the Preamble to the Refugee Convention explicitly relies upon international 
cooperation in order to fulfil the very aim of the Convention, namely ‘to ensure 
that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination, as well as to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms’. 259   It can also be added that the Refugee 
Convention relies on international cooperation, equally to ensure states parties’ 
relations under the Convention remain friendly.  
Within the operative part of the Refugee Convention, international 
cooperation in refugee matters is provided under the duty of the state parties to 
the Convention to cooperate with the UNHCR, enshrined in Article 35.  
 
255 VCLT, Article 31 (2). Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to 
Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on 
Refugees’, 659. 
256 VCLT, Article 31. 
257 ‘A treaty’s preamble defines, in general terms, the purposes and considerations that led the 
parties to conclude the treaty’. ‘Preambles are thus indicia of the intention of the parties to a 
treaty’. Makane Moïse Mbengue ‘Preamble’ Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law. (Last updated September 2006). 
258 Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, Volume XXI 
Reports of International Arbitral (18 February 1977) 53, 89, at para 19. 
259 Challenges to the 1951 Convention in its 50th Anniversary Year: Statement by Ms. Erika 
Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, UNHCR, at the Seminar on 
‘International Protection within one single asylum procedure’(April 2001) available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/admin/dipstatements/429d74282/challenges-1951-convention-its-50th-
anniversary-year-statement-ms-erika.html. 
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Contracting states undertake to cooperate with the office of the UNHCR, or 
any other agency that may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions and in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions 
of this Convention.260   
 
The same duty is reiterated verbatim in Article II (1) of the 1967 Protocol. The 
Protocol removed the geographical and temporal limitation of the Refugee 
Convention and made the refugee regime applicable to all future refugees.   
In his Commentary of the Refugee Convention, Grahl-Madsen noted that the 
Convention itself falls within the scope of Article 55 of the UN Charter, which 
promotes international cooperation for the solution of social and economic 
problems. 261   More specifically, the provision of Article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention ‘gives effect to the obligation, which Member States have entered 
into by virtue of Article 56 of the UN Charter’, bringing within the vested interests 
of the UN the material provisions of the Refugee Convention.262  This is further 
evidence to the community interest served by the Refugee Convention.  
The general duty of the states to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise 
of its protection and supervising mandate is further exemplified in the High 
Commissioner’s Statute.  States are called to cooperate inter alia by: 
 
admitting refugees to their territories, not excluding those in the most 
destitute categories, assisting the High Commissioner in his efforts to 
 
260 Refugee Convention, Article 35 (1). 
261 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2-11, 13-37, 
1997 UNHCR Division of International Protection at 149. Available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/3d4ab5fb9.pdf  
262 Ibid. 
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promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees; Promoting the assimilation 
of refugees, especially by facilitating their naturalization.263 
 
In relation to naturalisation, a qualified duty is imposed on states to facilitate the 
naturalisation of refugees in their territories to the extent feasible in Article 34 of 
the Refugee Convention.264   
From the combined letter of the provisions of Articles 34, 35 and the 
UNHCR Statute, the duty of states to cooperate with the High Commissioner 
extends through all the phases of refugee protection and is only exhausted when 
a solution for each individual refugee is achieved.  In support of such a duty of 
states to solve refugee situations are Aleinikoff and Poelott.265  The Conference 
of the Plenipotentiaries which completed the Convention recommends in its Final 
Act that: 
 
[G]overnments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they 
act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these 
refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement.266   
 
The Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries sheds light to the ordinary meaning of the 
provisions of Articles 34 and 35.  Under Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, the ordinary meaning principle extends to the treaty as a 
whole – namely, the text, the Preamble and Annexes, and any agreement or 
 
263 UNHCR Statute, Article 8 (d). 
264 Grahl-Madsen Commentary of the Refugee Convention, Article 34. 
265 Aleinikoff and Poellot ‘The Responsibility to Solve: The International Community and 
Protracted Refugee Situations’, 215-217. 
266 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, 25 July 1951, UNTS Vol. 189, p. 137. 
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instrument related to the treaty and drawn up in connection with its conclusion.267  
In accordance with this so-called principle of integration, 268  a textual 
interpretation of all the above provisions supports a general duty of states in 
international law to cooperate in the provision of refugee protection and to find 
solutions. 
Outside the Refugee Convention, UN Member states are also expected to 
support and participate in good faith by virtue of their obligations under the 
International Economic and Social Cooperation Chapter of the Charter.269  Given 
that UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly, 270 a 
duty to cooperate with the High Commissioner applies not only to the states- 
parties to the Refugee Convention, but to all 193 members of the UN. 
Sixteen years after the conclusion of the Refugee Convention, the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on Territorial Asylum.271  Taking a step further 
the call for international cooperation in the Refugee Convention, the Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum reflected on the need of states and the UN to positively 
support refugee host states. Article 2 of the Declaration notes:  
 
where a State finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, 
States individually or jointly or through the United Nations shall consider, in 
a spirit of international solidarity, appropriate measures to lighten the burden 
on that State.272  
 
 
267 James Crawford Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2019), 381. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Jean-Pierre L Fonteyne, ‘Burden Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of 
International Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees’ (1978-1980) 8 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 161, 180. 
270 UN Charter, Article 22. 
271 UNGA Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967) UNTS 189 (2545).   
272 Ibid., Article 2. 
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 Should have been negotiated and concluded as a Convention, the Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum would have codified a legal obligation to positively participate 
in responsibility sharing. 273   That said, the principles reflected in the 1967 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum form an integral part of the contemporary 
international legal framework.274 
 
2.4.2. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
The UNHCR has on numerous occasions affirmed and stressed the quintessential 
importance of international cooperation and responsibility sharing in refugee 
matters, in particular in cases of mass influx of refugees.275  Several conclusions 
of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee and the High Commissioner’s governing 
body have stressed the importance of international cooperation and responsibility 
sharing.276  As early as 1981, the UNHCR, in its Executive Committee Conclusion 
No. 22 on the Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, 
stated: 
 
A mass influx may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries; a 
satisfactory solution of a problem, international in scope and nature, cannot 
be achieved without international cooperation. States shall, within the 
framework of international solidarity and burden sharing, take all necessary 
 
273 Paul Weis, ‘The Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum’ (1979) 50 
British Yearbook of International Law 151. 
274 Guy S Goodwin-Gill ‘The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum’ United Nations Audio-
visual Library of International Law, available in pdf at https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dta/dta.html  
275 It shall be noted that no definition of a mass influx situation exists however in international 
law. 
276 There are various UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions that refer to and stress the 
importance of cooperation and responsibility sharing in refugee matters. See indicatively 
only: UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions: No. 11, 22, 52, 77, 79, 80, 85, 89, 100, 
102. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), A Thematic Compilation of Executive 
Committee Conclusions, (7th edition June 2014). 
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measures to assist at their request, States which have admitted asylum 
seekers in mass influx.277 
 
The Executive Committee in Conclusion No. 100 emphasised the global 
dimension of refugee protection in the context of mass influx and called states to 
cooperate in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility sharing to address refugee 
situations.278   
The enlightened positivist sees the relevance and the value inherent in these 
soft-law instruments in the assessment of the current state of the law.  The 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme was established 
by the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) in 1958. 279  The 
UNHCR is an international organisation and, as such, a subject of international 
law in itself. 280  The Executive Committee Resolutions such as the Notes and 
Guidelines on International Protection complement the international refugee 
regime, as they contribute to the process of refugee law’s formation, interpretation 
and direction.281  Therefore, despite their soft law-character,282 the Conclusions of 
the Executive Committee that reinforce states’ duty to cooperate with one another, 
and with the UNHCR, in the provision of protection have some normative 
 
277 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 22 ‘The Protection of Asylum-Seekers in 
Situations of Large-Scale Influx’ (1981) Executive Committee, 32nd session. Contained in 
United Nations General Assembly Document No. 12A (A/36/12/Add.1). 
278 UNHCR, Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing 
in Mass Influx Situations, Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and 
Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations No. 100 (LV) – 2004 Executive Committee 
55th session. Contained in United Nations General Assembly Document A/AC.96/1003. 
279 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), E/ RES/672 (XXV), 1958 Establishment of 
the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. 
280 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 430 
281 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 429 - 430. 
282 In this context, soft law is used to denote the non-legally binding character of the 
instrument. In general, soft law is a multi-faceted concept. For the various conceptions of it, 
See Boyle ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’, 119.  
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weight.283  This argument can be further supported if one notes the composition 
of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR.  It consists also of states that have 
not ratified the Refugee Convention, thus expressing the opinio juris of a wider 
group of states, including crucially refugee host states.  Given the specialist 
knowledge of the Committee of Experts and the fact that the conclusions are taken 
by consensus, the Committee’s Conclusions shall be treated as having normative 
weight.284  
 
2.4.3. The Global Compact on Refugees reflecting a community interest 
The latest addition to global refugee policy is the Global Compact on Refugees. 
The Compact, which, as already mentioned frames the problem of refugees as the 
‘common concern of humankind’, which in turn ultimately relies on successful 
international cooperation between states, 285  seeks to provide ‘a basis for 
predictable and equitable burden - and responsibility-sharing among all United 
Nations Member States ..’ as a specific objective of the duty to cooperate in 
refugee matters in pursuance with the UN Charter. 286   
 Cast in this light, the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations is the latest evidence to the claim that 
refugee protection and hence international refugee law serves a community 
interest which can only be advanced through international cooperation and 
responsibility sharing.  The Global Compact can be also said to represent a ‘ 
 
283 Soft law can also refer to ‘international prescriptions that are deemed to lack requisite 
characteristics of international normativity’ but that nonetheless ‘are capable of producing 
certain legal effects’. WM Reisman et al, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ (1988) 82 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings, Remarks by G Handl 371. 
284 Vincent Chetail, International Migration Law (Oxford University Press 2019), 385. 
285 Global Compact on Refugees, para 2. 
286 Global Compact on Refugees, para 2 and 3. 
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“quasi-lesiglative” endeavour that states are positively working together’ in the 
international level to address or solve the refugee problem.287   
 
2.5. The lack of a legal obligation of responsibility sharing  
To conclude, an enlightened positivist reading of the relevant sources of 
international law support that there exists a duty of states to cooperate in the 
provision of refugee protection firmly rooted in international refugee law.   
More specifically, such a duty stems from the reading of the UN Charter, the 
Refugee Convention, the UNHCR Statute, but also from soft law UNGA 
Resolutions on refugees, UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions and Notes 
on International Protection and the Global Compact on Refugees that seeks to 
operationalise international responsibility sharing for refugees.   
Despite the soft-law character of some of these instruments, they exercise 
considerable normative weight to the extent that they supplement the 
contemporary international refugee protection regime and contribute to the 
process of refugee law’s formation, interpretation and development.288  
 The numerous explicit references to responsibility sharing in the various 
UNHCR Conclusions and UNGA Resolutions in particular, supports the view put 
forward earlier; that responsibility sharing can be seen as a normative corollary of 
the duty of states to cooperate in refugee protection.  Türk and Garlick explain the 
specific telos of international cooperation in refugee matters: 
 
One of the purposes of international cooperation(..), as widely acknowledged 
in political discussions and academic writing, is to ensure a fairer distribution 
 
287  Wolfrum, ‘Identifying Community Interests in International Law’, 20. 
288 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam The Refugee in International Law, 429 - 430. 
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among states of the costs and disadvantages – as well as the potential benefits 
- of hosting refugees on their territory.289 
 
Even if responsibility sharing is seen as a normative corollary of the duty to 
cooperate, it falls however short of codifying a positive obligation of each state to 
achieve or even contribute to the responsibility sharing effort.  Under international 
refugee law, the state to which the refugees arrive bears sole legal responsibility 
for their protection and its associated costs.290  As a result, the duty to cooperate 
to protect refugees can be at best described as a vaguely worded legal duty of 
means, which in light of the absence of subsequent positive obligations, cannot 
itself solely turn responsibility sharing into a legal obligation. 291   
 
2.6. Regional frameworks on refugee protection 292  
The discussion has so far accommodated international law and international 
refugee law instruments, both hard and soft law so as to determine the existence 
 
289 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 664. 
290 Hathaway & Neve, 117. 
291 Chetail argues this in the context of UNHCR Executive Committee Guidelines on 
International Protection, noting that the duty of cooperation under Article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention is at best an obligation of means, unable to translate soft law into hard law. 
Chetail, International Migration Law, 385. 
292 The discussion of the regional refugee instruments is by no means comprehensive. There 
are numerous scholarly detailed accounts dedicated on the regional asylum instruments in the 
context of Latin America, Africa and the European Union.  Indicatively only David J Cantor, 
Nicolás Rodriguez Serna (eds) 'The New Refugees: Organised Crime and Displacement in 
Latin America' (ILAS Publications, University of London 2016). Liliana Jubilut, Refugee 
Protection in Brazil and Latin America – Selected Essays (Transnational London Press 
2018).  Marina Sharpe, The Regional Law of Refugee Protection in Africa (OUP 2018). 
Tamara Wood, ‘The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa’, in Satvinder Juss (ed), Research Handbook on Refugees (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019). George Okoth-Obbo, ‘Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa’ (2000) 8 African 
Yearbook of International Law 3.  
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of a legal duty of states to cooperate in order to share responsibilities for refugee 
protection.  In addition to the international legal framework at UN level, there are 
important regional institutional frameworks on international protection, that 
advance the community interest served by the Refugee Convention at the regional 
level.  Regional instruments explicitly complement293 the international refugee 
law regime and contribute to the progressive development of international refugee 
law,294 altogether operating within the international legal regime.295   
 
2.6.1. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa 
The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa is a progressive regional instrument that expands the refugee 
definition296 and brings under a single refugee instrument ‘normative concepts of 
solidarity and responsibility sharing. 297   
 
293 OAU Convention, Article VIII, para 2. 
294 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action and Brazil Declaration.  
295 Tristan Harley concluded from his analysis on the Latin American refugee context that the 
‘progress that Latin American states have made towards meeting the protection needs of 
refugees highlights the potential for regional protection frameworks to operate within the 
international refugee law regime’. Tristan Harley, ‘Regional Cooperation and Refugee 
Protection in Latin America: A ‘South-South’ Approach’ (2014) 26 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 22, 45. 
296 The 1969 OAU refugee definition covers “every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality compelled to leave his place of habitual residence 
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality. OAU 
Convention, Article I (2). 
297 Nik Marple, ‘Rights at Risk: A thematic investigation into how states restrict the freedom 
of movement of refugees on the African Continent’ UNHCR New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Research Paper No. 281 (October 2016), 17. 
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In the area of responsibility sharing, it establishes joint responsibility of all 
the African Union’s Member states298 and codifies an obligation for responsibility 
sharing. Article II, paragraph 4, stipulates: 
 
[w]here a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to 
refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States 
and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of 
African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures 
to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. 299 
 
Commentators of African refugee law and policy note that the responsibility 
sharing measures envisaged to lighten refugee host states have rarely been 
taken.300  In particular, only four African states have enacted national legislation 
to reflect the provision of Article II (4) of the OAU Convention as an obligation 
in their respective national asylum laws.301 
Despite the ‘positivisation’ of an inter-African responsibility sharing 
obligation within a regional treaty on asylum, African states have failed to 
establish the necessary institutional arrangements for responsibility-sharing that 
would effectively implement Article II (4).302   
 
298 Guy Martin, ‘International Solidarity and Co-Operation in Assistance to African Refugees: 
Burden-Sharing or Burden-Shifting (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 250, 259. 
299 Bill Rutinwa ‘The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa’ 
(2002) 21 Refugee Survey Quarterly 12, 18. 
300 Marina Sharpe, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees and Conflict Prevention in Africa: 
“Root Causes” and Yet Another Divide’, International Journal of Refugee Law 707, 708. 
301 David J Cantor, Farai Chikwanha, ‘Reconsidering African Refugee Law’ (2019) 31 
International Journal of Refugee Law 182, 212. 
302 Tamara Wood, ‘The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa’, in Satvinder Juss (ed), Research Handbook on International Refugee 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019), 24. 
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The legal anchor of the Africa’s open-door policy was always premised upon 
assistance, both from within and outside, the continent.303  The UNHCR, during a 
regional intergovernmental conference in Benin in 2004, acknowledged that 
refugee protection challenges in Africa have to do with the limited capacities of 
host States, as well as the absence of meaningful international responsibility 
sharing at international level. 304  The failure Rutinwa notes might not be the 
continent’s fault alone, as assistance from the North is a necessary condition for 
operationalizing responsibility sharing and providing international protection 
within the region.305  The absence of a legal obligation and a formal structure in 
for responsibility sharing in international law can be said to determine the success 
or failure of regional responsibility sharing arrangements. 
 
2.6.2. Latin America’s soft law instruments 
The earliest key regional instrument for refugee protection in Latin America was 
the Cartagena Declaration of 1984.306  States in the region, although joined the 
international refugee regime at a later stage had already longstanding experience 
with political asylum. 307   The Cartagena Declaration expanded the refugee 
definition to include: 
  
 
303 Rutinwa ‘The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in Africa’, 18. 
304 José Riera and Demian Casey, (principal eds), Regional Parliamentary Conference on 
Refugees in Africa, ‘The Challenges of Protection and Solutions’ Outcome of the June 2004 
regional parliamentary conference co - organized by the African Parliamentary Union and 
UNHCR, in association with the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the ICRC’ (Cotonou Benin 1-
3 June 2004), 34. Available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/427224a44.pdf  
305 Rutinwa ‘The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa’, 34. 
306  Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. The CIREFCA process which in 1987 sought to 
integrate refugees within the regional peace process is discussed as an example of a 
comprehensive approach to responsibility sharing in the next Chapter that addresses 
responsibility sharing in the practices of states.  
307 Cantor, ‘Responsibility-sharing in the refugee field: lessons from Latin America’, 1. 
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generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts and massive 
human rights violations or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order’ but additionally and crucially linked refugee 
protection in the region with the search for durable solutions.308   
 
The Latin American refugee protection framework is built upon the so-called 
‘Cartagena Spirit’ - a spirit of regional solidarity between states and joint 
responsibilities for refugees. 309   Interestingly, the regional framework has 
progressively developed over the years under a series of soft law instruments.  The 
characterisation, ‘soft’, in this context, refers to the form, namely the non-binding 
nature of the various instruments concluded as declarations and action plans. 
The Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action310 was adopted in 2004 - by 20 
Latin American states in commemoration of the 20 years since the adoption of the 
Cartagena Declaration- and established a new guiding framework reflecting 
commitments to regional solidarity and responsibility sharing. 311   Like the 
Cartagena Declaration, the Mexican Plan of Action linked refugee protection with 
the search for durable solutions. 312   In 2014, 30 years since the Cartagena 
Declaration, the Latin American states and the states of the Caribbean concluded 
another instrument, the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action.313  The 2014 Brazil 
Declaration integrated the previous lessons learned and renewed the commitments 
of states to existing programmes on regional protection and solutions. 
 
308 Cartagena Declaration, Conclusion 3. 
309 Stefania E Barichello, ‘Responsibility Sharing in Latin America’, in Satvinder Juss (ed) 
Research Handbook of International Refugee Law, 111.  
310 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action. 
311 Harley, ‘Regional Cooperation and Refugee Protection in Latin America: A ‘South-South’ 
Approach’, 22.  
312 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action, Chapter 3, Solidarity Cities Programme for Self 
Sufficiency and Local Integration, Solidarity Resettlement Programme. 
313 Brazil Declaration. 
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From an international law point of view, the various Declarations and Plans 
of Actions adopted in the context of Latin America, from the 1980’s to now, are 
non-binding soft law instruments.  The form of an instrument, however, does not 
preclude its normative impact.  Indeed, the above soft law instruments have had a 
normative impact on states conduct and asylum in the region, which is seen in the 
various asylum legislations enacted at the national level.314   
 
2.6.3. Responsibility sharing under the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is rooted in Articles 78 and 80 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).315  Article 80 
TFEU reads:  
 
[T]he policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation 
shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States. Whenever necessary, the acts of the Union adopted pursuant to this 
Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the CEAS is founded upon principles of solidarity 
and fair responsibility sharing.316  However, the strong formulation of Article 80 
additionally suggests that the provision of asylum to third country nationals is the 
common responsibility of the EU, as an institution as well as of its Member 
 
314 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action, Chapter 1 para 6. 
315 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1. 
316 Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation, DG Migration and Home Affairs Final Report 
December 2015, 3. 
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States.317 It is therefore possible to argue that there is a community interest at the 
EU level with respect to providing asylum to third country nationals.  
The provision of Article 80 TFEU has been criticised for being overtly vague 
in its legal construction so that can hardly impose any subsequent legal obligations 
upon Member States.318  Tsourdi argues that because the provision is couched in 
mandatory terms within the treaty it imposes a legally binding obligation of result 
on the part of Member states as well as the EU.319  Specifically, the ‘asylum policy 
and its implementation should be conducted in such a manner so as to ensure that 
responsibilities are shared fairly and equitably among the Member States.’320  
Those who object to the afore interpretation of the provision as establishing an 
obligation of result, do not, nonetheless, disregard the otherwise normative 
requirement entailed thereunder.321   
Having said this, Article 80 TFEU falls short of providing concrete 
modalities on how to achieve fair sharing.  In this sense, commentators view the 
legal effect of the provision as the general obligation of the EU and Member States 
 
317 Evangelia Tsourdi, ‘Solidarity at Work? The Prevalence of Emergency Driven Solidarity 
in the administrative governance of the Common European Asylum System’ (2017) 24 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 667,674. 
318 Gregor Noll, ‘Failure by Design? On the Constitution of EU Solidarity’, Odysseus 
Network Searching for Solidarity in the EU Asylum and Border Policies, A Collection of 
Short Papers following the Odysseus Network’s First Annual Policy Conference, 26-27 
February 2016, 3, available at http://odysseus-network.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Searching-for-Solidarity-Short-Papers.pdf . 
Gregor Noll, ‘Why the EU gets in the way of refugee solidarity? Open Democracy (22 
September 2015). Eleni Karageorgiou, ‘The law and practice of solidarity in the Common 
European Asylum System: Article 80 TFEU and its Added Value’ 2016 European Policy 
Analysis,5. 
319 Tsourdi, ‘Solidarity at Work? The Prevalence of Emergency Driven Solidarity in the 
administrative governance of the Common European Asylum System’, 673. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Esin Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More 
than Window Dressing?’(2016) 22 European Law Journal 449. 
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‘to adopt measures, which to a certain degree – depending on the circumstances – 
optimize a system of fair responsibility sharing between the Member States’.322   
What is uncontested from the reading of the provisions, is that the CEAS 
takes the duty to cooperate in refugee protection a step further, by requiring each 
Member state to undertake its fair share.323  In search of what constitutes a fair 
share, the relative capacities of the Member states have been suggested as a 
criterion.324  Be that as it may, even in the relatively harmonised context of the 
European Union, Member states have not agreed to a single methodology for 
measuring relative protection capacities, and this is telling particularly for one 
reason.  The use of macroeconomics criteria such as GDP or population size 
‘involves complex economic and social calculations that necessarily entail the 
exercise of a certain degree of discretion, for example, as to the methodology 
used’. 325  In other words, macroeconomics indicators are perceived as objective 
indicators of fairness, although they too are constructed out of a certain sets of 
assumptions and prejudices.326  The Dublin Regulation, the legal framework that 
the EU has legislated in implementing Article 80 and 78 of the TFEU 327  is 
examined in the next chapter, which discusses responsibility sharing 
arrangements in the practices of states. 
 
322 Karageorgiou, ‘The law and practice of solidarity in the Common European Asylum 
System: Article 80 TFEU and its Added Value’, 4, 10. 
323 Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than 
Window Dressing?’, 468. 
324 Tsourdi, ‘Solidarity at Work? The Prevalence of Emergency Driven Solidarity in the 
administrative governance of the Common European Asylum System’, 674. Karageorgiou 
Rethinking Solidarity in European Asylum Law A Critical reading of the key concept in 
contemporary refugee policy ,78. 
325 Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than 
Window Dressing?’, 457. 
326 Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists (Bloomsbury 2017), 123. 
327 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 2013 L.180/31. (Dublin Regulation). 
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2.7. Conclusions 
Having read and discussed the international law provisions on international 
cooperation and responsibility sharing for refugee protection, it is clear that a 
general duty of states to cooperate in refugee matters exists and is firmly rooted 
in international refugee law.  The combined reading of all the relevant 
international and regional protection frameworks supports that the scope of the 
duty to cooperate covers the whole spectrum of international protection, from the 
initial phase of protection from refoulement, to the provision of asylum and the 
progressive and effective guarantee of the socioeconomic rights enshrined in the 
Refugee Convention, to the provision of durable solutions.  
Yet the challenge remains that this general duty does not further crystallise 
to subsequent legal obligations of responsibility sharing, leaving further positive 
action at the discretion of states.  Within the regional refugee law instruments too, 
one comes across various degrees of institutionalisation of international 
cooperation and responsibility sharing, some more positivized than others, 
depending on the specificities and the history of each region. 
Finally, an enlightened positivist’s claim put forward in the Thesis, is that 
it is possible, if not warranted, to view the international refugee law regime as a 
whole, including the Refugee Convention, - a multilateral treaty with near 
universal participation and the UNHCR - as evidence of the existence of a 
community interest in international refugee law.  The framing of refugee 
protection as community interest has important implications for responsibility 
sharing.  Since the problem of refugees is framed in the recent Global Compact 
on Refugees as ‘a common concern of humankind’,328 the protection of refugees 
and the provision of solutions can and indeed should be understood as a common 
 
328 Global Compact on Refugees, opening statement, para 1. 
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or ‘collective’ 329 responsibility of the international community. This common 
responsibility needs to be somehow shouldered and shared fairly between states 
and this is why responsibility sharing can be seen as an ‘expression of a 
















329 A Hurwitz ‘Norm Making in International Refugee Law’ 2012 106 American Society of 
International law Proceedings 430, 431. 
330 T Kritzman Amir, ‘Community Interests in International Migration and Refugee Law’, in 
Benvenisti and Nolte (eds) Community Interests Across International Law (CUP 2018), 352 
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This Chapter examines responsibility sharing in the practice of states so as to 
examine, how and to what extent states sought to implement the duty to cooperate 
under the international refugee law regime in good faith, through legal and non-
legal structures.  It does so by discussing the Dublin Regulation under the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the EU cooperative arrangement 
with Turkey, the bilateral arrangement between Italy and Libya, Australia’s 
offshore processing arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru 
respectively, and finally, the US-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement.   
The study is concerned with the responsibility sharing arrangements states 
have concluded in the name of international cooperation.   Importantly, it does not 
seek to assess the compliance of the said arrangements under international refugee 
and human rights law.  Moreover, the arrangements are assessed in light of the 
dominant paradigm of deterrence and protection elsewhere, reflected in the much-
used concept of Safe Third Country.  In addition to the above arrangements, the 
Chapter discusses the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees 
(CPA) and the International Conference on Central American Refugees 
(CIREFCA).  The two historical examples that represent positive and overall 
successful instances of responsibility sharing in the practices of states have been 
partnerships between states of the Global North and the Global South for the 
benefit of refugees.   
The Chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the UNHCR’s Convention 
Plus Initiative, an unsuccessful attempt by UNHCR to fill the gap of the Refugee 
Convention and conclude a normative framework for fair responsibility sharing 
at UN level, and a discussion of the Global Compact on Refugees as the latest 
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addition of comprehensive responsibility sharing efforts at the UN level.  The aim 
of looking into the CPA and CIREFCA examples, is to identify the various factors 
that contributed relative success of the ad hoc partnerships, whilst the discussion 
of Convention Plus Initiatives showcases what went wrong in the process. The 
discussion of the Global Compact on Refugees discusses how the Compact 
envisages responsibility sharing and canvasses the latest advances in relation to 
the operationalisation of responsibility sharing under the Compact. 
 
3.2. Financial and physical responsibility sharing in light of the deterrence 
Paradigm331  
To begin with, responsibility sharing in practice is generally categorised to two 
main forms - financial responsibility sharing and physical responsibility 
sharing.332  Noll identifies a third form of responsibility sharing in the context of 
the European Union the asylum policy harmonisation.333  
With respect to harmonisation of policies, the EU serves an important 
example.  There has been specific supranational legislation under the CEAS 
aiming at the harmonisation of asylum procedures across all EU Member states, 
namely on status determination and reception standards.334  The results of the 
 
331 There is a rich scholarship on the deterrence paradigm in international refugee law. See 
indicatively only Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen ‘International Refugee Law and Refugee 
Policy: The Case of Deterrence Policies’ (2014) 27 Journal for Refugee Studies 574, Thomas 
Gammeltoft Hansen, Nikolas Feith Tan, ‘The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future 
Directions for Global Refugee Policy’ (2017) 5 Journal on Migration and Security 28, 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Jens Vedsten-Hansen (eds) Human Rights and The Dark Side of 
Globalisation (Routledge 2016) James C Hathaway, Thomas Gammeltoft - Hansen ‘Non-
Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’ (2015) 53 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 235.  The Chapter draws from the literature on deterrence to shed light 
into how states implement their duty to cooperate for refugees in practice.  
332 Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 3.  
333 Noll, ‘Risky games? A theoretical Approach to Burden Sharing in the Asylum Field’, 236 
334 EU Council Directive 2013/32 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing 
International protection (recast). 
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sharing of policies within the context of CEAS have however demonstrated the 
risk of ‘creating a race to the bottom between the EU Member States in order to 
deter asylum seekers from choosing one country over the other’, 335  which 
ultimately undermines the normative objective of fair sharing of 
responsibilities.336   
 Insofar as financial responsibility sharing is concerned, it is the primary 
form of responsibility sharing and the component most preferred by the Global 
North.  It entails - what the name suggests - the financing of refugee protection 
associated costs.  Financial responsibility sharing at UN level is facilitated, 
primarily, by voluntary donations of western countries to the UNHCR’s 
humanitarian assistance programmes.337  Under financial responsibility sharing, 
comes also the provision of development aid, technical assistance or capacity 
building in host countries.338  UNHCR has stressed the normative expectation of 
wealthier states to contribute to responsibility sharing in accordance with their 
capacities. 
  
From the perspective of international burden-sharing, those regions that host 
the smallest number of refugees relative to their wealth can be expected to 
 
335 Martin Wagner, Paul Baumgartner (Principal Authors) ‘The Implementation of the 
Common European Asylum System’ Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C: Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE May 2016), 101. 
336 Eiko Thielemann ‘Why Asylum Policy Harmonisation Undermines Refugee Burden-
Sharing’ (2004) 6 European Journal of Migration and Law 47, 64. 
337 In regional contexts there are also regional mechanisms of financial responsibility sharing. 
In the European Union, there was the European Refugee Fund, an intra-EU financial 
compensation mechanism for refugee receiving Member States. The ERF was succeeded by 
the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) (2014-2020), which cannot, however, be 
considered as pure refugee responsibility sharing tool as it covers a wide range of issues 
including, border control.  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-
asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund_en  
338 Global Compact on Refugees, para 32. 
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assist those with the highest number of refugees in relation to their 
economies.339 
 
The challenge in relation to the voluntary nature of the financial donations in the 
context of North-South cooperation in refugee matters is that any development 
assistance is increasingly earmarked,340 without additional development aid for 
the refugee host countries.  
Insofar as physical responsibility sharing is concerned, it has traditionally 
been linked to resettlement.  The UNHCR’s Resettlement Handbook defines 
resettlement as ‘the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have 
sought asylum to another State that has agreed to admit them as refugees and to 
grant them permanent settlement and the opportunity for eventual citizenship’.341  
Resettlement has a two-fold role; a durable solution in itself and a tangible form 
of physical responsibility sharing.342  The numbers of resettlement offered on an 
annual basis indicates however that resettlement is a solution only for a minority 
of refugees.   
The longstanding preference of the Global North to finance refugee 
protection in the Global South, rather than admitting refugees, is better explained 
when viewed in light of the deterrence paradigm that seeks to contain the locus of 
refugee protection to the Global South.  The underlying rationale for the 
deterrence paradigm has been described as, the belief by the developed states that 
they ‘can successfully insulate themselves from taking on a substantive and 
proportional responsibility in regard to refugee protection by speculating on the 
 
339 UNHCR, ‘Convention Plus Issues Paper Submitted by UNHCR on Addressing Irregular 
Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers’ FORUM/CG/SM/03, 11 March 
2004 (hereafter, UNHCR Issues Paper)  
340 Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibilities of States to Protect Refugees, 147. 
341 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (Revised edition, July 2011), 36. 
342 Global Compact on Refugees, para 90 
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way that migration control is designed vis-à-vis international refugee and human 
rights law’.343 
As early as the 1980’s, refugee law policies developed by the Global North 
sought to contain the locus of refugee protection predominantly within countries 
of the Global South .344  These deterrence measures coined by Hathaway in the 
1990’s as non-entrée,345 have been defined as comprising of efforts by powerful 
states ‘to prevent refugees from ever reaching their jurisdiction at which point 
they become entitled to the benefit of protection from non-refoulement and other 
rights set forth in the Refugee Convention’.346  Deterrence measures of non-arrival 
seek to prevent access to the territory through migration control, and deterrence 
measures of non-admission seek to retroactively exclude refugees who have 
already arrived at the territory from the ‘procedural door’.347  A typology of non-
entrée measures put forward by Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, shapes the 
overall picture.  Non-entrée measures can be unilateral, bilateral and multilateral.  
They can range from carrier sanctions, visa controls, international zones, to more 
sophisticated cooperation-based measures, such as interception on the high seas, 
provision of equipment, machinery and training, deployment of immigration 
officials, joint or shared law enforcement, direct migration control, and the use of 
international agencies to intercept refugees.348  Such measures can be said to serve 
a very specific objective of the Northern countries: 
 
343 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Feith-Tan, ‘The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future 
Directions for Global Refugee Policy’, 31. 
344 Hathaway, Reconceiving International Refugee Law, xxi. 
345 James C Hathaway, ‘The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée’ (1992) 91 Refugees 40. 
346 Hathaway and Gammeltoft - Hansen ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
Deterrence, 244. 
347 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Feith-Tan, ‘The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future 
Directions for Global Refugee Policy’, 34. Jens Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Europe’s Response to the 
Arrival of Asylum Seekers: Refugee Protection and Immigration Control’ UNHCR New 
Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 6 (May 1999), 4. 
348 Hathaway and Gammeltoft - Hansen ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
Deterrence, 251-256. 
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Non-entrée allows wealthier states to insist upon the importance of refugee 
protection as a matter of international legal obligation, knowing full well that 
they themselves will largely be spared its burdens. It enables a pattern of 
minimalist engagement under which the formal commitment to refugee law 
can be proclaimed as a matter of principle without risk that the wealthier 
world will actually be compelled to live up to that regime’s burdens and 
responsibilities to any serious extent.349  
 
Such practices have created what Gibney describes as a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around 
the world’s richest countries, keeping most of the world’s refugees confined to 
the South.350   
Historically, the rise of non-entrée has been attributed to the demise, of what 
Hathaway explains, as an interest-convergence between receiving states and 
refugees existing until then.351  The acute need for labour post-World War II, that 
had made the stock of European refugees and their cultural assimilation at the 
time a domestic interest for some developed countries, gradually disappeared.352  
Later, the strong Cold War sentiment had refugees fleeing the Soviet Union, being 
welcomed in the West.353  The African decolonization process that resulted in 
large scale refugee movements in the 1960’s and 1970’s,354 was seen as putting 
an end to the pattern of generous admission policies at the time and gave rise to 
restrictive ones in the 1990’s.355   
 
349 Hathaway, Gammeltoft - Hansen ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
Deterrence’, 242. 
350 Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’, 452. 
351  Hathaway, Reconceiving International Refugee, xviii 
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Today, with immigration being portrayed as the ‘global celery that nobody 
desires’,356 states of the Global North have become even more reluctant to admit 
large numbers of refugees in their territories and in an attempt to circumvent or 
limit their responsibility in international law, they have multiplied the efforts and 
doubled the budgets on border control and deterrence. 357  In addition to the 
measures of non-arrival and non-admission, deterrence includes offshore asylum 
processing onto third countries, criminalisation of irregular migration, and more 
sophisticated and indirect policies that seek to pose the asylum country in an 
unattractive light.358  
  
 3.3. Protection elsewhere and the Safe Third Country concept 
Restrictive asylum policies have traditionally been facilitated by the idea of 
‘protection elsewhere’ and the concept of Safe Third Country (STC).359  The 
proliferation of STC arrangements can be attributed to the responsibility gap of 
the Refugee Convention which offers a fertile ground.360   
 
356 Yuval Noah Harari, 21st Lessons for the 21st Century (Vintage 2019), 23. 
357 In a Report issued in 2014, Amnesty International claimed that the EU allocated 1,820 
million for activities, equipment and technological infrastructure focusing on control of the 
external borders of the Schengen area and only 17% , (700 million), were allocated to support 
asylum procedures, reception services and the resettlement and integration of refugees. 
Amnesty International, ‘The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, Human Rights Violations 
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358 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Feith-Tan, ‘The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future 
Directions for Global Refugee Policy’, 34. 
359 Rosemary Byrne, Andrew Schacknove ‘The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum 
Law’ (1996) Harvard Human Rights Journal 185. 
360 Julian M Lehmann ‘Outsourcing Protection and the Transnational Relevance of Protection 
Elsewhere, The Case of UNHCR’ in Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation, 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds) (Routledge Studies in Human Rights 
2017), 333. 
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The last 40 years have witnessed various arrangements in relation to 
responsibility premised upon protection elsewhere.361  The notion of protection 
elsewhere, is essentially, a departure from the rule of territorial asylum through 
the use of legal fictions. 362  Under the rule of territorial asylum, responsibility for 
the processing of the asylum claim arises when the individual enters the territory 
or comes under the jurisdiction of a state.363  Such legal fictions include the 
distinct rules of 'first country of asylum', the 'safe host country' and 'safe third 
country’. Despite their conceptual differences, they are all premised on the 
availability of protection in another country.364  For this reason, this thesis uses 
the term ‘safe third country’ to enclose the underlying basis of these various rules, 
which according to Legomsky, occupy in actual practice two points of the same 
continuum.365  
The STC notion has been the legal device upon which various regional 
arrangements on refugee protection have been structured.366  The idea originated 
 
361 Swerissen, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Refugee Law’ SHARES Expert 
Seminar Report (2011), 6. 
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in Europe around the 1990’s,367 in response to the then perceived forum shopping 
and irregular movement of asylum applicants.368   
As a legal device, it serves a twofold function in law; a procedural one - as a 
rule of admissibility of an asylum claim - and a substantive one - as an exclusion 
clause from refugee status during the merits phase.369  The rationale behind the 
notion, is that an asylum seeker ‘is coming from a country in which he or she was 
safe from persecution and to which safe return is possible’.370  The STC notion 
has also been used to justify maritime interceptions and transfer of asylum seekers 
to a third transit country and summary returns.371  From a responsibility sharing 
perspective, the STC is an attempt by states, in some sort of cooperative context, 
to limit physical responsibility sharing by shifting the responsibility for asylum to 
another country.372   
As a matter of international refugee law, the legality of the STC practices is 
deeply contested.  To begin with, the notion is not explicitly anchored in 
international refugee law.  The Convention does not explicitly authorise a transfer 
of a refugee or an applicant for asylum from one state party to another.  Crucially, 
it does not prohibit it either.  To add to this, Article 31 (1) of the Convention forbid 
states from imposing penalties to refugees who, coming directly from a territory 
where their life or freedom was threatened, enter their territory without 
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authorisation.373  In addition, international law does not impose a duty on the 
asylum seeker to seek refuge in the first state she finds herself.374   In fact, there 
is sufficient support in international law that some limited choice can be 
legitimately exercised, in particular where family members already reside in one 
country.375   
In light of the above, states are not forbidden in principle from returning or 
transferring the refugee to a territory of a state that is deemed otherwise safe, even 
if that country is not party to the Refugee Convention.376  Nonetheless, the safety 
of one country, as the House of Lords has cautioned, cannot rest on blanket 
designations and thus needs to be assessed on an individual basis.377  
 
3.4. Responsibility sharing arrangements premised on STC 
This section discusses some of the most popular instances of STC arrangements 
on refugees, including the Dublin Regulation under the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), the EU cooperative arrangement with Turkey, the 
bilateral arrangement between Italy and Libya, Australia’s offshore processing 
arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru, respectively, and finally the 
US-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement.  In the case of the EU, it should be 
noted that Libya and Turkey are not the only countries in the region with which 
the EU, or Member states individually, have entered into migration control 
 
373 Refugee Convention, Article 31 (1). Emphasis added. 
374 UNHCR Guidance Note on bilateral and/or multilateral transfer arrangements of asylum-
seekers, (May 2013) para 3 (i).  
375 EXCOM Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) 1979, para. (h) (iii), (iv). 
376 Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek 
Protection in Another State’, 226. 
377 House of Lords, European Union Committee 11th Report of Session 2003-04 
‘Handling EU asylum claims: new approaches examined Report with Evidence House of 
Lords’, para 66. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam The Refugee in International Law, 392. 
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arrangements.378  The reason the discussion focuses on the Italy-Libya and EU-
Turkey arrangements is because each one is representative of the Central and 
Eastern Mediterranean migratory routes respectively used by refugees.  As noted 
in the introduction, the purpose is not to assess whether the arrangements comply 
with international refugee and human rights law, although such assessment 
becomes incidental in the legal analysis. 379  The objective is to look into these 
cooperative arrangements from the perspective of whether they truly aim at 
responsibility sharing. 
 
3.4.1. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Dublin 
Regulation 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the EU as an institution, and the Member 
states individually, have an obligation of solidarity and fair responsibility sharing 
under the CEAS.  Among the legal measures devised to implement Articles 80 
and 78 of the TFEU has been the Dublin Regulation.380  The Dublin Regulation 
allocates responsibility for the processing of an international protection claim 
made by a third country national among Member States according to a series of 
 
378 For an overview of current and potential partners in regions that face different migratory 
challenges, See Elizabeth Collet, Aliya Ahad, ‘EU Migration Partnerships: A Work in 
Progress Report’ (2017) European Migration Policy Institute) available at 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/eu-migration-partnerships-work-progress  
379 On the compliance of safe third country arrangements with international law, See 
indicatively, Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to 
Seek Protection in Another State’ 223. Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of the “Safe Third 
Country” Notion Contested: Contested, Insights from the Law of Treaties’ 665. Gill-Bazo 
‘The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection, 
Assessing State Practice’ 42. Cathryn Costello ‘The Asylum Procedures Directive and the 
Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of 
International Protection’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law 35.  
380 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 2013 L.180/31. (Dublin Regulation). 
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rules.  The most popular allocation rule in use, is the rule of ‘first country of entry’.  
According to this rule, the Member state responsible for an asylum claim is the 
one which the third country national irregularly crossed its border by land, sea or 
air having come from a third country.381  
The STC rule is enshrined in Article 38 (1) of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive too.382  The provision lays down the legal safeguards when a Member 
State may apply the safe third country rule.  These are the guarantees that: i) the 
asylum seeker’s life and liberty is not threatened on account of one of the Refugee 
Conventions reasons ii) the principle of non-refoulement will be respected iii) no 
removal will violate the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and iv) there exists a possibility to request refugee status and, 
if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention.383   
Although the Dublin Regulation was never meant to be a responsibility 
sharing instrument,384 it has de facto functioned as one.  The implementation of 
the first country of entry rule under the Dublin Regulation has, as a result, 
unilaterally shifted responsibility for asylum towards the EU’s frontline Member 
states.385  The Mediterranean South, comprising of Italy, Greece, Spain and to a 
lesser extent Malta, has felt over the years that the Dublin Regulation has placed 
 
381 Dublin Regulation, Article 13. 
382 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (Recast). (Asylum Procedures Directive). 
383 Indicative cases before the ECtHR on the possibility to apply for asylum before removal 
are, Sharifi and Others v Italy and Greece (Application No. 16643/09), 21 October 2014, 
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Application No. 16483/12), 15 December 2016, Hirsi Jamaa and 
Others v Italy, (Application No. 27765/09), 23 February 2012. 
384 Sheila Maas, Elena Jurado, Mathieu Capdevila, Maylis Labayle, Laura Hayward, 
‘Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation DG Migration and Home Affairs  
Final Report’ (4 December 2015), 4. 
385 Paul McDonough, Magdalena Kmak, and Joanne van Selm ‘Sharing Responsibility for 
Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered’ European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE), (March 2008), 13. 
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a somewhat arbitrary responsibility upon them because of their geographic 
location, as first countries of entry into the EU.386  If seen from the legal obligation 
for solidarity and fair sharing enshrined in Article 80 of the TFEU, the ‘first 
country of entry rule’ goes squarely against such obligation.  In fact, the Dublin 
Regulation preserves inequalities in the sharing of asylum responsibilities 
between Member states and has legitimized the practice of burden-shifting 
practice.387  Essentially, it obstructs the normative objective of Article 80 TFEU 
to deliver fairness among Member states in the allocation of resources and 
responsibilities within the CEAS.388 Finally, the fact that the Member state that 
‘lets’ an asylum seeker enter irregularly is apportioned the responsibility for her 
international protection claim, serves the logic of a blame-based regime that 
obstructs distributive justice between the Member states.389   
The unfairness and unsustainability of the Dublin regime was starkly 
manifested during the so-called refugee crisis in 2015-2016, when the Council of 
the European Union had to take emergency solidarity measures with Greece and 
Italy under Article 78 (3) of the TFEU.  The provision reads:  
 
In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an 
emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third 
countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt 
 
386 Maria- Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the 
European Union Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension.; The Safe Third Country 
Concept Revisited’ (2006) International Journal of Refugee Law, 571, 578.  Emphasis in the 
original. 
387 Eiko Thielemann, ‘Why Refugee Burden-Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, 
Free-Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the EU’ (2018) 56 Journal of Security and Migration 
Studies 63, 79. 
388 Violeta Moreno Lax, ‘Solidarity’s reach: Meaning, dimensions and implications for EU 
(external) asylum policy’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
740, 751.  
389 Ibid., 753. 
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provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It 
shall act after consulting the European Parliament. 
 
Two emergency Relocation Decisions were put in place in 2015 as relief measures 
to Greece and Italy respectively which witnessed increasing large-scale arrivals 
of third country nationals from Turkey and Libya.  The two Council Decisions 
ordered the relocation of 160 000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece over the 
course of two years. 390  The first Council Decision ordered the relocation of 
24000 asylum seekers from Italy and 16 000 from Greece391 and the second of 
120 000 asylum seekers in total.392  The Second Relocation Decision also included 
a sophisticated distribution formula that allocated a quota of asylum seekers 
between Member States on the basis of population size, GDP, unemployment rate 
as well as on previous efforts of Member states in resettlement.393  The Relocation 
Decisions proved however hard to enforce.   
Despite the efforts of the Commission to distribute asylum seekers against  
an idea of differentiation in accordance with a formula of integrated relative 
capabilities, Member states pledged and relocated only a small percentage of their 
 
390 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece 
L.239/80. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece L. 248/80. 
391 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523, Article 4. 
392 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, Article 4. 
393 The distributive key is found in ANNEX, European schemes for relocation and 
resettlement, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf  
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 108 
allocated shares.394  Some Member states, like Hungary, Poland and Austria, did 
not relocate any asylum seekers.395   
In April 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its 
judgment on the applications of the European Commission against Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic.  The Court found that these three countries had 
been in violation of European Union law by not complying with the Relocation 
Decisions.  It ruled that the Member states falsely relied on the maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security pursuant to Article 72 
TFEU,396 as well as on the alleged malfunctioning of the relocation mechanism, 
which was Czech Republic’s plea for avoiding compliance.397  Part of the broader 
semi-compliance with the allocated shares under the Relocation Decisions was 
the result of insufficient pledging by Member states.  Lack of sufficient pledging 
was further attributed to the wider rejection of EU’s authority over Member states 
in such matters and a concomitant projected rejection of the EU rule of law and 
European values. 398   
During the past four years, the Dublin Regulation has been in the process of 
Reform.  The systemic unfairness of the Dublin system towards the frontline 
Member states, as well as the third country nationals,399 led the EU Commission 
 
394 Elspeth Guild, Cathryn Costello, Violeta Moreno Lax, ‘Study on Implementation of the 
2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece’ (March 2017) Study for the LIBE 
Committee, 27.  
395 European Commission ‘Relocation and Resettlement: Commission calls on all Member 
States to deliver and meet obligations’ Press Release (16 May 2017).  
396 CJEU (Third Chamber) Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, Commission v 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (2 April 2020), paras 145-147. 
397 Ibid., paras 180-183. 
398 Guild, Costello, Moreno Lax, ‘Study on Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions 
establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy 
and of Greece’, 42. 
399 Küçük ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than 
Window Dressing?’, 463. 
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to submit a Proposal for Reform of the Dublin Regulation (The Dublin IV) in 
2016. 400  At the time of writing, the proposal is still under consideration, although 
there has been media reporting that the Commission might withdraw the 
proposal.401 
On the area of responsibility sharing, the Dublin IV introduces a ‘corrective 
fairness mechanism’, an allocation mechanism that is activated automatically in 
cases where Member states deal with a disproportionate number of asylum 
seekers.402  In contrast with the temporary nature of the Relocation Decisions, this 
is supposed to be a standing mechanism, activated as follows: The 
disproportionate share is reached when the applications of a Member state exceed 
150% of its share, which is further calculated on the basis of its population and 
GDP with both criteria having equal weight.403  Member states that do not wish 
to undertake their fair share of responsibility by means of admitting asylum 
seekers into their territory are given the option to opt-out from the system for 
twelve months and instead, make a ‘financial solidarity contribution of EUR 250 
000’.404  This opt-out clause provides strong incentives to countries that already 
shy away from physical responsibility sharing, to continue to do so.  
Some preliminary comments are due with respect to the operationalisation 
of responsibility sharing under the proposed Regulation.  Firstly, the Dublin IV 
does not discharge with the old Dublin rules.  The regulation maintains the 
patently flawed ‘first country of entry’ rule and sustains the concentration of 
excessive costs and responsibilities in the Member states adjacent to the EU’s 
 
400 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM (2016). ( Dublin IV).  
401 Nikolaj Nielsen ‘Commission bins 'Dublin' asylum-reform proposal’ (20 February 2020) 
available at https://euobserver.com/migration/147511  
402Dublin IV, Articles 23, 24 
403 Ibid. 
404 Dublin IV, Article 37 (3). 
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external borders. 405   As Maiani contends, the corrective fairness mechanism 
places extensive responsibilities on the overburdened frontline Member States 
turning them into the ‘gatekeepers’ of CEAS.406  Secondly, insofar as the aim of 
the system remains the prevention of secondary movements and ‘abuse’ of the 
system by asylum seekers, and not responsibility sharing proper between Member 
states as per Article 80 TFEU, it is highly unlikely that it can deliver fairness 
between Member states.  Lastly, there ought to be a public and permanent 
discourse between Member states on fairness and how best it can be optimised 
under the CEAS.  One lesson learned from the Emergency Relocation Decisions 
experiment, is that even a highly institutionalised and relatively harmonised 
asylum context, as is the European Union, cannot support an automated allocation 
of binding quotas. This sends a very strong message for what can realistically be 
expected for responsibility sharing at UN level.  
 
3.4.2. The EU’s cooperative arrangements with third countries 
In the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015 -2016, the European Union launched the 
New Migration Partnership Framework with regional countries outside the 
European Union.407  Against a background of ‘containment strategy,’408 coupled 
with the logic of protection elsewhere, the EU concluded the EU-Turkey 
 
405 Francesco Maiani, ‘The Reform of the Dublin System and the Dystopia of ‘Sharing 
People’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 622, 632, 633. 
406 Francesco Maiani, ‘The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation’, Study for the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament (2016), 36. 
407 Commission announces New Migration Partnership Framework: reinforced cooperation 
with third countries to better manage migration, European Commission, (Press Release, 7 
June 2016).  
408 Mariagiulia Giuffré, ‘From Turkey to Libya, the EU Migration Partnership from Bad to 
Worse’ Eurojus (20 March 2017).  
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Statement in 2016409 and re-established its cooperation with Libya, through Italy’s 
bilateral MoU’s with the former.410  
 
3.4.2.1. Italy – Libya 
Europe’s cooperation with Libya has attracted widespread criticism, in particular 
for the implicit aim to outsource migration management and to prevent migrants, 
including refugees, from arriving at European shores. 411   It has been rightly 
characterised as the ‘most well-known example of international deterrence’.412   
Libya has a long-standing cooperation history with the European Union, and 
particularly, with Italy in the context of combatting illegal migration.413  With 
Italy being the first point of entry via the Central Mediterranean route, Italy’s 
cooperation with Libya stretches long back in the Gadaffi years.  Following the 
fall of the Gadaffi regime, Italy resumed cooperation with Libya, despite the dire 
human rights situation that emerged in the country.  In 2017, Italy concluded a 
 
409 ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ Council of the European Union Press Release (March 18, 2016).  
410 Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of 
migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route.  (February 3 2017).  It is noted that 
there exist additional cooperative arrangements between countries of the EU and 
neighbouring countries in the context of the wider EU Migration Partnership Framework 
based on the STC such as Spain’s extended cooperative arrangements with North African 
countries that are not discussed in the section. For a rich analysis of Spain’s practices see Gil-
Bazo, ‘The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection, 
Assessing State Practice’, 55-59. Nikolas Feith-Tan International Cooperation on Refugees: 
Between Protection and Deterrence, PhD thesis, University Department of Law (2018), 58-
62. On file with the author. 
411 Amnesty International, ‘Libya: Shameful EU Policies Fuel Surge in Detention of Migrants 
and Refugees’ (16 May 2018). 
412 Feith-Tan, International Cooperation on Refugees: Between Protection and Deterrence 
,57.  
413 Accordo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista 
per la Collaborazione nella Lotta al Terrorismo, alla Criminalità Organizzata, al Traffico 
Illegale di Stupefacenti e Sostanze Psicotrope e All’Immigrazione Clandestina (Rome, 13 Dec 
2000). For an overview on Libya’s and Italy’s bilateral cooperation history, See Giuffre, 
‘State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for Italy’s Push-backs to Libya? 
(2012) 24 International Journal of Refugee Law 692, 701-703. 
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Memorandum of Understanding with Libya’s Government of National Accord.414  
Under the MoU, the Libyan Coast Guard autonomously intercepts and returns 
back to EU-funded reception centres in Libya, migrants and refugees who make 
the crossing of the Mediterranean.   
The purpose of the cooperation is according to the MoU to combat illegal 
immigration.415  Implicitly, the MoU is based on the presumed ‘safety’ of Libya.  
UNHCR’s position on Libya as a safe country remains the same since 2011, when 
the High Commissioner intervened in the proceedings of Hirsi and others v Italy 
before the European Court of Human Rights.416  The landmark case of Hirsi refers 
to the interception and collective expulsion by the Italian authorities of 24 
Eritreans and Somali refugees from Libya, without the opportunity to apply for 
asylum or to obtain an effective remedy.  The Strasbourg Court asserted that Italy 
did exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and had effective control over the 
intercepted, who faced a serious risk of refoulment in Libya.417  As a result, it 
found Italy in violation of Article 3, Article 4, Protocol No. 4 and Article 13 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. UNHCR intervened in the 
proceedings with the following statement: 
 
The lack of an asylum system in Libya means that there are not sufficient 
safeguards to ensure that persons in need of international protection will be 
recognized as such and accorded legal status and associated entitlements that 
could ensure their rights, including to protection against refoulement, are not 
 
414 2017 Memorandum d'intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del 
contrasto all'immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e 
sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra Io Stato della Libia e la 
Repubblica Italiana. (May 2 2017). (Italy -Libya Memorandum of Understanding). 
415 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, Article 1 (b). 
416 UNHCR intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirsi and 
Others v Italy Application no. 27765/09 (March 2010). Available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b97778d2.html  
417 Hirsi and Others v Italy. 
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violated. The risk of chain refoulement denying international protection, 
especially to Eritrea, cannot be excluded.418  
 
In 2018, following investigations and reports from Amnesty International419 and 
Human Rights Watch,420 UNHCR restated that it does not consider it appropriate 
for states to apply in practice a designation of Libya as ‘safe third country’.421  
The High Commissioner stressed in a statement that Libya is not even to be 
considered ‘a place of safety’ for disembarkation of rescued individuals, 
irrespective of status pursuant to the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea.422  The Statement reads: 
 
 In light of the volatile security situation in general and the particular 
protection risks for third-country nationals (including detention in 
substandard conditions, and reports of serious abuses against asylum-
seekers, refugees and migrants) UNHCR does not consider that Libya meets 
 
418 UNHCR Intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Hirsi and 
Others v. Italy. (March 2010), 10. 
419 M De Bellis, Europe’s shameful failure to end the torture and abuse of refugees and 
migrants in Libya  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/europes-shameful-
failure-to-end-the-torture-and-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya/  
420 Human Rights Watch Report ‘No Escape from Hell EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of 
Migrants in Libya’(March 2019). 
421 UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya (Update II) (2018), 10. 
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b8d02314.pdf  
422 A ‘Place of safety’ as defined in the IMO Guidelines, para 6.17 (and as referred to in the 
Annex to the 1979 SAR Convention, paragraph 1.3.2) ‘is a location where rescue operations 
are considered to terminate.  It is also a place where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer 
threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can 
be met. The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those 
alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case 
of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea’. Resolution MSC.167(78) (adopted on 20 
May 2004) MSC 78/26/Add.2 Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. 
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the criteria for being designated as a place of safety for the purpose of 
disembarkation following rescue at sea.423 
 
As a response to the outcry of the international civil society on the human rights 
violations committed against migrants and refugees in Libya, the High 
Commissioner signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda and the 
African Union in September 2019  for the purposes of evacuating refugees from 
Libya’s detention centres.424  According to UNHCR, the rescued individuals have 
been given ‘asylum-seeker status’ in Rwanda  and while their cases are being 
assessed’ and further solutions are pursued, ‘including resettlement, voluntary 
return to countries of previous asylum, voluntary return to countries of origin 
where safe to do so and local integration in Rwanda’.425   
Despite this progress, at the time of writing, the Libyan Coast Guard 
continues its maritime interceptions of refugees and migrants who when returned 
to Libya are held in detention centres where they are further subject to inhumane 
and degrading treatment with no guarantee against refoulement.426   This led 
UNHCR to issue another update position on Libya as a safe third country in 
September 2020, where it stresses that states should not continue to designate 
Libya as a safe third country with the concomitant rejection of an asylum claim 
as inadmissible before it is considered on the merits.427  
 
 
423 UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya (Update II) (September 2018), para 40-42. 
424 Joint Statement: Government of Rwanda, UNHCR and African Union agree to evacuate 
refugees out of Libya (Press Release 2019). 
425 UNHCR Third group of refugees evacuated to Rwanda from Libya with UNHCR support 
Press Release (25 November 2019). 
426 UNHCR Position on the Designations of Libya as a Safe Third Country and as a Place of 
Safety for the Purpose of Disembarkation Following Rescue at Sea (UNHCR September 
2020).  
 427 Ibid. 
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3.4.2.2. EU-Turkey 
In 2016, the European Union a deal with Turkey in the form of a Statement and 
communicated as press release, known as the ‘EU–Turkey Statement’.428  Despite 
its dubious legal status,429 Turkey under the Statement is designated as a safe third 
country for the return of all irregular migrants and asylum seekers whose asylum 
applications have been declared inadmissible by Greece and who entered Greece 
irregularly through Turkey.  The legal basis for the returns to Turkey is the safe 
third country notion that functions as an admissibility rule under the EU’s Asylum 
Procedures Directive.430   
As with Libya, although to a much lesser extent, the presumption of Turkey 
as safe for returns of asylum seekers has been strongly challenged by NGOs and 
scholars.431  The reasons behind this are twofold.  Firstly, Turkey has reserved to 
the Refugee Convention with a geographical limitation that grants refugee 
protection only to refugees coming from Europe.432  Therefore, asylum seekers 
subject to returns under the EU Turkey Statement, and who in their majority are 
from Syria and other non-European nationalities, are granted under Turkish law 
some ‘conditional refugee status’ and are allowed to reside in Turkey only 
temporarily until they are resettled. 433   Secondly, the overall human rights 
 
428 EU-Turkey Statement. 
429 Steven Peers, ‘The Draft EU/Turkey Deal on Migration and Refugees: Is It Legal?, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-draft-euturkey-deal-on-migration.html  
430 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast).  
431 Emanuela Roman and Steve Peers, ‘The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What could 
possibly go wrong?’, EU Law Analysis (5 February 2016).  at: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/the-eu-turkey-and-refugee-crisis-what.html  . 
Elizabeth Collet ‘The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal’ Migration Policy Institute 
(March 2016). 
432 Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection, Article 61. Unofficial 
translation can be found at 
https://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5a1d828f4  
433 Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection, Article 62. 
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situation in the country has deteriorated, following the attempted Turkish military 
coup.  The coup triggered a state of emergency in Turkey in 2016 and a derogation 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 434   The lack of 
international protection to non-EU nationals under Turkish law and the general 
human rights situation in the country suffice to challenge the characterisation of 
Turkey as ‘safe third country’ for all returnees without individual assessment.  
The Greek Council of State, the supreme administrative court of Greece had, 
however, a different view, where in a comforting for the EU-Turkey Statement 
decision, ruled on the application of two Syrians that Turkey qualifies as a safe 
third country under the Refugee Convention and thus the two individuals can be 
returned there and claim adequate protection. 435  The problem with this reasoning 
is that Turkey provides only protection from refoulement to non-European 
nationals and not the full gamut of the socioeconomic  rights, which the Reufgee 
Convention afford to recognised refugees.  As the dissenting Greek Judge noted 
‘what is critical for a decision to be made is not just the protective legislative 
framework, but rather its de facto implementation in the country concerned’. 436   
Four years into its implementation, the agreement has turned Greece into a 
buffer zone for the European Union’s migration and refugee policy, or as the 
President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen prefers, the European ‘aspida’ 
 
434 ‘Measures taken under the state of emergency in Turkey’ Statement by Mr Nils Muižnieks, 
the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights (27 July 2016). 
435 The Decision is only accessible in Greek. (Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας ΣΤΕ/Ολομέλεια 
2348/2017). For an overview of the case, reasoning and the dissenting opinion in English, See 
Angeliki Tsiliou, ‘When Greek judges decide whether Turkey is a Safe Third Country without 
caring too much for EU law’ EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy (29 May 2018). 
436 The Decision is only accessible in Greek. (Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας ΣΤΕ/Ολομέλεια 
2348/2017). For an overview of the case, reasoning and the dissenting opinion in English, See 
Angeliki Tsiliou, ‘When Greek judges decide whether Turkey is a Safe Third Country without 
caring too much for EU law’ EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy (29 May 2018). 
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the Greek word for shield.437  The rest of the Member States are increasingly 
closing their borders and impose restrictions of movement.438   
The Greek state lacking asylum capacity, buttressed from EU-imposed 
austerity measures, has been left alone to cope with the mass influx, whilst arrivals 
from Turkey continue.439  This unilateral shift of the responsibility onto Greece 
and the lack of meaningful solidarity and responsibility sharing by the rest of the 
EU Member states, as required by Article 80 TFEU, had as a result a deteriorating 
quality of refugee protection in the Greek state.440   
The deal’s ramifications and the inherent problems of the CEAS have been 
primarily and negatively felt by the refugees.  Asylum seekers and other migrants 
in Greece are detained in camps, deprived of adequate living standards, enduring 
the cold winters for four years now.441  The continuous escalation of the Syrian 
conflict and the active participation of Turkey in the region, led the latter into a 
blunt effort to bargain for geopolitical support in Syria in March 2020, to halt the 
implementation of the deal with the EU actively leading thousands of migrants 
and refugees to Greece’s north-eastern land borders.  
 
437 Alastair Jamieson, ‘Greece is 'Europe’s shield’ in migrant crisis, says EU chief von der 
Leyen on visit to Turkey border’ (Euronews March 4 2020),  available at 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/03/greece-migrant-crisis-is-an-attack-by-turkey-on-the-
eu-austria  
438 Since 2015, Hungary has its borders closed to refugees and asylum seekers and has put in 
place razor-wired fences to its borders with Serbia. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-34556682. 
439 According to official statistics 66.000 applications for asylum were lodged in Greece in 
2018. https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/statistics. As Dimitriadi notes, 
‘Amidst the worst economic crisis of recent years, none of the services could hire personnel. 
Only existing civil servants could request a transfer, and few chose to do so.  For the First 
Reception Service, interpreters, psychologists, medical staff, all had to be subcontracted 
through NGOs, thereby making the service dependent on external resources’. Angeliki 
Dimitriadi ‘The Impact of the EU-Turkey Statement on Protection and Reception: The Case 
of Greece’ Global Turkey in Europe, Working Paper 15 (October 2016), 6. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Kumi Naidoo, ‘A scar on the conscience of Europe: Letter to Greek Prime Minister on 
conditions facing refugees in Greece’ (23 November 2018). 
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There are many problems with the EU-Turkey Statement.  At the heart of the 
deal has been ‘a one for one’ offer - for every Syrian being returned to Turkey 
from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU 
taking into account the UN vulnerability criteria.442  Crucially for the present 
analysis, the true purpose of the deal has been migration management, border 
control and responsibility shifting.443  As a result of this, refugees have been 
confined in border regions leading to unnecessary human suffering and the whole 
situation as experienced on the ground by local populations have naturally made 
the latter ‘to lose confidence to European and national institutions to maintain 
social cohesion’.444 
The EU-Turkey deal showcases the fragility of STC arrangements and ripple 
effects responsibility shifting arrangements have on the refugees as well as on 
interstate relationships in the region.  At the time of writing, the relations of 
Greece and Turkey are further strained, given a reincarnated interest by Turkey in 
drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, where there has been a longstanding 
territorial dispute with Greece over the limits of the two countries’ respective 
Exclusive Economic Zones.  The above discussion reveals the wider geopolitical 
interests at play in the region and Turkey’s strategy to use the Deal as bargaining 
chip against the European Union’s wider migration control interests.445   
 
 
442 EU-Turkey Statement. 
443 Michelle McEwen, ‘Refugee Resettlement in Crisis: The Failure of the EU-Turkey Deal 
and the Case for Burden-Sharing’ (Spring 2017) Issue 2 Swarthmore International Relations 
Journal.  
444 Eleni Karageorgiou, ‘The impact of the new EU Pact on Europe’s external borders: The 
case of Greece’ Asile Project (28 September 2020) available at 
https://www.asileproject.eu/the-impact-of-the-new-eu-pact-on-europes-external-borders-the-
case-of-greece/  
445 According to Kathimerini reports, the meeting of the EU leaders on the matter in the end 
of September will discuss a package of issues including migration. (4 September 2020. 
https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/561066541/sarl-misel-karoto-kai-mastigio-gia-tin-toyrkia/  
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3.4.2.3. Australia’s offshore processing regime 
If there is one country that has been pioneering the outsourcing of international 
protection responsibilities to third countries, that is Australia.  Australia has 
operated a systematic offshore processing regime for asylum claims in 
partnerships with third countries in the Pacific region, such as Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea (PNG).446  Nauru and PNG are not the only countries in the region 
with which Australia has built a sophisticated cooperative regime.  Indonesia 
cooperates with Australia in the form of stopping asylum seekers from leaving for 
Australia by boat.  Cooperation, in this case, takes the form of funding, equipping 
and training that comes at the expense of asylum seeker’s ability to seek protection 
in the region.447  Australia also cooperates with Sri Lanka, a refugee producing 
country, as well as Malaysia.448  The discussion focuses on Australia’s offshore 
processing arrangements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG) because they 
have been notoriously questionable practices - not only in respect of their legality 
under international law- but also with their true objective to shift responsibility 
for refugees to third countries in the region. 
Australia’s offshore processing regime in cooperation with Nauru and PNG 
developed in the early 2000’s and can be divided for the purposes of the analysis 
into two periods.  The ‘Pacific Solution’ operationalised between 2001-2007 and 
the ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’, the offshore processing resumed by Australia 
 
446 Jane McAdam, ‘Extraterritorial Processing in Europe Is ‘regional protection’ the answer, 
and if not, what is?’ Policy Brief 1 (2015) Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International 
Refugee Law 9.  
447 On Australia – Indonesia cooperation See, Antje Missbach ‘Doors and fences: Controlling 
Indonesia's porous borders and policing asylum seekers’ (2014) 35 The Singapore’s Journal 
of Geography, 228-244.  Savitri Taylor, 'Exporting Detention: Australia-funded Immigration 
Detention in Indonesia' (2012) 87 Journal of Refugee Studies 88. Nikolas Feith Tan ‘The 
Status of Asylum Seekers in Indonesia’ (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 365. 
448 Prime Minister of Australia, ‘People smuggling cooperation with Sri Lanka’ (Press 
Release, 17 November 2013) http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-11-17/peoplesmuggling-
cooperation-sri-lanka . Emily Howie, 'Asia–Pacific: Australian border control in Sri Lanka' 
(2014) 39 Alternative Law Journal 52. 
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in 2013.449  The policy in both instances is about the maritime interception and 
transfer of asylum seekers bound for Australia to Nauru and PNG for the purposes 
of asylum processing and protection.  
Australia’s bilateral arrangements have been framed by regional power 
asymmetries in the Asian-Pacific region.  Power asymmetries are a useful lens 
that explains why PNG and a micro-state like Nauru, accepted to become 
processing centres for Australia, with the concomitant mass influx in aliens as 
well as the social and political cost of hosting the asylum seekers.  It is observed 
that, in this context, the two host states were countries dependent on Australia’s 
aid, a fact that makes them willing to consent to deals that offer financial 
assistance, even if the arrangements are bound to raise serious legal concerns. The 
selection of these two states was strategic due to historical relationships.   
Both Nauru, one of the world’s smallest countries, and PNG, before gaining 
full independence, were trusteeships under the Administration of Australia.450  
This hierarchical power relationship allowed Australia to use its ‘ extremely poor, 
politically unstable and socially vulnerable neighbours’ so as to transfer asylum 
seekers, in exchange for money, preventing Nauru and PNG from bargaining on 
equal terms. 451  To offset the onus of essentially warehousing intercepted asylum 
seekers, Australia offered in exchange to both countries free medical care, 
educational opportunities and sports ovals.452  What illustrates this more is that 
 
449 Australia government, Operation Sovereign Borders https://osb.homeaffairs.gov.au  
450 For a discussion on Australia’s historic ties to Papua New Guinea and Nauru, See Taylor 
‘The Pacific Solution or Pacific Nightmare; The Difference between Burden Shifting and 
Responsibility Sharing’, 19-31. 
451 Taylor ‘The Pacific Solution or Pacific Nightmare; The Difference between Burden 
Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’, 32. 
452 Tara Magner ‘The less than Pacific Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’ (2004) 16 
International Journal of Refugee Law 53. 
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‘Nauru’s half of GDP comes directly and indirectly from the regional processing 
centre’.453    
Australia’s model of offshore processing kicked-off after the Tampa incident 
in 2001, involving a Norwegian freighter.  The MV Tampa, having rescued 443 
asylum seekers, was denied entry and disembarkation on Australia’s Christmas 
Island, the closest port of safety at the time.454  The passengers were transferred 
to a navy vessel and were forcibly removed to detention camps in Nauru.455  The 
incident marked the beginning of Australia’s offshore processing policy 
development, championed as the ‘Pacific Solution’.456  In an amendment to the 
Migration Act of 2001,457  the Minister of Immigration unilaterally designated that 
the countries of PNG and Nauru are deemed incontestably safe for the processing 
of asylum claims, and that all asylum seekers bound to Australia would be, going 
forwards, transferred to these two countries.458   
 
453 Feith-Tan, International Cooperation on Refugees: Between Protection and Deterrence, 
citing an article from the Interpreter at 50. Footnote omitted. 
454 Maureen Richees,’ Remembering the Tampa Affair,18 years on’ The Courier Australia, 
(24 August 2019) https://www.thecourier.com.au/story/6342730/remembering-the-tampa-
affair-18-years-on/  
455 Ibid.  
456 Janet Philips, ‘The ‘Pacific Solution’ revisited: a statistical guide to the asylum seeker 
caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island’ Background Note, (September 2012) Australian 
Parliament available at 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/pubs/BN/2012-2013/PacificSolution#_Toc334509636  
457 198 A of the Migration Act, as inserted by the Migration Amendment (Excision from the 
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001.  
458 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the 
Commonwealth of Australia, relating to the transfer to and assessment of persons in Nauru, 
and related issues. https://dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/pages/memorandum-of-understanding-
between-the-republic-of-nauru-and-the-commonwealth-of-australia-relating-to-the-transfer-
to-and.aspx  2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Government of Australia, relating to the 
transfer to, and assessment and settlement in, Papua New Guinea of certain persons, and 
related issues. https://dfat.gov.au/geo/papua-new-guinea/Documents/joint-mou-20130806.pdf  
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From 2001 to 2017, a series of Memorandum of Understandings have been 
signed between Australia and the two countries. 459   Although the offshore 
processing stopped in 2007, an increase in boat arrivals and deaths at sea in 2012 
had Australia resume the transfer of asylum seekers intercepted by Australian 
officers, to Nauru and Manus Island in PNG from 2012-2017.460   
The bilateral STC arrangements have been widely criticised and condemned 
for resulting in serious human rights violations of the detainees in Nauru and 
Manus Island.  The detainees have been subject to an unjust and prolonged 
detention, and degrading treatment in direct violation of international human 
rights law.461  For those detained in the processing facilities, UNHCR has reported 
on serious levels of abuse, self-harm and neglect. 462  The international media, 
such as The Guardian, have been continuously reporting on the dire situation and 
ill-treatment of asylum seekers in Nauru and Manus Island that have resulted in 
serious mental health problems, including suicide attempts by children.463  The 
 
459 Press Release, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, MoU on Asylum Seekers Signed 
With Nauru (Dec.10, 2002), available at 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa181_02.html. Press Release, Australian 
Minister For Foreign Affairs, New Memorandum of Understanding Signed with Nauru (Mar. 
5, 2004). 
460 Alison Rourke, ‘Australia to deport boat asylum seekers to Pacific islands’ (August 2012) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/13/australia-asylum-seekers-pacific-islands  
461 Human Rights Council, Twenty-eighth Session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mr. Juan E. 
Méndez’ A/HRC/28/68/Add.1 (6 March 2015), paras 16-31.  
462 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Submission by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Inquiry into the Serious Allegations of 
Abuse, Self-harm and Neglect of Asylum-seekers in Relation to the Nauru Regional 
Processing Centre, and any like Allegations in Relation to the Manus Regional Processing 
Centre Referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 12 November 
2016.  
463 Oxfham Media Release, ‘Oxfam calls for urgent action to get Kids Off Nauru’ (23 October 
2018). P Farrell, N Evershed and H Davidson, ‘The Nauru Files: Cache of 2,000 Leaked 
Reports Reveal Scale of Abuse of Children in Offshore Detention’, The Guardian (Australia), 
(online edition), 10 August 2016.   
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 123 
transfer of the asylum seekers offshore Australia was even characterised as a 
‘discriminatory and arbitrary punishment for seeking asylum’.464   
Australia has denied any legal responsibility for the state of the asylum 
seekers in Nauru and on Manus Island.  The UNHCR on the contrary supports 
that Australia remains responsible under international law for those who have 
sought its protection - a fortiori because it is Australia that ‘designed, financed 
and managed the system in which these two developing and under-resourced 
countries participate’.465   The legality of Australia’s offshore processing regime, 
in light of the extended human rights violations occurred has been scrupulously 
assessed against international human rights law standards by scholars. 466  
Literature has also explored Australia’s responsibility in international law for 
internationally wrongful acts, applying the rules of attribution of conduct under 
the law of state responsibility.467  
 In April 2016, the Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court ruled that the 
detention of asylum seekers under the bilateral agreement breached the right to 
liberty under PNG’s constitutional order.468  The landmark decision found that the 
 
464 Jared L Lacertosa, ‘Unfriendly Shores: An Examination of Australia's "Pacific Solution" 
under International Law’ (2014) 40 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 321, 356. 
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October 2018). 
466 Indicatively, Amy Nethery, Rosa Holman, ‘Secrecy and human rights abuse in Australia’s 
offshore immigration detention centres’ (2016) 20 The International Journal of Human Rights 
177. Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, ‘Offshore processing of asylum applications Out of sight, 
out of mind?’ CEPS Commentary (Brussels: CEPS, 27 January 2017).   
467 See Hathaway and Gameltoft-Hansen ‘Non Refoulement in A World of Cooperative 
Deterrence’ 2014. Taylor, ‘Australian Funded Care and Maintain ace of Asylum Seekers in 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, All care but no Responsibility?’ 337.  Tan, ‘State 
Responsibility and Migration Control: Australia’s international deterrence model’ in T 
Gammeltoft Hansen and Jens-Vedsted Hansen (eds) Human Rights and the Dark Side of 
Globalisation (Routledge 2017), 225. Azadeh Dastyari, Asher Hirsch, ‘The ring of steel : 
extraterritorial migration controls in Indonesia and Libya and the complicity of Australia and 
Italy’ (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 435.  
468 Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, Namah v Pato (Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Immigrations), para 74. 
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persons on Manus Island Regional Processing Centre were forcefully brought into 
PNG, held against their will and that the administrative arrangements between the 
two sovereign countries were in breach of PNG’s constitutional guarantee of 
liberty of all persons.469  Following this ruling, the processing centre on Manus 
Island formally closed in October 2017.   
In 2018, the Migration Act was amended and a legislation on the urgent 
medical evacuation and transfer of refugees and asylum seekers in mainland 
Australia passed in 2019, known as the Medevac Bill.470  As positive as this move 
is, in response to the new Law, the Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison 
announced the reopening of Christmas Island’s detention centre, declaring that 
refugees and asylum seekers who are found to need a medical transfer will not be 
sent to mainland Australia, but will first go to Christmas Island, where they will 
be further assessed.471  
The Pacific Solution and the Operation Sovereign Borders were Australia’s 
response to large scale arrivals of asylum seekers in the region. The arrangements 
purported to have been concluded in the name of cooperation and responsibility 
sharing.472  The overtly stated purpose of the Operation Sovereign Borders was, 
as its name suggested, border control of illegal migration as a sovereign act.  The 
cooperation of Nauru and PNG was easily bought at a price, given the countries’ 
existing power asymmetries and financial dependence on Australia.473  Australia’s 
 
469 Ibid. 
470 Migration Amendment (Urgent Medical Treatment) Bill 2018 A Bill for an Act to amend 
the Migration Act 1958, and for related purposes.  
471 'Tropical location' used to lure doctors to Christmas Island for refugee medical transfers 
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“Purchaser” from “Provider” in Asylum Policy’ New Issues in Refugee Research (2003) 
UNHCR Working Paper No. 91, 2003. 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 125 
bilateral offshore processing arrangements were therefore an example of the 
language of responsibility sharing being used as ‘a deceptive rhetorical veil,’ 
whilst, in reality, they had been tantamount to responsibility shifting.474  More 
generally, it can be observed that partner states knew that their cooperation was a 
valuable commodity, which they were willing to trade, even when agreements 
might have been presented before them as a fait accompli.475 
 
3.4.2.4. The United States and Canada Safe Third Country Agreement  
In 2004, Canada entered into a bilateral safe third country agreement with the 
United States (STC Agreement). 476  For a long period of time, Canada had been 
hailed as a leader in refugee protection standards worldwide. 477   It has 
traditionally been seen as a destination country - and a particularly welcoming 
one-478 with high rates of approval of asylum applications.479  In contrast, the 
United States, also a traditional destination country for many years, has always 
had more restrictive asylum policies in place, in particular for refugees coming 
from Central America.480 
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477 Efrat Arbel, Alletta Brenner, ‘Bordering on Failure Canada - US Border Policy and the 
Politics of Refugee Exclusion’ Harvard Immigration and Law Clinic, Harvard Law School 
(November 2014), 104. 
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of refugees. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-10-07-mn-5066-story.html  
479 Andrew F Moore, ‘Unsafe in America: A Review of the US Safe Third Country 
Agreement’ (2007) 47 Santa Clara Law Review 201, 208. 
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Following the landmark case of Singh481 before the Supreme Court, Canada 
revitalised its national asylum system and established a tribunal process that gave 
every asylum seeker the opportunity to have their claim assessed on its merits.482  
Since the conclusion of the STC Agreement, however, there has been a shift 
towards increasingly restrictive and exclusionary policies on asylum.483   
The US-Canada STC Agreement is a bilateral agreement which constitutes 
an arrangement for sharing and determining responsibility for asylum between the 
two neighbouring countries and which, for the purposes of the agreement, have 
designated each other as safe.   In theory therefore, it can be said to be the 
framework for bilateral responsibility sharing for asylum between the two 
countries.  
Under the agreement, ‘[t]he Party of the country of last presence shall 
examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee 
status claim of any person who arrives at a land border, port of entry […] and 
makes a refugee status claim’. 484   It shall be noted that the Agreement applies 
only to those individuals entering from the US at official ports of entry, and 
borders, hence many asylum seekers have resorted to irregular crossings to 
Canada, particularly dangerous in winter. 
Over the years, the STC agreement has been challenged on the grounds that 
it acts as deterrent,485 which has resulted in the irregular crossing of borders and 
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484 US-Canada STC Agreement, Article 4 (1).   
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Agreement’ Wilson Centre, Canada Institute (4 April 2017) , 8.  Available at 
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more specifically, on the grounds that the US, cannot be considered a safe country 
at least for a certain category of refugees.486   
In 2007, the Canadian Council for Refugees, Amnesty International and the 
Canadian Council for Churches, challenged the designation of the US as a safe 
third country under the Agreement.487  The Federal Court, having granted the 
coalition of organisations legal standing in the proceedings, found that the US 
does not comply with its non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and the Convention against Torture,488 and that the application of the 
safe third country rule, in the context of this bilateral STC Agreement, violates 
refugees rights under the Canadian Charter.489  Although the decision was later 
overturned by Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal on technical grounds, what is 
important, is that in the first instance, the Court did challenge the legality of the 
agreement determining that the US is not a safe country for all refugees arguing 
that the agreement violates refugees rights under international law.490   
Under the Trump Administration, the new anti-refugee and anti-Muslim 
policies that have been adopted have had a negative impact on protection seekers 
in the region.  The 2017 Executive Order on Immigration under the Zero 
Tolerance Policy of the Trump Administration, included a travel ban for several 
 
486 Canadian Council for Refugees ‘Why we are challenging the USA as a “safe third 
country” in the Federal Court of Canada’ Explanation (December 2017), available at  
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Refugees v. Canada, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1583, 2007 FC 1262. 
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Treatment or Punishment (1984) UNTS Vol 1465, 85. 
489 Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, para 239-240. 
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Muslim-majority countries, under which refugees are punished for illegal entry491 
-contrary to the Refugee Convention- 492  with either expedited removal, or 
detention in substandard conditions and with no access to counsel.493  Because of 
the bilateral STC Agreement, these refugees have no prospect of applying for 
asylum in Canada, unless they attempt an illegal crossing.494  These changes in 
the US asylum policy have rendered the US, according to commentators and legal 
advocates, no longer safe within the meaning of the bilateral STC Agreement.495   
A challenge of the STC Agreement was recently lodged before the Federal 
Court of Canada in 2017, by the Canadian Council for Refugees and Amnesty 
International and other applicants seeking to have the STC Agreement declared 
unconstitutional under Canadian law.496  The case is about refugee claimants who 
reached Canada from the US and filed a claim for asylum but were returned to the 
US on the basis of the STC Agreement.  Upon return they were detained by US 
Immigration officials.  The applicants asked the Court, inter alia, to declare that 
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Canadian Council for Refugees Explanation (December 2017), available at   
https://ccrweb.ca/en/safe-third-country-challenge-explanation  
494 Refugees crossing into Canada from US on foot despite freezing temperatures (The 
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Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and Nedira Jemal Mustefa v. The Minister of 
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
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Canada needs to consider rescinding the STC Agreement with the US and, as an 
interim measure, to immediately suspend the agreement. 
The Court ruled its decision in July 2020.  It found that ‘ineligible STCA 
claimants are returned to the US by Canadian officials where they are immediately 
imprisoned by US authorities.497   The Court also held that the ‘ “sharing of 
responsibility” objective of the STCA should entail some guarantee of access to 
a fair refugee process’ and that, in this case it hasn’t, as applicants were removed 
to the US because of the STC Agreement without any assessment of their risks or 
the substance of their refugee claim.498  Finally, the Court held that ‘Canada 
cannot turn a blind eye to the consequences that befell’ applicants who are 
removed to the US because of the operation of the STC Agreement,499 and given 
that the provisions enacting the agreement infringe upon constitutional guarantees 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Peoples, the Court invalidates the STC 
Agreement.500  
Because of the Agreement, the number of international protection claims for 
Canada has been drastically reduced.  It was the disproportionate number of 
asylum applications that led Canada to negotiate a STC arrangement with the US 
in the first place.501  A report claims that the effects of the STC agreement have 
been felt unevenly, as the implementation of the agreement has resulted in large 
numbers of asylum seekers being kept in the United States and out of Canada.502  
The same report sheds light into the different motivations behind the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the two countries: 
 
497 Ibid., para 103. 
498 Ibid., para 128. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid, Conclusion. In response to the ruling, the government of Canada has appealed the 
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While the Agreement was designed as a “burden sharing mechanism” (..) the 
United States (..) entered the agreement primarily to fortify the border, whilst 
Canada entered into the Agreement to deter asylum seekers from making 
refugee claims in Canada.503  
 
Thus, Canada through the STC Agreement has insulated itself from extensive 
responsibilities that it would otherwise have towards refugees.  Additionally, 
since the two parties to the Agreement do not have comparatively similar systems 
of refugee status determination in place - with Canada having way more generous 
asylum policies and legal and procedural safeguards than the US -504 this bilateral 
arrangement challenges even a theoretical scenario of fair and equitable allocation 
of protection responsibilities between the two states.505  
 
3.5. Comprehensive approaches to responsibility sharing  
Up to this point, the discussion accommodated those safe third country 
arrangements, formal and informal, between states that primarily have served the 
logic of ‘protection elsewhere’ in order to prove that contrary to their purported 
responsibility sharing objectives, they have resulted in the shifting of 
responsibility, undermining fair sharing between the parties to these arrangements 
and the quality of refugee protection.506   
During the life of the refugee regime, there have been however examples 
of responsibility sharing arrangements that brought states together to effectively 
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506 Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 285. 
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protect refugees and solve refugee situations.  The next section discusses two past 
responsibility sharing arrangements - the Comprehensive Plan of Action for 
Indochinese Refugees (CPA) and the International Conference on Central 
American Refugees (CIREFCA) - 507  as examples of overall successful 
partnerships between states of the Global North and the Global South.  It also 
discusses UNHCR’s Convention Plus Initiative,508 an attempt by UNHCR to fill 
in the gap of the Refugee Convention and bring states together to conclude a 
normative framework for fair responsibility sharing at UN level.  The section 
concludes with a discussion and assessment of the Global Compact on Refugees, 
the most recent collective effort of UNHCR and states to address the need for fair 
and equitable responsibility sharing comprehensively through a wide range of 
modalities. 
There has been a lot of research and analysis from scholars on how and why 
the CPA and CIREFCA ‘appealed’ to states that subsequently devised ad hoc and 
comprehensive responses to the two refugee emergencies. 509  The objective of the 
present analysis is to identify the various factors that contributed to the overall 
 
507 Another international responsibility sharing experience from the past was the two 
International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I & II). Although 
ICARA II was the first arrangement that made the nexus between refugees and development 
aid explicit, it did not have any positive impact on responsibility sharing between the global 
North and African states.  Camps were built, whilst western states did not response to the 
African plea for equitable responsibility sharing and the spontaneous or coerced repatriation 
of African refugees in many occasions became the norm.  Finally, the security of refugees was 
compromised by the nexus between refugee camps and African military conflicts.  For a 
detailed assessment of ICARA I and II see Hans and Shurke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’, 88-82.  
508 UNHCR, Convention Plus, At A Glance, available at, 
https://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/convention/403b30684/convention-plus-glance-june-
2005.html  
509 Indicatively, Hans and Shurke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’ 88-102.  Suhrke, ‘Burden Sharing 
During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action’, 396.  
Alexander Betts, ‘Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the 
Indochinese CPA’ UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper 120, (January 
2006), 27. 
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success of the two arrangements, outside the unique political junctures and 
regional specificities of each one of them, so as to draw a somewhat ‘universal’ 
lesson.  On the other hand, the discussion of the UNHCR’s Convention Plus 
Initiative serves another purpose; to flesh out and understand the reasons why the 
process failed to conclude a normative framework. What could have been done 
differently in the negotiating process back then and what lessons learned, if any, 
were implemented in the Global Compact on Refugees. 
 
3.5.1. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for the Indochinese refugees 
A ‘textbook’ example of meaningful international cooperation and responsibility 
sharing took place between 1979 and 1993.  The process involved the cooperation 
of countries of origin, countries in the region – assuming a first asylum role - and 
countries outside the region, assuming a resettlement role.510    
From the very beginning, the Vietnamese exodus became the business and 
foreign policy consideration of all anti-communist states of the West, and 
particularly of the US, which responded to the flight of the labelled ‘boat people’ 
with liberal admission policies.511  The Indochinese refugees were individuals 
who fled Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  A conference in Geneva was convened 
in 1979512 to come up with, what has been characterised as a model of ‘universal’ 
responsibility sharing. 513   Under this model of responsibility sharing, states 
assumed different protection roles; states in the region assumed first asylum 
responsibilities and states further afar in the global North undertook explicit 
 
510 Betts, ‘Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese 
CPA’, 27. 
511  Suhrke, ‘Burden Sharing During Refugee Emergencies The Logic of Collective versus 
National Action’, 405. 
512 UN General Assembly, Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, 
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at Geneva, on 20 and 21 July 1979, 
and subsequent developments: Report of the Secretary-General, 7 November 1979, A/34/627, 
available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68f420.html  
513 Hans and Surhrke ‘Responsibility Sharing’, 100. 
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commitments to resettle 514  with an exception of Japan, which responded to 
responsibility sharing demands only through increased financial contributions.515   
Asylum in the region became contingent, however, upon resettlement 
elsewhere.  Although as a matter of international law, the provision of 
international protection is not contingent upon responsibility sharing, in the 
context of the Vietnamese exodus, the neighbouring countries, namely Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia, offered temporary protection only due to explicit 
resettlement quotas committed by western states.516  Western countries, such as 
the US, Australia, Canada and France, committed to the responsibility sharing 
effort with resettlement quotas that were a result of a market-based model 
consisting of both immigration and humanitarian criteria.517   
As new flows of Indochinese refugees continued to emerge, western 
countries became sceptical about the genuine refugee status of the Indochinese, 
as well as the openness of their resettlement policies.  All the while, neighbouring 
countries responded with excessive use of deterrence measures and 
refoulement.518  A second Geneva Conference was called in 1989 by the UN 
Secretary General at the time, to respond to the new waves of Indochinese 
refugees. 519   The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) agreed during the 
Conference was premised upon individual refugee status determination, whereby 
the Vietnamese had to prove their refugee status after an agreed cut-off date.520  
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518 Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities; The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 667. 
519 Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action of the International Conference on 
Indochinese Refugees, Report of the Secretary General A/44/523 (1989). 
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The cut-off date varied across the neighbouring countries.521  This meant that from 
the date of the cut-off, the Vietnamese were not considered de facto refugees, but 
rather economic migrants who had to prove their refugee status.  Those who fell 
short of the refugee status were voluntarily repatriated to Vietnam with the help 
and monitoring of UNHCR,522 under what has been described as a controversial 
process from a human rights perspective.523  The failure of the human rights 
mandate of the CPA was strongly observed in the phase of the individual 
determination process, which did not offer the individual asylum seeker the 
benefit of the doubt. 524   UNHCR essentially became a ‘broker’ between the 
countries of first asylum and the countries of origin and resettlement in an effort 
to afford durable solutions.525  
The Steering Committee of the International Conference on Indochinese 
Refugees,526 chaired by UNHCR and comprising of government representatives 
worked towards identifying resettlement quotas.  Countries outside the region 
pledged their commitments under a three-year target timeline. 527   UNHCR 
provided statistics on past contributions, helping states to identify their targets.  
 
521 Betts, ‘Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese 
CPA’ , 34. 
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319. 
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For the purposes of implementing the CPA, the High Commissioner circulated a 
responsibility sharing distribution formula, identifying the proportion of 
resettlement quotas for each state of the resettlement states.  This, Betts notes, 
 
is illustrative of the way in which UNHCR managed to credibly convey to 
states that without each contributing their ‘fair share’ the whole process 
would fail. In other words, free riding was not an option if states hoped to 
meet their individual or collective interests.528  
 
Certain criteria informed the resettlement process beyond the pledged quotas.  The 
caseload of refugees with social ties to third countries would be resettled there 
and the caseload of refugees lacking such ties would be equitably shared between 
the rest of the states.529  The US’ significant leadership role in this large-scale 
resettlement and the sense of responsibility they felt towards its erstwhile allies 
was another important geopolitical factor to highlight.530   
However, the CPA was far from a flawless responsibility sharing 
arrangement.  Arthur Helton was a significant player in the CPA’s implementation 
who concluded in his own overview and assessment that, in the end, humanitarian 
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 When thinking of the universal lessons that can be drawn from the CPA process, 
these are limited by the fact that it was a product of a certain political juncture.532  
That said, the CPA combined two important characteristics that are not context or 
region-specific and are illustrative of forging collective action and structuring 
responsibility sharing against an idea of fairness.   
Firstly, the whole process linked refugee protection to a durable solution. 
The essence of protection is realised in securing the full gamut of socioeconomic 
rights to the individual refugee as well as a permanent solution. Under the CPA, 
responsibility sharing went beyond mere financial assistance, during the 
emergency and initial stage of protection from non-refoulement, to securing the 
rights enshrined in the Convention and to providing for long-term solutions to 
most refugees. At the time, resettlement outside the region, onto Western states 
was for a majority of refugees the preferred solution.   In other words, the Global 
North did commit and did actively participate in physical responsibility sharing 
taking its fair share. Among the determinative criteria for the refugees to be 
resettled, existing social ties of refugees to third states were crucially considered.   
Secondly, the Plan of Action provided for different roles for different states 
laying down interlocking, interdependent and differentiated commitments, 
voluntarily pledged by states before the Steering Committee of the Conference.  
In the context of CPA, states came to recognise for all sort of reasons, including 
geopolitical, that the plight of the Indochinese was an international, common 
concern, a community interest, and countries of both the Global North and South 
would only benefit if they were to cooperate.  Free riding, therefore, was not an 
option, because of existing issue linkages in the community interest.  For these 
reasons, the CPA was a positive example of an effort to collectivize the common 
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responsibility to protect refugees, 533  even if ad hoc against the basis of 
differentiated commitments.  
 
3.5.2. The International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA)  
In the Central American context, CIREFCA was a process that arose out of the 
Esquipulas Peace Agreement of 1987.  The Agreement marked the end of 
longstanding conflicts in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua.534  The Conference on Central American Refugees,535 like the CPA, 
focused on providing solutions at a regional level for the two million people 
displaced by the conflicts, as part of a process. 536   
Unlike the CPA, which worked around the migration-asylum nexus, 
CIREFCA aimed to bridge the gap between humanitarian relief and 
development.537  The Central American Peace and Development Process was a 
process of long-term assistance to the displaced and post-conflict development in 
the region.  The protection of refugees and the forcibly displaced was positively 
linked to issues of peace and development, making the case for an integrated 
developmental approach to forced displacement.538   
The Conference, under the auspices of UNHCR and UNDP, took place in 
Guatemala City in 1989 and resulted in a Declaration and a Concerted Plan of 
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Action,539 explicitly conceived as a follow-up process to the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration.540  The Plan focused on voluntary repatriation, local integration of 
refugees and their contribution to economic development. 541   The integrated 
developmental approach dynamically adapted from country to country, depending 
on whether the state was a source of refugees or a country of asylum, offering 
self–reliance to the refugees, development opportunities to the host communities 
and securing stability in the region.542  Further, the CIREFCA process played an 
important normative role in the region by contributing to the development and 
dissemination of international protection norms, strengthening regional solidarity 
between states and joint responsibilities for refugees.   
Responsibility sharing in the region did not end with the CIREFCA process.  
The Brazil and Mexico Declarations and Plans of Action discussed earlier,543 
frame responsibility sharing in the region over what Cantor describes as ‘an 
ostensibly south-south principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’.544  
States of origin, transit and destination within one region assume distinct roles to 
refugee situations.  In light of this, responsibility sharing in Latin America links 
refugee protection to comprehensive solutions by expanding labour mobility 
programmes where refugees can freely move to third countries and have access 
to gainful employment promoting economic self-sufficiency. 545  This is the well-
known ‘Cartagena Spirit’ of regional solidarity between states that builds on 
regional shared values and joint responsibilities for refugees.546   
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3.5.3. Pulling the threads together: The three ‘c’s. 
The CPA and the CIREFCA processes were products of a strongly influenced 
Cold War-sentiment in refugee protection that had the UN and states assume 
priority for the refugees for various interests, including humanitarian.  There, are 
however, three common threads evident in both the CPA and the CIREFCA 
processes.  Betts has summarised the success of examples in what I further 
identify as the three ‘c’s.  Both processes were cooperative because they involved 
a wide range of countries, including countries of origin, asylum, resettlement 
and/or donor countries. They were comprehensive because they adopted a range 
of durable solutions simultaneously, and they were collaborative in terms of 
working across UN agencies and civil society organisations.547  Perhaps, the word 
collaborative may today be replaced by UNHCR’s ‘multi-stakeholder’ or ‘whole 
of society’ approach to refugee situations.548   
Interestingly, there is a fourth common thread that permeates both 
processes, also beginning with a ‘c’. A common but differentiated responsibilities 
logic framed both partnerships and brought states of origin, asylum and 
destination together, from the initial emergency phase to the provision of durable 
solutions allowing each state to pledge commitments to physical and financial 
responsibility sharing, assuming its fair share. 
 
3.5.4. UNHCR Convention Plus Initiative 
The Convention Plus Initiative (2002-2005) was a three year, UNHCR-led 
project, which brought states together to negotiate a normative framework on 
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international responsibility sharing for refugees.549  The “Plus” intended to be a 
number of generic and special ‘soft law’ agreements based on three priority 
strands: the strategic use of resettlement; more effective targeting of development 
assistance to support durable solutions for refugees; clarification of the 
responsibilities of states in the event of irregular secondary movements.550  These 
generic agreements would then be applied to specific protracted refugee 
situations. 
The Convention Plus, although failing to complement the Refugee 
Convention with a normative framework for responsibility sharing,551 enriched 
states’ and UNHCR’s experience.  Two distinct tools were used to bring states 
together to agree on differentiated commitments to refugee protection; an idea of 
‘common but differentiated responsibility sharing’ that would leave every actor 
better off and the use of issue linkages, namely linking refugee protection to other 
interests such as migration control and development.552   
In the Convention Plus, responsibility sharing was framed as a North-South 
dialogue from the outset.  There was a clear division of labour between donor 
states of the North that would finance protection (financial responsibility sharing) 
and Southern states that would provide protection (physical responsibility 
sharing).  The issue of linkages in the Convention Plus initiative was played as 
follows: the High Commissioner appealed to Northern states to commit to 
responsibility sharing on the basis of their strong interests in halting irregular 
secondary movements, and to the Southern states by persuading them that 
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development assistance from the North would benefit their local populations, so 
they should make local integration and self-sufficiency for refugees viable. 553   
The shortcomings of the Convention Plus have been highlighted in 
literature.554  Out of all the reasons identified in scholarship, I would like to focus 
on two in particular; the lack of transparency in negotiations and the conditionality 
of the targeted development assistance.  Firstly, the negotiations on targeted 
development assistance by the Northern donor countries were conducted behind 
closed doors.  Essentially, the Southern refugee hosting states, the would-be 
recipients of the development assistance, felt and, indeed were excluded, from the 
negotiations.555  Secondly, and again related to development assistance, Southern 
host states requested that any targeted assistance for refugee protection be 
additional to that of poverty eradication and other needs, so that aid does not 
become conditioned, or as South Africa put it in a meeting during the Convention 
Plus, ‘linked to readmission agreements’.556  The request was not met by donor 
states.  They made clear that no additional funding for refugee self-reliance would 
be allocated and any targeted development assistance would come from already 
allocated and earmarked budgets.557   
The absence of additional development assistance to refugee hosting states, in 
particular given their already overstretched capacities and developmental needs, 
were not perceived by the former as fair.  To the contrary, conditioning aid upon 
readmission agreements further polarised states across the North-South divide, 
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thereby aggravating the North-South relations, ultimately hindering the conclusion 
of a normative framework. 558 
One lesson learned from the Convention Plus Initiative is that refugee 
targeted assistance is that refugee targeted assistance to developing host states 
should not be linked to streamlined development aid.  A notion of fairness 
between states would require separate and additional financial arrangements and 
resources to host states. 
Secondly, the division of labour between Northern donor states and Southern 
hosts, that framed the Convention Plus and continues to frame contemporary 
responsibility sharing debates, does not cater for fair sharing.  This is for the simple 
reason that fair sharing requires a structural adjustment.  In a critique of the 
Convention Plus, Zeick wrote: 
 
A structural adjustment, as it were, that would entail a reapportioning of the 
responsibilities of states, and would go beyond a mere palliative, voluntary, 
and ad hoc form of assistance to unduly heavily burdened states.559 
 
The need for this structural adjustment in the international refugee law regime is 
still pertinent today.  Before unpacking and elaborating further on this argument, it 
is considered appropriate to look into how the Global Compact on Refugees, 
envisages the operationalising of responsibility sharing between states and explain 
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3.5.5. The Global Compact on Refugees as a comprehensive framework towards 
a more equitable and fair responsibility sharing  
The Global Compact on Refugees was adopted on 17 December 2018, by a large 
majority of 181 votes before the United Nations General Assembly, with the US 
and Hungary opposing and with Dominican Republic, Eritrea and Libya 
absenting.560  It was a result of two years intense negotiations chaired by UNHCR, 
who also led the drafting the Compact.  
Despite being non-binding, the Compact is rooted in international refugee 
law and policy,561 situated within and under the Refugee Convention and builds 
on ‘operational practice developed since the earliest days of the UN’.562  Its 
primary purpose as stated in the document is to provide a basis for ‘predictable 
and equitable burden and responsibility sharing among all United Nations 
Member States, together with relevant stakeholders, as appropriate..’.563  
As already put forward in the thesis, the adoption of the Global Compact 
on Refugees by the General Assembly of the United Nations represents for the 
enlightened positivist the latest evidence to the claim that the protection of 
refugees, including the provision of solutions, reflects a community interest in 
international law which is primary served by the Refugee Convention and which 
can only be advanced through international cooperation and responsibility 
sharing.  This is why the Compact frames the contemporary refugee challenge as 
the ‘common concern of humankind’, stressing thus the common responsibility 
of the international community, whilst emphasizing that refugee protection runs 
parallel with and depends on fair responsibility-sharing.564  Another objective of 
the Global Compact is to support the refugee hosting states, by easing pressure, 
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for the latter provide a global public good on behalf of the international 
community.565  In practical terms, the Compact envisages responsibility sharing 
as a partnership of states of origin, asylum, transit and destination against a 
framework of common responsibilities differentiated on each states’ capacities 
and resources.566   
The Compact puts in place a series of voluntary participatory pledging 
conferences.  A periodic Global Refugee Forum is established at a ministerial 
level, to be convened every four years during which states, and other relevant 
stakeholders, announce their pledges and contributions to the objectives of 
Compact.567  Pledges are then recorded and tracked in a public registry operated 
by UNHCR.  The Compact provides for follow-up and review processes such as 
a stocktaking of progress and a mechanism that tracks and reviews the 
implementation of the contributions.568   
When it comes to what responsibility sharing entails under the Global 
Compact, there is a non-exhaustive list of modalities, ‘areas for support’ that 
states can choose to pledge for in line with their capacities.569  In this sense, the 
scope of responsibility sharing under the Global Compact on Refugees is 
considerably broader than what has traditionally been understood to mean 
financial and physical sharing.  It extends to supporting host countries and 
communities with infrastructure, expertise and resources to all identified areas of 
support, to prevention of root causes and political support to countries origin.570   
In relation to prevention of the root causes of forced displacement, this is a 
laudable effort supported at the UN level through the UN Secretary General’s 
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Agenda on Prevention. 571   However, broadening the scope of responsibility 
sharing in refugee law to include root causes or post conflict prevention raises 
certain concerns.  Addressing the root causes, - namely prevention of refugee 
flows has been facilitated through the provision of aid, peace talks and 
peacekeeping missions, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and diplomacy.572  
In a seminal article on the geopolitics of refugee studies, Chimni argued that the 
root causes strategy that has been hailed as the appropriate response to refugees 
coming from the Third World has been responsible for the turn to protection in 
the region, through humanitarian and development assistance.573  This strategy 
has in turn been conceptually facilitated by the proclamation of ‘the right to 
remain’, which has had as a consequence the right to seek asylum to be de-
emphasized.574  It has been thus supported that the right to remain, precisely 
because it is conditioned upon some sort of intervention to prevent flight in the 
first place,575 ultimately negates the palliative character of the refugee protection 
regime.576   
Taking these concerns to the implementation of the Global Compact, 
pledges made by states to address root causes and capacity building in countries 
of origin can be used as tokens of their commitments to responsibility sharing.577  
It is submitted, however, that contributions to root causes should remain outside 
the context of responsibility sharing for the purposes of international protection.   
In light of the wider externalisation and contentment practices discussed in 
this Chapter, a narrower conception of responsibility sharing that aligns with the 
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Refugee Convention’s objective to ensure protection to refugees is limited to the 
two components of financial and physical sharing.  Financial sharing, understood 
as assistance to refugee host countries to meet the rights of refugees guaranteed 
by the Refugee Convention and physical sharing as relocating refugees to third 
countries, when such rights cannot be guaranteed by the host country.  To use the 
words of the Brazilian representative at the UN, physical sharing becomes 
necessary so ‘a proportion of refugees currently in overloaded (developing) 
countries can seek protection elsewhere’. 578   This physical sharing can be 
facilitated either through the institution of asylum, or resettlement or through 
complementary pathways to protection. 579   
The Global Compact has endorsed a ‘whole of society approach’, expanding 
the stakeholders to protection and responsibility sharing beyond states, to 
individuals, academics and researchers, cities, municipalities and local 
authorities, faith-based organisations, NGOs, parliaments, private sector 
organisations, refugees and diaspora and sports organisations – that can also 
pledge material, financial and other support to protection and solutions 
contributing to the responsibility sharing effort. 580   
As already mentioned, it is too early in the Compact’s implementation to 
assess any normative impact on the nature of responsibility sharing in 
international refugee law.  Indeed, many of the responsibility sharing modalities 
envisaged in the Compact can be said to be promising.  In particular, what stands 
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out is that the Compact promotes responsibility by capacity, by calling states to 
contribute on the basis of their capacities, resources and levels of development.581   
 Despite these positive advances, the thesis argues that the Compact is 
unlikely to fill in the normative gap of the Refugee Convention with respect to 
responsibility sharing.  This is primarily because the Compact solely rests on what 
has been described as the conundrum of ‘no new obligations but with a political 
commitment’. 582   The pledges and contributions to protection and solutions 
remain entirely discretionary for states, as does the participation to the Global 
Refugee Forums.  There is no formal structure,583 outside the ad hoc Global 
Refugee Forums, nor an explicit responsibility sharing partnership between states 
based in international law.584  The whole edifice of the Compact rests in the good 
will of states that choose to participate in the Forums every four years.  
Lastly, the Global Compact has in many respects drawn and cherry picked 
from a combination of climate change law instruments but missed important 
opportunities in the process of doing so.  One such missed opportunity is not 
explicitly adopting a framework of CBDRRC585 and expressly pronouncing on 
the common responsibility to protect refugees and resolve refugee situations and 
what that entails with respect to states’ differentiated contributions to protection 




581 Global Compact, para 5. 
582Gilbert ‘Not Bound but Committed’, 29. 
583 Aleinikoff, The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees’, 613. 
584 Geoff Gilbert ‘Not Bound but Committed’ (2019) 59 International Migration IOM 28, 30. 
Emphasis added.  
585 Global Compact on Refugees, para 1 and 4. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
 As a matter of international law, the STC arrangements discussed in this Chapter, 
constitute a bad faith implementation of the duty to cooperate in the provision of 
refugee protection and solutions, going squarely against fair responsibility 
sharing.  The only exception to such practices can be currently seen in the context 
of responsibility sharing in Latin America.   
The increasing focus of the Global North on migration management and 
border control has thus had a direct impact upon the provision of international 
protection by defining approaches to asylum.586  Western states’ efforts to move 
refugees away from their borders and contain them in third countries are 
challenging the very foundations of the international refugee regime. 587   
The STC arrangements discussed in the Chapter have enhanced the risk of 
direct or indirect refoulement, contributed to indefinite prolonged detention, 
family separation, as well as other numerous violations of refugees’ human 
rights.588  This is because the true objective of the Dublin Regulation, Australia’s 
offshore processing regime and the other bilateral agreements discussed in the 
context of responsibility sharing in the practices of states, has been border control, 
combatting people smuggling, and control of irregular or secondary migration 
movements.589   
 What is more, these practices directly challenge the vision of a cosmopolitan 
idea of hospitality towards refugees.  According to Shacknove and Byrne, the STC 
concept in particular, has normative implications, to the extent that it, ‘stresses the 
random geographic proximity of host States to the country of origin, runs counter 
 
586 Crisp, ‘A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalization, Migration and the Uncertain Future of 
the International Refugee Regime’ UNHCR New Issues on Refugee Research, Working Paper 
No 100. (December 2003). 
587 Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 171. 
588 Moreno Lax, ‘The Legality of Safe Third Country Notion Contested: Insights from the 
Law of Treaties’, 668. 
589 Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 164. 
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to the intended universal scope of the Refugee Convention (..) and undermines 
the principle of burden sharing’.590   
A further result of the STC arrangements is the negative impact they have on 
interstate relations. As evidenced in the context of the EU, frontline Member 
states were disproportionately encumbered because of the Dublin’s operation and 
left without support from their fellow central and northern Member States creating 
tensions in the region.  
In the context of the wider North-South relations, Northern countries have 
generally endorsed, in one way or another, the STC concept and have expressed 
the view that ‘earlier passage or stay in another country’ engages the 
responsibility of that state for the processing of the claim.591  Refugee-hosting 
developing states, on the other hand, have at various opportunities expressed their 
concern on STC practices and the view that such practices undermine fairness 
between states.  In 1993, Brazil stated before the UNHCR Executive Committee: 
 
Recourse to the concept of "protection elsewhere" also posed serious 
problems, since it placed increased pressure on less developed countries or 
those not sufficiently prepared to provide protection and assistance to 
refugees. 592 
 
In a similar vein, the Bulgarian representative commented: 
 
Some countries were applying the concepts of first country of asylum and 
safe country of origin in a manner that caused his Government great concern 
 
590 Byrnie and Shacknove ‘The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law,’ 227.  
591 Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of Safe Third Country Notion Contested, : Insights from the 
Law of Treaties’, 707. 
592 UNHCR Executive Committee, Forty-fourth session, A/AC.96/SR. 485, October 1993, 
Summary Record of the 485th / Statement of Brazil para 2. 
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(..) The problem was one of the utmost importance for Bulgaria, a major 
transit country for refugees from Africa, Asia and the Middle East.593 
 
In light of the above, the STC arrangements result in a glaring imbalance of 
protection responsibilities between states by stressing responsibility by proximity, 
rather than responsibility by capacity. 594   
To conclude, throughout the life of the international refugee law regime 
life, the need for greater fairness in the way refugee protection responsibilities are 
shared between states has been acknowledged by host states, donor states and 
UNHCR before multiple fora and most recently within the Global Compact on 
Refugees.   
To return to the lessons learnt from the UNHCR Convention Plus Initiative 
identified earlier in the discussion, and Zeick’s observation of a structural 
adjustment that was missing at the time,595 it is argued that a structural adjustment 
is still missing today from international refugee law.  The structural adjustment 
necessary to fill in the gap of responsibility sharing consists of a responsibility 
sharing structure that will permanently institutionalise responsibility sharing in 
international law and put in place a partnership framework, whereby states of 
origin, transit and destination come together and contribute to protection 
according to their capacities and resources.   
To this end, a conception of responsibility sharing put forward in the thesis 
is considerably narrower than the one reflected in the Global Compact on 
Refugees.  It is limited to a common baseline commitment to financial and 
physical responsibility sharing.  Financial sharing is understood as humanitarian 
 
593 UNHCR Executive Committee, Forty-fourth session, A/AC.96/SR. 485, October 1993, 
Summary Record of the 485th / Statement of Bulgaria, para. 47. 
594 M W Doyle, ‘Responsibility Sharing: From Principle to Policy’ (2018) 30 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 618, 619.  
595 Zeick, ‘Doomed to Fail from the Outset? UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative Revisited’, 
404. 
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and development assistance to refugee host countries to meet the rights of 
refugees guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and physical sharing is 
understood as the need for physical relocation through the institution of asylum, 
resettlement and other complementary pathways to protection when refugee host 
countries are severely encumbered.  These two essential components symbolize 
the common baseline commitment each state should make to refugee protection.  
Other refugee related action such as policy harmonisation in regional contexts, 
political support in countries of origin, root causes prevention, resources, research 
and expertise to host countries are important insofar as they complement and not 










4 Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 





This part of the thesis embarks on a de lege ferenda exploration of how 
international refugee law can develop to fill in the gap of the Refugee Convention, 
under a formal structure of responsibility sharing that codifies a responsibility 
sharing obligation in international law.  In pursuing this, the parallel study of 
international environmental law is instrumental.   
This Chapter begins with a brief discussion of the logic of differential 
treatment in other areas of international law reflecting of community interests, 
including the law of development and international trade law, the law of the sea 
and international human rights law.  The discussion provides context and historical 
background on the various rationales for differentiation between states in various 
legal regimes, evidencing that contextual, non-reciprocal commitments have long 
been a key feature of international law making.  It continues with a discussion that 
sheds light on the normative rationale of the principle of CBDRRC, which reflects 
an idea of fairness in international law, exemplified in the context of resource and 
benefit allocation between states of the Global North and the Global South.  
Further, it examines how the logic of CBDRRC has been implemented in key 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), before embarking on a detailed 
journey into the role and evolution of the principle in the international climate 
change regime.  It concludes with a detailed analysis of the legal architecture of 
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the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, as one recent example of how 
international law can accommodate the competing and often conflicting interests 
of states under a legal framework in pursuit of community interests.  
 
4.2. Differential treatment in international law  
Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities596 captures 
the essence of differential treatment in international environmental law. 597  
Although the doctrine of CBDRRC originated and was explicitly articulated in 
international environmental law, the wider practice of differentiated legal 
obligations between states can be traced back to the Treaty of Versailles.598  
Historically, differential treatment emerged as a way of balancing the inherent 
inequalities and competing interests among states - something that had been 
previously largely ignored in international law making.599  At a more theoretical 
level, differentiation in law stems from an idea of substantive equality between 
states. 600  This is in contrast to the legal equality of sovereign states that requires 
their strict and uniform legal treatment.601  In practice, it has also been a tool for 
forging collective action and ensuring broader participation in multilateral treaty 
 
596 The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
was first expressed as ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development as Principle 7. 
597 Philippe Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of 
Inter-State Relations’, (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 549, 577. 
598 Cristopher D Stone, ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’ 
(2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 276, 278. referring to the 1919 Constitution 
of the International Labour Organisation. Footnote omitted.  
599 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford Clarendon Press 1986), 
351. 
600 Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 549, 553. 
601 Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’, in D Bodansky, J Brunnée & E Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007), 646. 
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regimes.602  In summary, the role of differential treatment is generally understood 
as twofold; a distributive one, insofar as states are not substantively equals and a 
facilitating one, insofar as it strengthens multilateralism and cooperative action.603   
 
4.2.1. Differential treatment in international trade and international development 
law 604 
When the international community acquired a more heterogeneous composition 
little after decolonisation in the 1960’s, it became clear that formal legal equality,  
as legal corollary of sovereign equality, could not be upheld at all times. 605  
Developing states had different social and economic priorities to developed states 
and therefore, the central challenge was to accommodate such diverse priorities 
and realities in a context-specific legal regime on international cooperation and 
responsibility sharing in the various areas of common concern to the United 
Nations in the pursuit of community interests. 
The developing countries started to voice their concerns about the control 
over economic resources of their territories and to argue that political 
independence had not brought with it economic independence.606  The states of 
 
602 Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, 550. 
603 Ibid. 558. 
604 The expression ‘international law of development’ (or ‘international development law’) is 
attributed to the economist A Philip who during the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development called developed states to establish such law. The legal school of international 
development law has appealed to French Jurists who shaped originally the debate and it was 
emerged in connection to the international development strategy put forwards by the UN in 
the 1960s. See Ahmed Mahiou, ‘Development, International Law’ Max Plank Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law (2013).  
605  Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, 564. 
606 Ibid, 565. 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 155 
Asia, Africa and Latin America had as their central preoccupation and mission 
their economic development.607   
In 1964, a negotiating block of developing countries, the G-77/China, under 
the auspices of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
started putting before international for the demand to remedy economic stagnation 
during the colonial rule and to assist the less economically advanced states to 
become economically independent.608  At the same time, alternative normative 
prescriptions for a new international legal system, that would respect and promote 
the interests of the global South, appeared in the academic discourse.609  The birth 
of the law of development signified a nascent approach to international law, with 
the developing countries calling for a regime of positive discrimination, unilateral 
and non-reciprocal preferences, and for a new set of principles and rules on the 
international order.610  
 It was the 1970’s when demands for a new set of international principles and 
rules culminated in the establishment of the movement of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). 611   The three fundamentals of the NIEO were the 
protection of the economies of developing countries, positive discrimination and 
non-reciprocity by means of application of the principle of preferential 
 
607 Lavanya Rajamani Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006), 4. 
608 The Group of 77 at the United Nations http://www.g77.org/doc/  
609 The appearance of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) is an 
academic, intellectual movement that begun to confront colonialism and question the 
foundations of international law, as a system that legitimizes, produces and sustains the 
subordination of the Third World by the West. See Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL’ (2000) 
94 Proceedings of America Society of International Law, 31-38. 
610 Maurice Flory, ‘Adapting International Law to the Development of the Third World’ 
(1982) 26 Journal of African Law 12, 15. 
611 Daniel Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of the Developing Countries, Differential, Contextual 
and Absolute Norms’ (1990) 1 Colorado Journal International Environmental Law and Policy 
69, 74. 
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treatment.612  Despite the short life of the NIEO movement, the dialogue between 
the North and the South was shaped by the NIEO rhetoric.613  The year of 1974 
was dedicated at the United Nations to the establishment of a NIEO.  The adoption 
of the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, 614 the Programme of Action on the NIEO,615 and 
the Adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States616 were the 
three instruments and outcomes of the NIEO movement.  The UNGA Declaration 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was founded in 
respect for the principles of inter alia, ‘the broadest co-operation of all the States 
members of the international community based on equity’ and ‘preferential and 
non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all fields 
of international economic co-operation whenever possible’.617   
All three NIEO resolutions repeatedly affirmed the importance of equity, the 
latter dictating that the individual characteristics of developing countries need to 
be taken into account.618  Shelton has noted that references to equity throughout 
the texts of the NIEO instruments, such as ‘equitable sharing, equitable prices and 
equitable terms of trade’ reflected a concerted effort ‘to apply the principle of 
distributive justice to construct new legal and political arrangements to allow 
 
612 Wil D Verwey, ‘The Principles of a New International Economic Order and the Law on 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs’ (1990) 3 Leiden Journal of International Law 
117,123. 
613 Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, 566. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 
19. 
614 Declaration on the Establishment of New International Economic Order UNGA A/Res/S-
63201 (S-VI) (1974) Sixth Special Session.   
615 Ibid. 
616 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States’, UNGA Resolution ‘A/Res/29/3281 
December 1974. 
617 Declaration on the Establishment of New International Economic Order, paragraph 4 (b), 
(n). 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Article 25. 
618 Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of the Developing Countries, Differential, Contextual and 
Absolute Norms’,78. 
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developing countries to overcome the inheritance of their colonial past’.619 Equity 
or fairness thus understood, emanate from a conception of distributive justice that 
militates that the relevant dissimilarities, - pervasive inequalities ‘of economic 
capacity or lack of development to tackle a given problem’ among the subjects of 
law - 620 warrant special attention or special treatment in international law.621   
Within international trade law, the claim for distributive justice was pursued 
by developing countries through an insistence on preferential treatment.  
Preferential treatment in trade agreements, namely granting special rights and 
privileges to the developing countries only, was one of the earliest instances of 
differential treatment within international law in favour of the developing 
countries. 622   
During the life of the NIEO movement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) tried to accommodate some of the demands of developing countries 
for non-reciprocity and preferential treatment.  In 1964, the GATT was revised to 
include special provisions for developing countries. 623   In 1979, the GATT 
established a permanent legal basis for preferential treatment of the developing 
countries, commonly known as the ‘Enabling Clause.  This provided for derogation 
from ‘the most favoured nation clause’, namely GATT’s Article 1 non-
discrimination provision. 624   The contracting states adopted the ‘Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
 
619 Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’, in D Bodansky, J Brunnée & E Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007), 650. 
620 Ibid. 647. 
621 Tuula Honkonen, The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (2009 Kluwer Law International), 40-41. 
622 Verwey ‘The Principles of a New International Economic Order and The Law on General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’, 123. 
623 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Part IV Goods, Article XXXVI (8) 
recognized for the first time the principle of non-reciprocity in tariff negotiations or 
renegotiations.  
624GATT, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903). 
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of Developing Countries’, which granted preferential tariffs to the developing 
countries.625  
Notwithstanding the changes to GATT, the economic and social 
discrepancies between the developed and developing countries were not reduced 
and the profits of the vast majority of developing countries were very limited.626  
Even if the NIEO rhetoric managed to influence, in principle, the regulatory 
framework on international trade, in practice, trade concessions by means of 
preferential treatment of the developing countries were merely discretionary, ‘an 
entitlement whose implementability is not guaranteed by a corresponding 
obligation to the extent necessary to make it a substantive right’.627  
The claims of the developing countries on preferential treatment did not 
flourish because the developed states were not prepared to commit to legally 
binding, non–reciprocal preferential standards, nor to any form of wealth 
redistribution.  The NIEO rhetoric did not make it beyond the early 1980’s when 
a laissez faire approach to the global regulatory market was introduced.628  The 
early 1990’s witnessed the demise of preferential treatment of the developing 
countries in the global trade arena, especially since the establishment of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).629  In light of the new pressing global concern in 
relation to environmental issues, the need for economic development resurfaced 
and differential treatment took the form of ‘mutually accepted non-reciprocity’.630   
 
625 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries’ 28 November 1979, GATT BISD 1980, 203-205.  
626 Verwey ‘The Principles of a New International Economic Order and The Law on General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’, 140. 
627 Ibid.,141. 
628 Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, 568. 
629 GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (World Trade Organization), 15 December 
1993.  
630 Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations’, 556. Shelton, ‘Equity’, 650.  
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4.2.2. Differential treatment in the Law of the Sea 
The negotiations on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),631 were influenced by the NIEO rhetoric and relevant debates before 
the UNGA. 632 The Law of the Sea Convention recognises in various provisions 
the special needs of the developing countries.633   
The need for differential treatment under the UNCLOS was somewhat 
different to that of the international trade regime.  It was used as a means to ensure 
access to participation and benefit-sharing under the international seabed legal 
regime.  The UNCLOS of 1982 established that the mineral resources of the deep 
seabed, what is termed ‘the Area’ are the ‘common heritage of mankind’ 634 and 
all activities in the Area, shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
irrespective of the geographical location of states, whether coastal or land-locked, 
and taking particular consideration of the interests and needs of developing 
states.635  
The concept of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ is the most well-known 
expression of community interest in international law with regard to the use of 
natural resources beyond national jurisdiction. 636  The institutionalisation of the 
principle in UNCLOS and the legal regime of the deep seabed establishes a regime 
of benefits-sharing between states that ensures an equitable sharing of financial, 
 
631 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted Montego Bay, 10 December 
198 and entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397. 
632 Honkonen, The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, 48. 
633 See indicatively, Article 202, 203 266, 267 268. Section 5 and 7 of the Annex to the 1994 
Agreement provide for transfer of technology and economic assistance. Agreement Relating 
to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982, July 1994. 
634 UNCLOS, Article 136. 
635 UNCLOS, Article 140. 
636 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’, 240. 
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and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area.637  A community 
obligation in the pursuit of the community interest in the deep sea bed regime is 
the obligation of states to cooperate with each other and with the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA),638 the latter acting as a trustee on behalf of mankind as a 
whole.639  The UNCLOS thus fosters community interests and ‘instantiates its 
vision of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’640 by acknowledging the 
disadvantaged geographic location of some of the developing landlocked states641 
and by ensuring broad participation to the seabed regime and a fair distribution of 
its financial benefits.  
In the context of prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, the 
UNCLOS includes two provisions on preferential treatment of developing 
countries, prescribing that developing states shall be granted preference by 
international organisations in the allocation of funds and technical assistance to 
enable them to meet their marine environmental protection requirements. 642  To 
conclude, this type of differentiation in the area of marine pollution and 
technology transfer is different to the one advocated under the early years of 
GATT and the NIEO movement.  It is an acknowledgment of the fact that 
developing countries have limited technical capacities and resources and thus 
require assistance from the developed countries.  It is not, hence, based on some 
idea of redistribution of wealth.   
 
 
637 UNCLOS, Article 140, paragraph 2. 
638 UNCLOS, Article 153. 
639 Wolfrum, Identifying Community Interests in International Law, 26. 
640 Volker Roeben, ‘Responsibility in International Law’ (2012) 16 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, 99.  
641 UNCLOS, Article 148. 
642 UNCLOS, Articles 202-203. 
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4.2.3. Differential treatment in International Human Rights Law 
 As it has already been noted an idea of community interests is not reserved for 
spaces beyond national jurisdiction but extends to other areas of international law 
such as the protection of human rights.  
It is not therefore surprising that an element of contextual differentiation 
therefore in favour of the developing countries, at the implementation level, 
structurally permeates international human rights instruments.  The term 
‘contextual’ is taken from Magraw’s distinction of norms into ‘differential, 
contextual and absolute’. 643   A contextual norm provides, on the face of it, 
identical treatment to all states-parties, but the implementation of it requires or 
permits consideration of characteristics that may vary from country to country.644   
In the first instance, permitting states to differentiate in the implementation 
of their human rights obligations might seem problematic, but in practice 
international human rights instruments include provisions that cater for the needs 
of developing countries, particularly when it comes to the implementation and 
realisation of the rights prescribed .645   
One such instance is the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights646 (ICESCR) that offers a certain degree of flexibility to 
countries in the implementation of the rights of the Covenant.647  Article 2 (1) of 
the ICESCR recognizes the particular socio-economic level of each state and 
requires states to take steps:  
 
 
643 Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of the Developing Countries, Differential, Contextual and 
Absolute Norms’, 74. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 23. 
646 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Adopted in 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS Vol 993. 
647 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 21. 
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[I]ndividually and through international cooperation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.648  
 
Recognition of the fact that states have different resources and capacities when it 
comes to the full realisation of the community interests enshrined in the Covenant 
does not mean that the rights protected thereunder are not universal, or that they 
can be subject to unfettered restrictions and abuse.649  It simply stresses the fact 
that developing countries have lower levels of economic development and that the 
full realisation of the economic and social rights of its people, as well as of the 
aliens hosted in their territory, depend to a great extent on international 
cooperation.   
As the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains in its 
General Comment on the nature of the obligation of Article 2: 
 
the concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact 
that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally 
not be able to be achieved in a short period of time. In this sense the 
obligations on socio-economic rights differ significantly from the obligation 
contained in Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which ‘embodies an immediate obligation to respect and ensure all 
of the relevant rights. 650 
 
 
648 ICESCR, Article 2 (1). 
649 Ibid. 22. 
650 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 3: The 
Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 9, of the Covenant). 
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The ‘progressive realisation’ concept infuses thus flexibility and represents a 
contextual form of differentiation between subjects of law, ‘reflects the realities 
of the real world’651 and gives states a margin of appreciation when it comes to 
implementation of the Covenant.652  Differential treatment in human rights law 
does not therefore alter the core of the legal obligations undertaken in the treaty 
by allowing for discrimination, rather it provides context and frames 
implementation in a way that acknowledges the limited capacities of the 
developing states.   
Since securing the full gamut of the socio-economic rights requires 
resources and international cooperation, by analogy the full gamut of socio-
economic rights envisaged in the Refugee Convention cannot be realistically 
guaranteed to the refugees, without assistance from the international community.   
A cautionary note on this parallel however is that compliance with the 
Refugee Convention is not and shall not become conditional upon receipt of 
international assistance.653  That said, the structural adjustment necessary to fill in 
the responsibility sharing gap of the international refugee law regime would 
require provisions that recognise the limited capacities of refugee host states 
whilst calling for meaningful assistance from the better resourced and capable 
states. 
 
4.3. The normative rationale for differentiation in international law  
The underlying thread for differentiation highlighted so far is the 
acknowledgement of the vast differences and the pervasive inequalities between 
states in an effort to redress them ‘in the service of some notion of fairness, 
 
651 Ibid. 
652 Magraw, Legal Treatment of the Developing Countries, Differential, Contextual and 
Absolute Norms’, 81. 
653 Dowd and McAdam, ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 198. 
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however elemental’.654  Fairness considerations have equally underpinned the 
refugee responsibility sharing discourse with respect contributions.  Reflections 
thus on the wider role of fairness in international law, particularly for multilateral 
law-making in areas of community interests are illuminating.  
One of the most famous conceptions of justice in contemporary political 
theory, particularly relevant to our debate on responsibility sharing and allocation 
challenges, is found in John Rawls’s Theory of Justice.655  Rawls’s conception of 
justice can be achieved only if the actors are placed in an ‘original position’ and 
behind the ‘veil of ignorance’,  where actors behave rationally, as if they are equals 
not knowing whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged by social or natural 
contingencies. 656   In the said conception of justice, social and economic 
inequalities are tolerated on the basis of a ‘difference principle’, according to 
which social and economic inequalities are acceptable, insofar as they result in 
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged in 
society.657  Although Rawls did not develop his theory of justice for international 
law,658 by analogy, a Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness at the international 
level warrants that the inequalities of states are taken into account within the law’s 
distributive aspects.659  Rawls’s theory of justice, although ideal theory, can have 
hermeneutic importance for international law.  Indeed, as one scholar argues, the 
principle of CBDRRC in international environmental law reflects Rawlsian 
understandings of justice as fairness. 
 
 
654 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 47. 
655 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University 1999). 
656 Rawls defines original position as ‘the appropriate initial status quo which ensures that the 
fundamental agreements reached in it are fair’. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 15. 
657 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 13, and 65-70. 
658 Rawls expressed the view that the ‘conditions for the law of nations may require different 
principles arrived at in a somewhat different way’. Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 7. 
659 For Rawlsian theories at the international level, Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989) 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY). 
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Reciprocity under cooperation governed by the principles of justice can be 
seen as a corresponding idea to common responsibility, and the ‘everyone 
doing his/her fair share’ as referring both to the requirement to participate in 
common action and to differentiated obligations when justice would require 
that.660  
 
Another notable account of fairness developed, particularly for international law, 
is that of Thomas Franck.661  When we speak of fairness, Franck contends, ‘we 
allude to claims of justice.662  Franck’s account of fairness in international law 
and institutions is pertinent to the responsibility sharing debates in all areas of 
collective action and community interest, irrespective of the nature of the resource 
or the burden to be distributed.   
Franck’s analytical framework begins with a working definition of his 
conception of fairness, which encompasses two aspects; a procedural one which 
is legitimacy – i.e. decisions arrived under the right process by those who are duly 
authorised – which he terms procedural fairness, and a substantive one, which is 
the distributive effect of the international legal system, namely distributive 
justice.663  As already noted, differential treatment serves a pragmatic rationale 
too, namely to secure effectiveness and wide participation in multilateral legal 
arrangements such as the GATT, UNCLOS and human rights regimes.  Wider 
participation and voluntary compliance are very much dependent at the 
international level on the perception of the rule or a system of rules as 
‘distributively fair’.664   
 
660 Honkonen, The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, 85.  
661 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 
1995). 
662 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 477. 
663 Ibid., 7. Emphasis added. 
664 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 7-8. 
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Franck offers a compelling argument on why matters of distributive justice 
should be a matter of international law, which this thesis endorses and builds on 
consistently with an enlightened positivist methodology.  Normative 
considerations of fairness should be central to the assessment and development of 
the law, ‘for the law must create solutions and systems which take into account 
society’s answers to these moral issues of distributive justice, for we are moral as 
well as social beings.’665 
Today’s international law accommodates normative considerations of 
fairness in the wider fairness discourse, even if they are not explicitly articulated 
as such: 
 
Bilateral and multilateral aid programs, concessionary lending, commodity 
stabilization, trade preferences [for poorer trading partners], resource 
transfers and sharing, and the creation, and equal or equitable distribution, 
of new resources: these are the new entitlements which mark a global 
awareness that distributive justice .... is never off the agenda, whether the 
subject is manganese nodules on the ocean floor, geostationary orbits in outer 
space, or penguins and the Antarctic’s icecap. 666 
 
 The concept and meaning of equity in international law is somewhat distinct to 
common law jurisdictions.667  Equity in international law has come to reflect the 
considerations of substantive differences between states when distributing 
 
665 Ibid., 8. 
666 Ibid., 436. 
667 In common law jurisdictions, equity represents the corrective function in the application of 
the law in an individual case. Therefore, international law commentators from common law 
jurisdictions are cautious in using the term equity in public international law. A well-
rehearsed debate on the nature of equity in international law is found in the Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law (1988) 277- 291 as well as in Francesco Francioni, 
‘Equity in International Law’ Max Plank Encyclopaedia of International Law.  
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burdens and benefits.668  Thus, equity in international law becomes synonymous 
with fairness.669  Batruch elucidates this point, by contending that ‘what in moral 
terms is called fairness, in law is termed equity. 670  Soltau argues: 
 
The language of sharing responsibilities for collective problems, of taking 
account of the relative position and capacities of developed and developing 
countries in the establishment and implementation of international regimes 
is the idiom of fairness in relations between states.671   
 
It is precisely this synonymous relationship of the two terms that manifests itself 
in the interchangeable use of both in the context of refugee protection and the 
relevant debate on responsibility-sharing that also revolves around an idea of 
fairness. 
More than any other area of international law, international environmental 
law has been the most progressive legal arena, where fairness and equity concerns 
have been structurally integrated within the various environmental protection 
regimes through the doctrine of CBDRRC. 672  CBDRRC is environmental law’s 
tool for structurally integrating considerations of fairness, either at the level of 
norms or at the level of implementation of norms.  Like the ‘common heritage of 
 
668 On this use of the term equity, Honkonen, The Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
Principle in Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 99. 
669 Henry Shue writes that what diplomats and lawyers call equity incorporates important 
aspects of what ordinary people everywhere call fairness. Henry Shue, ‘Global Environment 
and International Inequality’ (1999) 75 International Affairs 531. 
670 Christine Batruch, ‘Hot Air as Precedent for Developing Countries? Equity 
Considerations’ (1999) 17 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law Policy 45, 48.  
671 Fridrich Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 189. 
672 To be sure, equity in international environmental law has further two distinct iterations; 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity. See for a discussion Shelton, ‘Equity’.  
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mankind’ principle, CBDRRC is a norm that expresses community interests in the 
protection of the environment.673 
The following section discusses in detail how a logic of CBDRRC developed 
and framed the conclusion of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  
The discussion offers the foundations for a well-rounded understanding of the 
trajectory and role CBDRRC took in the climate change regime. 
  
4.4. Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDRRC) in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
The need to differentiate between states of the Global North and the Global South 
emerged over a ‘dialogue of dissonance’674 over international cooperation for the 
protection of the environment.  Understanding this dissonance can be helpful to 
the refugee responsibility sharing debate. 
The dissonance emerged over two conflicting community interests, both 
arguably in dire need for international regulation and international cooperation at 
the time; the protection of the environment and the economic development of 
some countries.  One of the early global environmental dialogues took place in 
Stockholm, during an international conference convened under the auspices of the 
UN in 1972.675   
The Report on the UN Conference on Human Environment stressed the need 
to balance environmental protection with economic development bringing, within 
its ideological terrain, the protection of basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as part of the human environment. 676   The Stockholm Declaration 
proclaimed that all non-renewable resources of the Earth must be managed in a 
 
673 Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Community Interests’, 151. 
674 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 54. 
675 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 
June 1972, at 2 and Corr.1. 
676 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 1.  
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way that ensures that benefits are shared by all mankind. 677   The special 
developmental needs of the developing countries were to be catered for through 
the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance.678  
Some of the key MEAs that advance the protection of community interests 
implement a CBDRRC logic. The first multilateral environmental agreement, 
premised upon differential treatment in favour of the developing countries, was 
the international legal regime on the protection of the ozone layer.   
The depletion of the ozone layer was initially a problem predominantly 
impacting the Northern hemisphere.679  Uncoordinated, unilateral action from 
specific countries resulted in a ‘free rider’ effect 680  that urgently needed the 
conclusion of a cooperative framework that would address it.  The Vienna 
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer 681  did not contain any 
substantive obligations for the states - parties.  Rather concluded as a framework 
convention, it sketched a general framework on the causes and effects of the ozone 
depletion through international cooperation and responsibility sharing. 682   In 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, and given the gradual global 
consensus on the gravity of the problem, developed and developing countries 
concluded a second legal instrument, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
 
677 Ibid., Principle 5. 
678 Ibid., Principle 9. 
679 Initial scientific evidence of the impact of industrially produced chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC) interacting with the stratosphere and destroying the ozone layer – a gas that absorbs 
ultra - violet radiation from the sun, protecting thus the earth was disturbing for the countries 
of the North America, Western Europe, Japan, China, Soviet Union. Louis P Oliva, ‘The 
International Struggle to Save the Ozone Layer’ (1989) 7 Pace Environmental Law Review 
213, 219. 
680 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 382. 
681 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (adopted 22 March 1985, entered 
into force 22 September 1988) UNTS 1513. 
682 Catherine Redgwell ‘International Environmental Law’ in M Evans (ed) International 
Law, 694. 
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that Deplete the Ozone Layer.683  The Montreal Protocol is considered to be a 
success story in terms of cooperative responsibility sharing framework within a 
treaty regime .684  Franck characterized the ozone legal regime as the culmination 
of the fairness discourse and fairness-related claims on equitable distribution of 
environmental burdens, ‘informed by economic and scientific information and 
aided by creative lawyering’.685   
Specific targets for the reduction of ozone-depleting substances were 
explicitly introduced based on differentiation between developed and developing 
countries under the Protocol.  Developing countries were granted longer 
implementation periods, 686  such as delayed compliance schedules 687  and 
permission to adopt different base years. 688   Financial and technological 
assistance were also conditions for the developing countries’ compliance with the 
Protocol.689   
Within such a flexible responsibility sharing structure, states accommodated 
the special claims of the least developing countries for economic development 
through the controlled use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), enabled resource 
transfer from the North to the South in the form of financial and technological 
assistance, crafting a legal regime on costs and benefits allocation against 
efficiency and fairness.  Franck observes that the developed countries secured the 
much-needed cooperation of the least developing countries in the regime because 
the fairness discourse ‘played an openly acknowledged part’ in the 
 
683 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 
1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) UNTS 1522. 
684 Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of 
International Environmental law’ (2012) 88 International Affairs 605, 608. 
685 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 380-381. 
686 Montreal Protocol, Preamble. 
687 Montreal Protocol, Article 5. 
688 Montreal Protocol, Article 5 (3) (a). 
689 Ibid. Article (5). 
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negotiations.690  As seen earlier, such fairness discourse between states of the 
Global North and developing refugee host states of the South was manifestly 
absent from the UNHCR Convention Plus Initiative and the lack of transparency 
was one of the reasons that the initiative failed.  The Global Compact’s fairness 
will also depend on matters of procedural fairness, namely to what extent states 
contribute to protection and solutions in accordance with their capacities as well 
as on the impact of those pledges and contributions on refugee protection, namely 
on fairness vis-a-vis the refugees.  
The rationale for differentiating in favour of the developing and least 
developing countries in the ozone layer regime, is not to exclude the developing 
countries from legal commitments, but rather to ensure that all states take action 
and help them meet such commitments under the relevant regime progressively.691  
It is only through the transfer of finance and technology that developing parties 
can meet their obligations under the Montreal Protocol.692   
A question that has arisen here is in relation to the legal conditionality, if 
any, for developing countries’ compliance with their obligations under the 
Protocol.  In other words, is compliance with the treaty conditioned on funding 
and resource transfer from the developed countries?  In the absence of such 
transfer, should developing states be relieved of their obligations?  
 If one were to draw a parallel here to the refugee protection context, it is 
without doubt that developing refugee host countries, local communities and 
essentially refugees are dependent on developmental aid and support.  This is 
 
690 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 386. 
691 Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of 
International Environmental law’, 608. 
692 Montreal Protocol, Articles 5 (5) and Article 6. ‘Developing the capacity to fulfil the 
obligations of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of this Article to comply with the 
control measures (…) will depend upon the effective implementation of the financial co-
operation as provided by Article 10 and the transfer of technology as provided by Article 
10A. 
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where a CBDRRC guided framework can flesh out the responsibility of the Global 
North countries to contribute in some sort of proportion to its economic and social 
capacities to protection and solutions. 
Another environmental matter which qualified in the 1990s as an area of 
common concern and therefore as a reflection of community interest was the 
continuing loss of biodiversity and the urgent need for its conservation.  The 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity693 establishes differentiated responsibilities between 
the developed and developing states.  Developing countries are tasked with the 
protection of their biodiversity, while their social and economic priorities are 
taken into consideration.694  Effective protection of the biodiversity in the Global 
South depends on finance and bio-technology transfer from the developed 
countries.695   Here too, developing countries’ obligations to the Biodiversity 
Convention stand irrespective of whether resources from the developed countries 
are eventually transferred, although the Convention acknowledges that the level 
of implementation by the developing countries ‘will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments’.696  It is 
important for the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the regime, that the 
limited resources and capacities of the developing countries are acknowledged.697  
Although the Biodiversity Convention does not explicitly pronounce on 
CBDRRC, the underlying logic is found in Articles 6 and 20 that provide for each 
party’s particular conditions and capabilities when meeting its contractual 
obligations, as well as in the provisions on financial and technology resource 
transfer to the developing countries.  
 
693 The Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) (1760 U.N.T.S. 69); Hereinafter, 
Biodiversity Convention.  Preamble, recital 2. 
694 Biodiversity Convention, Article 20 (4). 
695 Ibid., Article 16 (2) & Article 20 (1). 
696 Ibid., Article 20 (4). 
697 Ibid., Article 16 & Article 20. 
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Finally, another instance where the limited capabilities and resources of the 
developing countries are acknowledged and catered for within the legal 
framework, is the 1989 Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste.698  The legal 
regime of the Basel Convention is however different to that of the Ozone Lawyer 
and Biodiversity.  It differs because it is not a legal regime that establishes a 
general framework for the protection of an area reflecting a common concern.  
The concept of ‘common concern’ in international environmental law is targeted 
at specific environmental processes or protective actions, arising beyond the 
jurisdiction of states and within the jurisdiction of individual states, mostly 
identified as such in treaty regimes.699   
The Basel Convention, although it does not explicitly frames hazardous 
waste management as an area of common concern, it seeks to control the 
outsourcing of hazardous waste to developing countries that are ill-equipped 
financially, as well as technologically, to manage the waste in an environmentally 
sound way.700  The Basel Convention provides, therefore, for different rights and 
obligations between states of import (developing) and states of export 
(developed).  As one commentator noted, the Basel Convention, in Article 6 
‘codifies procedural justice’ by providing the developing countries with an 
absolute right to refuse any import of hazardous waste, unless they expressly 
consent to it.701  In this way, the Basel Convention seeks to alleviate the pressure 
 
698 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, (adopted in 1989 and it came into force in 1992), UNTS 1673. (Basel 
Convention). 
699 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2009), 565. 
700 The Basel Convention, Preamble, & Article 14 (2). The Convention provides that 
transboundary movements can only take place, if certain conditions are met and if they are in 
accordance with certain procedures.  
701 Basel Convention, Article 6. Lisa Widawsky, ‘In my Backyard: How Enabling Hazardous 
Waste Trade to Developing Nations Can Improve the Basel Convention’s Ability to Achieve 
Environmental Justice’ (2008) 38 Environmental Law 577, 595.  
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developing countries are often faced with and reduce the environmental burdens 
borne by these financially and technologically ill-equipped countries to manage 
them.702  
 
4.5. The international climate change law regime – The 1992 Rio Declaration 
The dissonance over economic development and environmental protection 
continued during the second 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), which took place in Rio.703  Developing countries 
sought access to the global market, trade, technology and development assistance 
whilst the developed countries sought progress on climate change, biodiversity, 
fisheries issues and forest loss.704  The delicate balance of competing interests was 
achieved through the ‘inchoate’ at the time, ‘concept of sustainable 
development’,705 first articulated in the 1987 Brundtland Report.706   
The Rio Declaration incorporates international environmental law’s key 
guiding principles: The polluter pays,707 the precautionary principle,708 and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.   
Principle 7 reads: 
 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have 
 
702 Ibid.  
703 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Earth Summit 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 3-14 June 1992. 
704 Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of 
International Environmental law’, 609 
705 Ibid. 
706 UN Report on the World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common 
Future (1987) United Nations. 
707 Rio Declaration, Principle 16. 
708 Rio Declaration, Principle 15. 
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common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.709  
 
Effectively, Principle 7 guides international cooperation and responsibility 
sharing on the environment.710  All states have a common responsibility to protect 
the environment from degradation, but the subsequent responsibilities - 
understood as commitments to take action - are further differentiated in 
accordance with Principle 7, on the basis of different contributions to 
environmental degradation.   
During the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention for 
Climate Change (UNFCCC),711 which began in 1991, the incorporation of the 
principle of CBDRRC within the treaty and what this would entail in practice 
became a matter of contention between developed and developing countries.  
 
4.5.1. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDRRC) in the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)  
Climate change, also known as global warming, refers to the phenomenon of the 
extraordinary warming of the earth’s atmosphere by increased concentrations of 
trapped Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.  It is therefore predominantly a 
 
709 Rio Declaration, Principle 7. 
710 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2nd edition 2003) 231. 
711 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted May 1992, entered 
into force March 1994) UNTS 1771. (UNFCCC) 
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human-induced environmental phenomenon that requires immediate collective 
action. 712   
The Preamble to the UNFCCC frames the problem of climate. Change as of 
common concern by acknowledging its global nature and ‘calls for the wider 
possible cooperation by all countries… in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC).  CBDRRC 
has framed climate change as a global problem, under a common responsibility 
framework, - a partnership between states emitters of greenhouse gases and states 
that contribute the least to the problem – with its differentiation element to have 
been instrumental in the legal regime’s evolution. 713 
Action to combat climate change is guided by four pillars, namely: (1) 
mitigation – actions to limit or prevent the rising of the earth’s temperature 
through the reduction of GHG emissions, (2) adaptation - actions to limit the 
harmful effects of climate change by adjusting ecological, social, or economic 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli714 (3) financial support 
and technology transfer to developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation 
actions, and (4) transparency and compliance.  The focus of this section is on the 
pillar of mitigation, as well as on the pillar of financial support and technology 
transfer because of the parallels and useful lessons that can be drawn for refugee 
responsibility sharing. 
As mentioned above, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration enunciated 
CBDRRC as the guiding principle for international cooperation and burden 
 
712 97% Scientific consensus supports that global warming is mostly man-made – largely 
down to burning fossil fuels and deforestation on a mass-scale. 
https://www.wwf.org.uk/climate-change-and-global-warming  
713 Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Community Interests Procedural 
Aspects’,166 
714 An adaption measure would be for instance the building of flood defences, and the setting 
up early warning systems for cyclones. https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-
big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean  
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sharing in the area of environmental protection.  The principle of CBDRRC was 
further legalised when it was included in the UNFCCC. 715   Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC is titled ‘Principles’ and includes the precautionary principle, 
sustainable development, equity, and the principle of CBDRRC.  Much has been 
said about their legal character, but it is widely acknowledged that their function 
qua principles in the operative part of the treaty is to guide the parties in their 
actions to achieve the Convention’s objective and to implement its provisions.716  
 Comparing Rio Principle 7 to UNFCCC Article 3, one notes that the 
formulation of CBDRRC is somewhat different. Article 3 of the UNFFCC reads: 
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.  Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
  
The principle’s original formulation is thus extended to additionally include 
states’ capabilities to respond to climate change.  Commentators explain that this 
was made following the developed countries’ insistence on the projected and 
expected rapid economic development of some of the developing countries, which 
would warrant a more dynamic differentiation in relation to mitigation 
commitments.717   
CBDRRC in the UNFCCC assigns greater responsibility to those countries 
which have contributed more to the climate’s degradation because of their 
emissions as well as to those countries that have more resources and capacities to 
 
715 UNFCCC, Preamble & Article 3. 
716 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée , Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law 
(Oxford University Press 2018), 127. 
717 Ibid., 128. 
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deal with the situation. 718   Under the Convention, Annex I parties have an 
individual legal obligation to adopt national mitigation policies and measures to 
limit their GHG emissions, as well as to report on it. 719   In relation to the 
individual commitments to mitigation, the UNFCCC does not provide for 
emission reduction targets.  Concluded as Framework Convention,720 it sought to 
establish a skeletal framework of general principles and set the context, rather 
than concretise states’ commitments.  With its Annex–based differentiation of 
states, the UNFCCC offered a flexible framework for future action and solidified 
at the time, the rigid categorization of countries in Annex I and Non-Annex I 
parties. 721   
The principle of CBDRRC has been key to the subsequent development and 
the operationalisation of responsibility sharing under the climate change regime.  
This was evident in the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, an instrument that 
supplemented the UNFFCC, and which sought to operationalise CBDRRC 
through internationally negotiated, legally-binding, quantitative emissions targets 
only for the developed countries.  
 
 
718 Michael Weisslitz, ‘Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the 
Global Climate Change Context’ (2002) 13 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 473, 476. 
719 UNFCCC, Article 4 (2) (b). 
720 Framework convention are international environmental law’s toolkit in forging collective 
action and participation to multilateral legal regimes. They establish the general principles and 
objectives and leave the details and the specific obligations towards the implementation of the 
objectives to be determined at a later stage and in subsequent legal instruments. On 
Framework Convention See Lawrence E. Susskind, Saleem H. Ali, Environmental Diplomacy 
(OUP 1994), 34. 
721 It shall be noted that there are provisions on review of the Annexes that could lead in 
amendments by a three-quarter majority. See UNFCCC, Articles 15, 16, 17. 
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4.5.2. Operationalizing CBDRRC under the UNFCCC   
4.5.2.1. Responsibility sharing in the Kyoto Protocol – A sharp differentiation in 
mitigation targets between the parties 
The Kyoto Protocol722 was launched by the Berlin Mandate.723 It was concluded 
in 1997 by the parties to the UNFCCC as a supplementary instrument to the 
Convention, focusing almost entirely on strengthening mitigation commitments 
of Annex I parties under Article 4.2 of the UNFCC.  
The Kyoto Protocol is a legal instrument that establishes internationally 
negotiated, legally-binding, quantitative emission reduction targets and timetables 
for Annex I developed countries parties 724  whilst excluding the developing 
countries from any mitigation commitments.725  A suggestion was made in the 
course of the Kyoto negotiations by some of the developed countries, and in 
particular the US, that the major economies among the developing countries 
should also voluntarily assume country-specific emission reductions 
commitments. 726   The US refused to reach its Kyoto targets and ratify the 
Protocol, unless major developing countries emitters such as China, India and 
 
722 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNTS  2303,162. 
723 The UNFCCC required the Conference of the Parties to review whether the commitment 
of the developed countries to take measures by the year 2000 was adequate. Decision 1/CP.1, 
The Berlin Mandate FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995). The Parties agreed that new 
commitments were indeed needed for the post-2000 period and they established the Ad Hoc 
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) to draft a protocol or another legal instrument for 
adoption at COP-3 in December 1997 in Kyoto.    
724 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3. 
725 Annex I Parties to the UNFCC, as a result of their 150 years of their industrial activity. 
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol The CBDRRC principle explicitly appears in Article 10 of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
726 This was based on a Resolution that passed in the US Senate that forbid the US from 
signing any subsequent legal agreement additional to the UNFFCC. US Senate Resolution 98, 
25 July 1997 105th Cong., 143 Congress Records. S8138-39 (Byrd-Hagel Resolution). 
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Mexico, also undertook mitigation action on a voluntary basis.727  The China  G7 
strongly opposed such a scenario as going squarely against the Berlin Mandate 
and CBDRRC.728  The US openly rejected the Protocol in 2001, when President 
Bush came into office. 
Kyoto’s legal commitments for Annex I parties are found in Article 3, which 
establishes an individual binding obligation of result for each developed country 
party to achieve its target. 729  The Kyoto targets are found in Annex B of the 
Protocol730 and are not uniform for all Annex I parties.  Although the targets were 
negotiated during the Kyoto international conference, they had been, by and large, 
sketched at the national level.731  Commentators note that the differentiated Kyoto 
targets were as much a result of politics, as well as of a lack of agreement on 
objective criteria for an equitable differentiation.732  This, in turn, led to a pledged-
based process that reflected each state’s national interests.733  If one were to draw 
an analogy, a similar Kyoto-style approach to refugee protection would entail, 
what has been proposed by some scholars as the allocation of pre-determined 
binding refugee quotas. 
 
727 Paul G Harris, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and 
United States Policy’ (1999) 7 NYU Environmental Law Journal 27, 42. 
728 Ibid., 35.  
729 Although some initial targets did change during the diplomatic negotiations to reflect 
greater commitments. Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 
172. 
730 Annex B quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment (percentage of base year 
or period), Kyoto Protocol. 
731 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 172. 
732 Among the proposed criteria for differentiation were CO2 emissions per capita, GDP per 
capita or CO2 emissions per unit of GDP. On whether all these ‘objective’ burden sharing 
rules serve fairness, See Lasse Ringius, Asbjorn Torvanger and Bjart Holtsmark ‘Can multi-
criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens OECD results from three burden sharing rules’ 
(1998) 26 Energy Policy 777.  
733 Honkonen, The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements,130. 
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Deeply controversial in many ways and overtly ambitious, some 
commentators note it is the most ambitious environmental agreement ever 
negotiated,734 the Kyoto Protocol legalised the carbon market735 and contributed 
to the future development of the climate change regime.  Most crucially, it 
accidentally defined CBDRRC’s trajectory.  The sharp division of countries into 
Annexes was not going to be sustainable in the long term and was increasingly 
seen to not reflect existing realities.  The fact that, under the Kyoto Protocol, 
China and countries with high GHG emissions were under no obligation to reduce 
them made many developed states gradually depart from the Kyoto regime and 
this bifurcated approach to mitigation commitments.  Although the Kyoto 
Protocol is still a treaty in force, the political momentum for its extension has long 
disappeared.  Instead, the recently concluded Paris Agreement, with its unique 
approach to CBDRRC, has taken over momentum.736   
 
4.5.2.2. Responsibility sharing post-Kyoto: CBDRRC revisited 
In the years that followed the conclusion and the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Parties to the UNFCCC had to review the future of the climate 
change regime. This was due to the unwillingness of many of the developed states 
to undertake new targets, unless major developing countries emitters also took 
action.  In response to this, the Bali Road Map was adopted at the 13th Conference 
of the Parties (COP) in December 2007 in Bali.737  The Bali Action Plan launched 
a process, a dialogue that would enable ‘the full, effective and sustained 
 
734 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 161. 
735 The Protocol also includes provisions on emissions trading. Kyoto Protocol, Article 17.  
736 D Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 207. 
737 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 
December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
thirteenth session. Available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf  
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implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action’ up to 
and beyond 2012, ‘in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision’. 738  
The Bali Action Plan opted for a process towards an outcome and not for a 
legally binding instrument. 739  It required, for the first time, that the developing 
countries, take ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of 
sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’.740  This 
gradual departure from the Kyoto paradigm, towards a new approach to 
differentiation in mitigation, that had the developing countries contributing 
equivalently to global mitigation action with the support of the developed ones, 
enabled wider country participation, including crucially the US reengagement 
with the climate change regime.741   
In 2009, the Conference of the Parties took ‘note’ of a political accord 
reached in Copenhagen. 742  The Copenhagen Accord, albeit a soft law instrument 
- similar to the Global Compact on Refugees- significantly influenced the bottom- 
up approach to mitigation.  It introduced the idea of pledge and review for national 
mitigations commitments.  More specifically, the Copenhagen Accord altered the 
way in which commitments under the UNFCCC are balanced and as a corollary, 
the way CBDRRC is interpreted.  The political commitments thereunder 
represented a departure from the one-sided operationalisation of CBDRRC à la 
 
738 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 
December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
thirteenth session. 
739 According to a commentator the ‘legal form that the outcome of the Bali Action could 
take, however, was left deliberately open’. It could be a legally binding instrument, a soft law 
instrument or a decision of the Conference of the Parties. Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to 
Bali, Killing Protocol Softly?’ (2008) International and Comparatively Law Quarterly 918. 
740 Bali Action Plan 1 (b) ii. 
741 Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and Beyond, Killing Kyoto Softly?’, 910. 
742 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th Session held in Copenhagen from 7 to 
19 December 2009, Addendum UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11. (Copenhagen Accord). The COP 
took note of the Copenhagen Accord rather than endorsed in as a COP decision. 
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Kyoto-style, to a bottom-up process of pledge and review. 743   Under the 
Copenhagen Accord, all states parties to the UNFCCC, irrespective of their 
development status, committed to undertake mitigation commitments and submit 
them to some form of international scrutiny towards the ambitious objective of 
limiting the global average temperature to 2 degrees Celsius.744  The emphasis, 
with respect to the principle of CBDRRC, is on the common responsibility, rather 
than the differentiated commitments, as was in Kyoto.745  Developed countries 
under the Copenhagen Accord committed to undertake economy-wide emissions 
reduction targets subject to international monitoring review and verification.746  
Meanwhile, developing countries committed to undertake national mitigation 
actions, and if financed by a developed country, also be subject to international 
monitoring review and verification process. 747   The ideological dissonance 
between developed and developing countries over the financial assistance to the 
developing countries persisted in Copenhagen.  Developed states saw the 
provision of assistance as ‘an implicit quid pro quo’ for developing states’ 
mitigation commitments, whilst the latter saw it as payment by the developed 
countries for their historical carbon emissions.748  
The changing character of CBDRRC was reiterated and endorsed in the 
subsequent COP Decisions arising out of the Ad Hoc Working Group’s work 
post- Copenhagen.749  In the 2014 Lima Call for Climate Action, towards a new 
 
743 Copenhagen Accord, para 4. 
744 Copenhagen Accord, para 1. 
745 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’ (2010) 
104 The American Journal of International Law 230, 240. 
746  Copenhagen Accord, para 4. 
747 Copenhagen Accord, Para 6. 
748 Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’, 237. 
749 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 
November to 10 December 2010, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of 
the Parties at its sixteenth session Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention of 2010 Decision 
1/CP.16/UNFCCC/CP/2010/7. (The Cancun Agreements). 
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agreement on climate change, the CBDRRC principle acquired an additional 
qualifier: Paragraph 3 of the Lima Call for Climate Action Decision reads: 
 
An ambitious agreement in 2015 that reflects the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different 
national circumstances. 750 
 
The discussion thus manifests the dynamic evolution of CBDRRC in the 
international climate change law regime.  The principle changed over the years to 
adapt to the ever-changing social and economic realities of states.  The next 
section discussed whether the dynamic qualifier, introduced in Lima, was the 
necessary compromise for the survival of the CBDRRC in the future of the legal 
regime. 
 
4.5.2.3. Responsibility Sharing in the Paris Agreement – CBDRRC sur-mesure:  
The CBDRRC dynamics were put to the test during the negotiations of a post-
2020 climate change law regime in Paris in 2015.  The Paris Agreement751 re-
introduced CBDRRC in the context of a multilateral treaty of universal 
obligations and re-established the concept, both as a legal device and as an 
application of elemental fairness in a legal regime, defined by prevalent 
asymmetries, vulnerabilities and different levels of socio-economic realities.752  
The Paris Agreement has a very ambitious objective; to hold the increase in 
global temperature to well-below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, 
 
750 The Lima Call for Climate Action 2014, Decision -1/CP.20/UNFCCC/CP/2014 Add. Para 
3. 
751 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP/.21 ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ (entered into force 29 
January 2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex. (Paris Agreement). 
752 Mariama Williams, Manuel F Montes, ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: 
Which way Forwards?’ (2016) 59 Dialogue, 114. 
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and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase towards 1.5 degrees 
Celsius.753  The Agreement contains a distinct version of CBDRRC from previous 
instruments. The basis for differentiation in states’ legal commitments is no longer 
the contribution to environmental harm rationale, but the respective capabilities 
and national circumstances. 754  One can see that this new version of CBDRRC is 
a conscious nod to practical international politics.755   
The responsibility sharing arrangement in the Paris Agreement is still 
normatively premised on CBDRRC, but it now entails an innovative, self-
differentiation model, tailored to each state’s national circumstances and 
respective capabilities.  With respect to mitigation commitments, each party can 
self-differentiate its commitments from its fellow parties when communicating its 
Nationally Determined Circumstances (NDCs).  Furthermore, whilst developed 
countries are normatively expected to continue to take the lead in climate action 
because of their greater capacities,756 the text of the agreement ‘leaves little room 
for tailoring commitments to differentiated responsibilities for environmental 
harm’.757   
The version of CBDRRC incorporated in the Paris Agreement is of particular 
relevance to responsibility sharing in international refugee law. A closer study of 
the version and how it structures the responsibility sharing arrangements reveals 
the cross fertilisation of the Global Compact on Refugees with this specific 
climate change instrument.  The Paris Agreement opens up differentiation across 
all pillars of responsibility sharing for climate change from mitigation, to 
 
753 Paris Agreement, Art 2 (1). 
754 Paris Agreement, Article 2 (2).  Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 
2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 45 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493, 511. 
755 Ibid.,514 
756 Paris Agreement, Article 4 (4). 
757 Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative 
Possibilities and Underlying, 511.  
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adaptation, finance and technology transfer, capacity building and 
transparency.758  
An important objective of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement which 
builds on the UNFCCC, has been a notion of fairness.  CBDRRC in the Paris 
Agreement promotes a new conception of fairness that frames the responsibility 
sharing arrangement. 759   The fairness of each NDC is self-assessed by the 
submitting state party and ought to be explicitly justified in light of CBDRRC.  
For example, the Parties when submitting their first rounds of NDCs in 2015 and 
2016, included a narrative on why their NDC’s are proportional to their ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of their 
national circumstances’.  
A Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions of the Parties prepared by the UNFCC Secretariat in 
2016, claimed that: ‘[s]ome Parties noted that no single indicator can reflect 
fairness or a globally equitable distribution of efforts’.760  The parties justified 
their submitted NDC’s in light of their particular, ‘social, economic and 
geographical factors’ or in light of more specific criteria, such as ‘responsibility, 
capability and historical responsibility, based on climate justice, share of 
emissions, development and/or technological capacity, mitigation potential, cost 
of mitigation actions etc.761   
In the first instance, the conception of fairness promoted in the Paris 
Agreement is endowed with a great degree of subjectivity determined by national 
 
758 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 
American Journal of International Law 288, 300. 
759 Nicholas Chan, ‘Contributions and the Paris Agreement: Fairness and Equity in a Bottom-
Up Architecture’ (2016) 39 Ethics and International Affairs 291-301.  
760 Conference of the Parties Twenty-second session Marrakech, 7–18 November 2016 
Aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions: an update Synthesis 
report by the secretariat FCCC/CP/2016/2 para 25. 
761 Ibid.   
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 187 
self-interest.  That said, the very fact that all parties’ have a procedural obligation 
to submit their NDC’s which are further publicly recorded, 762  ensures 
transparency.  As one commentator argues, the subjectivity is, however, mitigated 
by further endowing fairness with ‘a social character’ which turns the submitted 
NDC’s to ‘public claims of fairness’.763  This is where the Global Compact on 
Refugees missed the opportunity to introduce a procedural obligation of states to 
participate at least in responsibility sharing with non-binding pledges ensuring a 
common baseline procedural commitment.  
 
4.6. Financial assistance to the developing countries  
Financial assistance to the developing countries has been an important element in 
the conclusion and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
This section focuses on the financial obligations of the developed states to the 
developing countries under the UNFCCC and, specifically, under the Paris 
Agreement.  The provision of financial support to the developing countries is very 
relevant to refugee protection, where the majority of refugees are hosted in the 
developing countries, and where humanitarian and development assistance from 
the developed states remains under the status quo discretionary and increasingly 
earmarked within existing developmental budgets.764 
 
762 The NDCs communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by 
the secretariat pursuant with Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement. 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx The UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol and most recently the Paris Agreement all had provisions exclusively dedicated to 
climate finance. 
763 Emphasis in the original. Chan ‘Climate Contributions and the Paris Agreement: Fairness 
and Equity in a Bottom-Up Architecture’, 298. Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, ‘The Paris 
Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of Differential Treatment in the Climate 
Regime? (2016) 25 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law  
151, 155. 
764 Dowd and McAdam, ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 208. 
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The developing countries have always sought to secure the necessary 
financial, technology and capacity building resources that would help them meet 
their mitigation and adaptation commitments under the climate change regime.  
Indeed, financial commitments on the part of the developed states have been the 
quid pro quo for the developing countries’ cooperation and participation to the 
legal development of the climate change regime.765   
All climate change law instruments, including the Paris Agreement, provide 
for developed states’ financial commitments to the developing countries.766  The 
UNFCCC, for example, notes that the effective implementation of the developing 
countries’ commitments: 
 
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties 
of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources 
and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic 
and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties. 767   
 
Article 11 of the UNFCCC provides that ‘a mechanism for the provision of 
financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of 
technology, is hereby defined.’  It is important to highlight that the UNFCCC 
stresses the importance of resource transfer on a grant making, or at least 
concessional, basis.  Without delving too much into climate finance detail, Article 
11 did not specify whether the grant or concessional funding could be used to fund 
 
765 Bodansky, Brunnée , Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University 
Press 2018) 138. 
766 UNFCCC, Article 4 (3) 4 (4) 11. Kyoto Protocol, Article 11.  Paris Agreement, Article 9, 
10, 11. 
767 UNFCCC, Article 4 (7). 
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adaptation measures in the developing countries, given the local, rather than 
global, benefit it would offer.768   
Article 9 (1) of the Paris Agreement provides that developed countries shall 
provide financial resources to assist developing country parties with respect to 
both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under 
the Convention769.  This provision establishes a collective legal obligation on the 
part of the developed parties as a whole to provide assistance to the developing 
countries.770  The weakness of such wording, is that it is couched in rather passive 
terms, blurring further what each party is individually responsible for in terms of 
financial support.771  The only mention of grant-based climate finance in the Paris 
Agreement is found in paragraph 4 and is made with regard to the adaptation needs 
of the least developed and small island countries. It reads: 
 
The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a 
balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-
driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least 
developed countries and small island developing States, considering the 
need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.772 
 
 
768 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 147. 
769 Meaning the UNFCCC. 
770 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-
Obligations’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 337, 353. Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal 
Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 Review of European Comparative and 
International Environmental Law 142, 145-146. 
771 Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non 
Obligations’, 353. 
772 Paris Agreement, Article 9 (4). 
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Acknowledging that the effective implementation of the mitigation and adaptation 
commitments of the developing countries depends on financial assistance, 
including technology transfer and capacity building,773 is a statement of fact, that 
does not affect the obligation of the developing and least developed countries to 
mitigate and adapt.  In other words, the obligations of the developing countries 
under the Paris Agreement are not legally contingent on receipt of support.774  
That said, the provision offers context to the effective implementation of the 
Agreement. 
In practice however, many of the developing countries’ pledged NDCs have 
been made partly or wholly conditional upon international support.775  Therefore, 
despite the lack of legal conditionality between compliance and provision of 
assistance, developing countries have explicitly based their mitigation and 
adaptation commitments on receipt of support from the international community.  
Some commentators have highlighted the risk that the conditionality of the NDCs 
 
773 Provisions on technology transfer and capacity building in the Paris Agreement are found 
in Articles 10, 11 respectively. 
774 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law,131. 
775 As an example. Dominica’s NDC under the Paris Agreement reads: ‘This contribution is 
conditional upon receiving timely access to international climate change financing, 
technology development and transfer, and capacity building support for priority adaptation 
and mitigation measures. Dominica’s INDC will remain provisional pending confirmation of 
timely access to international climate change financing, technology development and transfer, 
and capacity building support for priority adaptation and mitigation measures detailed in this 
INDC. Dependent upon COP21 outcomes, Dominica reserves the right to revise the INDC’. 
Dominica’s NDC 2020 available at 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx 
Zambia’s NDC Zambia states that ‘This emission reduction is conditional and subject to the 
availability of international support in form of finance, technology and capacity building. The 
total budget for implementing both components is estimated at US$ 50 billion by the year 
2030, out of this USD 35 billion is expected to come from external sources while $15 billion 
will be mobilized from domestic sources’. Zambia’s NDC available at 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx  
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- though justified by fairness concerns - could eventually become the Paris 
Agreement’s Achilles heel. 776   
What is important to take from the Paris provisions on financial assistance is 
that the limited capacities of the developing countries are recognised and catered 
for in the legal arrangement through the mobilisation of climate change funding, 
particularly for adaptation. Additional funding mobilisation is also envisaged in 
the Global Compact on Refugees for refugee hosting states and their 
communities777 as one key component of effective responsibility sharing but it 
remains to be seen whether such funding will be additional to, namely above and 
beyond streamlined development funding. 
 
4.7. The Paris Agreement: A model legal architecture  
Much of the Paris Agreement provisions would not have been agreed on without 
the innovative legal design and creative lawyering that took place, which 
ultimately facilitated the conclusion of a multilateral treaty.  This section of the 
thesis zooms into the legal architecture of the Paris Agreement as a model 
example of a multilateral instrument on responsibility sharing whose legal design, 
namely the ‘art and craft’ of its provisions, contributed at least partly in 
overcoming political unwillingness and collective action problems.778  The term 
‘art and craft’ is used in the title of a book written by the prominent American 
environmental lawyer, Daniel Bodansky, who has participated in all multilateral 
negotiations on climate change for the past ten years.  In the author’s words: 
 
 
776 W P Pauw, P Castro, J Pickering, S Bhasin ‘Conditional nationally determined 
contributions in the Paris Agreement: foothold for equity or Achilles heel? (2020) 20 Climate 
Policy 468, 481. 
777 Global Compact para 32. 
778 Daniel Bodanksy, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard 
University Press 2011), 271. 
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 international environmental law, like politics is the art of the possible – and 
seeks to find the “sweet pot”, which goes as far as possible but not beyond. 
Above all, it sees the discipline of the international environmental law, not 
as a panacea, but rather as an art and craft. 
 
International refugee law has also been described, and rightly so, ‘as a balancing 
act between the interests of different states as well as a gesture of solidarity 
towards persons in need of protection’. 779   To bring therefore responsibility 
sharing within international refugee law, would require a skilful compromise that 
would bridge the gap between competing positions and advance the ball, even if 
a little.780  To this end, the study of the provisions on mitigation, transparency and 
implementation and compliance unfold true potential for the de lege ferenda 
development of international refugee law in light of the Global Compact 
advances. 
The Paris Agreement is built upon a so-called hybrid legal architecture of 
bottom-up and top-down obligations to the global effort to tackle climate change.  
During the Paris Agreement negotiations, the issue of the legal nature of the 
instrument per se, the differentiation in states’ mitigation, adaption, finance and 
transparency commitments, as well as the legal bindingness of each of the 
provisions, were central and highly vexed maters among the negotiators.781  The 
treaty includes a wide range of provisions that span the spectrum of legalisation, 
 
779 Karageorgiou, Rethinking Solidarity in European Asylum Law A Critical reading of the 
key concept in contemporary refugee policy, 18. 
780 Bodanksy, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 171. 
781 Lavanya Rajamani, Jacob Werksman, ‘The Legal Character and Operational Relevance of 
the Paris Agreement's Temperature Goal’ (2018) 376 Philosophical Transactions of The 
Royal Society 1, 13.  
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from hard-law, to soft-law, and as some commentators have argued, to even ‘non-
law’.782   
The Durban platform for Enhanced Action, that launched the mandate on the 
negotiations for what came to be the Paris Agreement, provided for the conclusion 
of either a ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force under the Convention’. 783   The fact that the Paris Agreement was not 
concluded as ‘protocol’ was in deference to the American political sensitivities 
withstanding from the Kyoto Protocol nomenclature.784  The Paris Agreement is 
a multilateral treaty under the definition of Article 2 (1) (a) of the VCLT.785  As 
the VCLT specifies, the particular designation of an instrument does not affect its 
legal status.786  The delicate balance of bottom-up and top-down commitments is 
examined further below. 
 
4.7.1. Bottom up- NDC’s 
The nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are a fundamental building 
block of the Paris Agreement.  The provision of Article 4 subjects each party to 
an obligation (‘shall’) to ‘prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
 
782 As ‘Non-law’ obligations have been characterised by commentators those provisions in 
relation to adaptation that set mere aspirations and provide context prescribe parties to act in a 
certain way or achieve something. Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate 
Change Law, 213.  Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and 
Non-Obligations’, 356.  Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris 
Agreement’(2016) 25 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
Law 142, 147. 
783 UNFCCC 2012 Decision 1/CP.17 Establishing of an ad hoc Working Group on a Durban 
Platform for enhanced action.  
784 In addition to the US domestic legislative process before the Senate for concluding 
international treaties. An Agreement was an easier way for the Obama administration to 
commit at the executive level. Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Devilish Details: Key Legal Issues in 
the 2015 Climate Negotiations’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 826. 
785 VCLT, Article 2 (1) (a). 
786 Ibid.  
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nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve’.787  In relation to 
the legal character of this provision, it establishes an ‘individual procedural 
obligation of conduct’ for each party to the Agreement. 788   Crafted as an 
obligation of conduct, the provision does not obligate the parties to achieve their 
NDCs, intentionally falling short of creating an obligation of result. 789  
Commentators agree that Article 4, does nonetheless, impose a good faith 
expectation on the parties, that they will take the necessary measures to implement 
their submitted NDC’s. 790   
The way NDC’s are constructed in Paris offers flexibility and latitude to each 
party to choose the content of their responsibility sharing commitments to climate 
change mitigation. The lesson learned from Kyoto was that states would never 
accept to be bound by pre-determined emission targets, hence only a more 
flexible, bottom-up approach to mitigation would be able to secure agreement. 
This is a useful insight to note for bringing the voluntary pledges and contributions 
of the Global Compact within international refugee law. 
The Paris Agreement, as already stated, differentiates between the parties by 
setting different normative expectations between developed and developing 
countries, as well as amongst developing countries.  For example, Article 4 (4) 
reinstates the practice that developed counties are encouraged but not obligated 
(‘should’) to continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute 
emission reduction targets’ and developing countries are encouraged to do the 
same over time, ‘in light of different national circumstances’.791  Commentators 
 
787 Paris Agreement, Article 4. 
788 Rajamani and Werksman, ‘The Legal Character and Operational Relevance of the Paris 
Agreement's Temperature Goal’, 6. 
789 For content, during the negotiations, the US, China and India opposed any legally binding 
obligation of result that would require the Parties to achieve the NDC’s. Rajamani, ‘The 2015 
Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’, 353. 
790 Rajamani and Werksman, ‘The Legal Character and Operational Relevance of the Paris 
Agreement's Temperature Goal’, 6. 
791 Paris Agreement, Article 4 (4). 
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have highlighted that it was because the provision of Article 4 does not create any 
new obligations for the developed countries, other than the ones already 
voluntarily assumed, that the powerful states such as the US ‘bought in’ to the 
Agreement.792   
Article 4 (3) sets a normative expectation for each party to progress its NDCs 
to reflect the highest possible ambition, in accordance with CBDRRC. 793  
Developed countries, are therefore, normatively expected to be more ambitious 
with their emission reduction targets, as they have objectively more resources, 
and hence, more capabilities.794  The level of ambition in the submitted NDCs will 
ultimately vary between the developing countries, as they too differ in national 
circumstances.795   
At first, the latitude the parties are offered in relation to mitigation 
commitments might seem counterproductive and unsatisfactory from a strict legal 
point of view.  After all, the NDCs in themselves are not binding and the parties 
are merely expected to achieve their pledges, instead of being legally obligated to 
do so.  In this sense those with great legal expectations are let down.  In order to 
be able to assess whether a legal obligation to pledge commitments, coupled with 
a good faith expectation to implement the pledges is sufficient to achieve the 
ambitious objective of the Paris Agreement, one needs to look at the greater 
picture.  The Paris Agreement is a treaty under international law providing a solid 
structure of procedural obligations, and as Brunnée remarks procedure can 
promote the protection of community interests in a solid way by serving its own 
important function.796  While the legal obligations are admittedly ‘softened’, the 
 
792 Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-
Obligations’, 355. 
793 Paris Agreement, Article 4 (3). 
794 This can be inferred from a combined reading of Article 4 (3), (4) and (5). 
795 Paris Agreement, Article 4 (4). 
796 Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Community Interests, Procedural 
Aspects’, 155. 
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Paris Agreement provides for a unique oversight system in the areas of 
transparency, review and implementation that tames the parties’ increased 
flexibility by placing a strong emphasis on procedure. 
 
4.7.2. Top-down oversight system 
To ensure effective implementation, the Paris Agreement sketches a relatively 
rigorous oversight system that completes the legal architecture.  The way the 
oversight system is structured stems from the rationale that ‘peer and public 
pressure can be as effective as legal obligation in influencing behaviour’. 797  The 
legal obligations on mitigation and financial support are further bolstered by 
respective legal obligations on transparency and accountability. 798  
 
4.7.2.1. Transparency framework 
The purpose of the transparency framework is the tracking of progress and to 
ensure clarity on both mitigation and adaption.  The Paris Agreement subjects the 
parties to individual obligations of information sharing. 799   In relation to 
mitigation, each party shall provide a national inventory report of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks, as well as inform on its progress 
towards achieving its NDCs.800  In contrast to reporting on adaptation measures, 
which allows for a certain discretion – ‘each party should also provide information 
related to climate change impacts and adaptation, as appropriate’ - there is no such 
margin on reporting in relation to mitigation action .801   
 
797 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 242. 
798 Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-
Obligations’, 353. 
799 Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative 
Possibilities and Underlying Politics’, 503. 
800 Paris Agreement, Article 13 (7) (a) (b). 
801 Paris Agreement, Article 13 (8). 
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Developed countries are also required to provide information on financial, 
technology transfer and capacity building support provided to the developing 
countries. 802  This requirement bolsters the obligation of developed countries to 
provide financial resources to assist developing country parties with mitigation 
and adaptation under Article 9, adding an extra layer of transparency in climate 
finance.   
When it comes to information-sharing and transparency on refugee 
responsibility sharing contributions, international refugee law is considerably 
underdeveloped, given that there is no international or national information 
repository, outside the Global Compact’s Dashboard that tracks the pledges and 
contributions, nor there are any procedural obligations upon states to report on 
their contributions to protections.  In particular, transparency through the 
communication of reports would be key to a legal instrument on responsibility 
sharing.  Apart from the informational role reporting primarily serves, when states 
join an agreement in good faith, ‘national reporting can perform a policy function 
by encouraging self-examination.803  Self-reporting can also contribute to norm 
making, as it allows for an assessment of the overall performance of a regime in 
achieving its objectives.804   
Under the Paris Agreement, each party is required to report how it considers 
that its NDCs are fair and ambitious, in light of CBDRRC and how it contributes 
towards achieving the objective of the Agreement, as set out in Article 2.805  An 
important lesson drawn from the negotiations of the Paris Agreement, as reported 
by participants, is that there are no agreed benchmarks for assessing fairness under 
 
802 Under the Paris Agreement the developed states have legal financial obligations towards 
the developing countries. Articles 13 (9), (10) and (11). 
803 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 239. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined 
contributions, referred to in decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/CP/2018/L.22. Annex I. para 6 and para 
7. 
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the UNFCCC.  This is because consensus on indicators has proved impossible.806  
However, if one conceptualises the value of self-reported NDCs as ‘public claims 
of fairness’,  807against states’ capabilities then international scrutiny and peer 
pressure can be a true gain. These are valuable lessons to tease out from the 
comparative study of the Paris Agreement that can provide room for improvement 
on the Compact’s follow up and review process but crucially also serve as the 
fundamental building blocks of a future legal instrument on responsibility sharing. 
 
4.7.2.2. A global stocktake 
As information obligations track the progress on the substantive obligations of the 
Agreement, so does the exercise of a global stocktake.  To this end, Article 14 
provides a global stocktake of the collective progress and implementation of the 
Agreement every five years, ‘in light of equity and the best available science’.808  
It is yet unclear how equity will inform the global stocktake in the absence of a 
definition in the climate change regime.809  The ambition cycle, namely the five-
yearly global stocktake, intends to enhance and strengthen the parties’ NDCs, 
which are required to be more ambitious than the previous ones. 810   The 
assessment on the implementation is limited to the collective progress, insulating 
the parties from an assessment of the adequacy of their individual mitigation 
efforts.811  Lastly, an integral part of the enhanced transparency framework under 
the Agreement, is a technical expert review of each party’s submitted 
 
806 Lavanya Rajamani, Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing international 
prescriptiveness with national discretion’ (2019) 68 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1023, 1031. 
807 Emphasis in the original. Chan ‘Climate Contributions and the Paris Agreement: Fairness 
and Equity in a Bottom-Up Architecture’, 298. Maljean-Dubois, ‘The Paris Agreement: A 
New Step in the Gradual Evolution of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime?’, 155. 
808 Paris Agreement, Article 14. 
809 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 245. 
810 Paris Agreement, Article 14 in combination with Article 4 (3). 
811 The first global stocktake is to take place in 2023.  
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transparency report.812  According to the modalities and procedures agreed during 
the latest meeting of the Conference of the Parties in Katowice, technical experts 
will be able to review inter alia the implementation and achievement of a party’s 
NDCs, identify areas for improvement, and review the adequacy or 
appropriateness of a Party’s NDC under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement in order 
to enhance transparency and ambition.  813  
 
4.7.2.3. Implementation and Compliance Mechanism 
Completing the oversight system, the Paris Agreement provides a mechanism on 
implementation and compliance. 814   Article 15 provides for a facilitative 
implementation and compliance mechanism, in the form of a standing committee 
of experts, that will operate in a non-adversarial and non-punitive way.  The 
concrete modalities and procedures were only agreed on in 2018.815  The rigor of 
the Committee’s oversight role, at least in principle, can be inferred from the Paris 
Rulebook - the decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement- that flesh out the top-down 
elements with respect to the procedures and mechanisms envisaged in the treaty, 
including the Committee’s modus operandi.816  
In brief, the Committee of Experts can initiate proceedings, regarding non-
compliance, with several binding procedural obligations that would otherwise 
 
812 Paris Agreement, Article 14 paras 11 and 12. 
813 Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December. 
Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support 
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2. See section 
VII, Technical expert review, in particular para 146 and 149. 
814 Paris Agreement, Article 15 (2).  
815 Ibid., Article 15 (3). 
816 Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018. 
Decision 20/CMA.1 FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 
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escape review.817  More importantly, the Committee may not address the ‘content 
of the contributions, communications, information and reports’ of the Parties.818  
The compliance procedure may only consider the breach of the procedural 
obligation of conduct per se, namely the omission to submit an NDC or a national 
inventory report.819  The compliance measures the Committee can take are ‘soft’ 
in nature and they include inter alia, opening a dialogue with the Party concerned, 
in order to make recommendations for the development of an action plan, or assist 
the concerned party, if necessary ,or issue findings in relation to matters of 
implementation and compliance.820  The oversight system is as soft as political 
necessity required. It does preserve considerable autonomy, flexibility and 
discretion for states, 821  but it does structure the responsibility sharing 
arrangements with procedural obligations and guarantees.  
To conclude, the Paris Agreement represents a unique legal architecture.  It 
expands on the climate change responsibility sharing arrangement under the 
UNFCCC, adopting a pragmatic yet principled approach.  The Paris Agreement 
creates few legal obligations of procedure softened against precision and the rest 
of the provisions set expectations and frame narratives.822  The legal form of the 
NDCs were instrumental in reducing the perceived costs of sovereignty that would 
arise from the conclusion of a binding legal instrument on responsibility 
 
817 Rajamani, Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing international prescriptiveness with 
national discretion’, 1039.  
818 Decision 20/CMA.1 FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, para 23. 
819 Ibid. 
820 Ibid., para 28-31. 
821 Rajamani, Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing international prescriptiveness with 
national discretion’, 1039.  It will be interesting to see how the Committee will operate in 
practice. It was scheduled to adopt its rules of procedure by the CMA3 in 2020 due to take 
place in November in Glasgow before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
822 Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-
Obligations’, 337. Bodansky ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’(2016) 25 Review 
of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 155. 
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sharing.823  The ‘shallow, self-determined mitigation contributions,’ as they have 
recently been characterised824 were the quid pro quo for a binding instrument on 
responsibility sharing.  
 To be sure, the Paris Agreement is far from perfect.  The Agreement is still 
in its early days of implementation, so there is no guarantee that it will work 
successfully.  As the three prominent international climate change law 
commentators conclude, ‘the issue of burden sharing will likely persist given the 
disparities among countries in wealth, historical and per capita emissions and 
circumstances’.825  Another commentator has argued that the Paris Agreement 
‘does not clarify what is equitable at a given time, nor what the CBDRRC 
principle means in a given situation’.826  In addition, many developing countries’ 
agendas prioritise poverty eradication and basic needs over climate change 
mitigation.827  The full potential of the oversight system will be assessed once the 
first global stocktake takes place in 2023, although experts already know that the 
submitted NDCs are insufficient against the magnitude of the climate 
challenge.828   
 
823 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law , 212. 
824 Rajamani, Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing international prescriptiveness with 
national discretion’, 1025. 
825 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 361. 
826 Maljean-Dubois, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of 
Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime?’, 155. 
827 India’s interpretative declaration to the Paris Agreement: Declaration: “The Government of 
India declares its understanding that, as per its national laws; keeping in view its development 
agenda, particularly the eradication of poverty and provision of basic needs for all its citizens, 
coupled with its commitment to following the low carbon path to progress, and on the 
assumption of unencumbered availability of cleaner sources of energy and technologies and 
financial resources from around the world; and based on a fair and ambitious assessment of 




828 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 249. 
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What, however, makes the Paris Agreement a model framework for 
responsibility sharing?  The answer is down to three elements.  Firstly, it is a 
legally binding instrument that represents the formal partnership of developed and 
developing states, emitters and least emitters states in international law on the 
fight against climate change.  Precisely what is currently missing from the 
international refugee law regime, a partnership and a structure in international 
law.   
Secondly, it has a unique institutional legal design of bottom-up 
implemented obligations and a top-down oversight framework that is mainly 
facilitative in nature.  It is carefully and intentionally crafted with procedural 
obligations of conduct, which in turn ensure states’ much-wanted flexibility 
against a very ambitious, if not aspirational, goal.  The Paris Agreement ‘was 
successful, in large part, because of its carefully calibrated, hybrid solutions to the 
issues of bindingness, prescriptiveness, and differentiation’.829   
Thirdly and lastly, it has an even more unique transparency and reporting 
framework which is key in building trust between the parties and in satisfying 
elemental considerations of procedural fairness, as all parties are obliged to 
participate in the legal regime and all stakeholders, including civil society 
organisations can publicly apply pressure on states to achieve more in line with 
their CBDRRC.  
 
4.8. Conclusions 
The international legal regime on climate change has been shaped by conflicting 
ideologies and competing interests between developed and developing countries- 
over economic development on the one hand and environmental protection on the 
other.  Developed states initially fought hard to bring the developing countries on 
 
829 Daniel Bodansky, Lavanya Rajamani ‘The Issues that Never Die’(2018) 12 Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 184, 190. 
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board with the climate change regime and to elevate environmental protection in 
the 1990s as a matter requiring international cooperation and international 
regulation.  Developing countries were at the time, more preoccupied with their 
own developmental priorities.  In many ways, they still are today.  Economic 
development and environmental protection were delicately coupled and balanced 
under the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.  CBDRRC reflects community interests in international 
environmental law and is the tool that progressively brought developing countries 
onboard multilateral environmental agreements, even when the protection of the 
environment was not in among their national priorities.   
In international climate change law CBDRRC had its own trajectory, partly 
because of the uniqueness and complexity of the climate change phenomenon.  
The principle dynamically evolved over the years following scientific 
advancements, adapting to the social and economic realities of the states-parties 
to the UNFCCC.  At times, it was the subject of intense controversy between 
states.  In some ways it continues to be so today.  Yet, it remains the chosen 
framework, the bedrock for the global responsibility sharing arrangement under 
the UNFCCC.830   
CBDRRC is a sophisticated concept rooted in ideas of fairness in 
international law with two interlocking components.  In the case of the legal 
regime on climate change, it is premised upon the common and shared 
responsibility of states to protect the earth’s climate, as part of the global 
commons from excessive warming.  This common responsibility to protect the 
climate reflects a community interest, which in international environmental law 
 
830 Jutta Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Community Interests Procedural 
Aspects’, in Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte (eds) Community Interests Across International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press), 166.  
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is also reflected in the concepts of ‘global commons’ and ‘common concern of 
humankind’.831   
Secondly, this common responsibility to protect the environment ought to 
somehow be shared between states, so as to serve an elemental idea of fairness.  
Not all states can and should contribute equally to climate change action.  They 
can however contribute equivalently.  CBDRRC reflects a conception of fairness 
as distributive justice, ‘in that it seeks to fairly distribute the burden of addressing 
climate change with the goal of improving conditions for all humankind’.832  Two 
of the most widely accepted principles of fairness are obliquely embedded within 
the doctrine of CBDRRC; the contribution to the problem principle and the 
capacity or capability to respond and take measures.833  What is more, distributive 
fairness under the CBDRRC extends to the developed countries’ responsibilities 
to continue taking the lead by firstly doing more and secondly by assisting less 
developed countries in meeting their own comments.834   
Under the most recent version of CBDRRC as posited in the Paris 
Agreement, the focus is on responsibility by capability and capacity in light of 
their national circumstances.835  The conception of fairness reflected in the Paris 
version of CBDRRC is a nod to pragmatism and international politics but also a 
departure from responsibility by culpability.  CBDRRC frames and guides the 
parties’ NDCs, becoming thus a normative tool for assessing states’ mitigation 
 
831 Paris Agreement, Preamble, recital 11. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell's International Law 
and the Environment, (Oxford University Press Fourth Edition 2009), 132. 
832 Cinammon P Carlane, JD Colavecchio, ‘Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris 
Agreement & the Future of International Climate Change Law’ (2019) 27 N.Y.U. 
Environmental Law Journal 108, 117. 
833 Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 133.  
834 Paris Agreement, Article 4 (4). 
835 Paris Agreement, Article 2 (2). 
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actions against their capacities,836  promoting transparency. According to two 
commentators:  
 
The invitation to engage in a more intentional, collective institutional 
discussion about how parties perceive fairness (and, thus, to some extent 
equity) represents a significant change from past practice. This level of 
participatory inclusiveness and transparency in the debate about the 
normative foundations for addressing climate change re-configures the 
parameters of the equity and fairness conversation.837   
 
On the downside, CBDRRC qua principle cannot dictate quantifiable shares of 
the global mitigation action needed.838  The UNFCCC never formally adopted 
criteria to measure fairness.839  The Paris Agreement sought to overcome this by 
opting for sur - mesure differentiation, allowing for states to determine their own 
fair share and their own indicators.  Some scholarly concerns have already been 
raised in respect of the ‘fine grained operationalisation’ of CBDRRC in the Paris 
Agreement: 
 
At the same time, this more inclusive model creates fairness and equity 
challenges by allowing the industrialized countries to continue to bear less 
than their fair share of the climate burden, while many developing countries 
have committed out of sheer necessity, desperation, or an effort to motivate 
 
836 Carlane and Colavecchio, ‘Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement & 
the Future of International Climate Change Law’,130. 
837 Ibid., 131. 
838 Werner Scholtz ‘Equity as the basis for a future international climate change agreement: 
between pragmatic panacea and idealistic impediment. The optimisation of the CBDR 
principle via realism’ (2009) 42 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa 166, 167.  
839 Pauw, Castro, Pickering, Bhasin ‘Conditional nationally determined contributions in the 
Paris Agreement: foothold for equity or Achilles heel’, 468. 
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their more industrialized counterparts, to take on more than their fair share 
of the burden. 840 
 
Summing up the lessons drawn from the parallel study of the logic of 
differentiation in international law and particularly the CBDRCC in international 
environmental law, it becomes evident that community interests are not only 
manifested in areas beyond national territories and jurisdiction, such as the deep 
seabed, Antarctica or outer space.  Equally they are advanced within seemingly 
territorial activities, such as the protection of biodiversity, climate change and 
crucially the protection of human rights.    
At the same time, it is important to note that not all community interests 
manifest themselves with the same degree of intensity.  In some areas the 
existence of community interests and thus the common responsibility is more 
expressly acknowledged than in others.  Responsibility sharing for climate change 
is one such example where the potential ramifications of not sharing the 
responsibility could be detrimental to all states and to the entire planet. Even in 
that case however, the intensity of the community interests may vary depending 
on states’ geographical positions.841  The climate change impact in some countries 
is far worse than others.  A stark example of this imbalance is the rising sea level 
in small island states that threatens the very existence of these countries.   
Having said this, the common responsibility of all states to protect the 
climate has been codified and acknowledged as such in international law through 
inter alia the principle of CBDRRC.  In contrast, under international refugee law, 
the state to which the refugees arrive bears sole legal responsibility for their 
protection and its associated costs.842  One thus could wonder whether beyond the 
 
840 Carlane and Colavecchio, ‘Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement & 
the Future of International Climate Change Law’, 180. 
841 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’, 242.  
842 Hathaway & Neve, 117. 
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general duty of states to cooperate in refugee matters and in the absence of a 
positive responsibility sharing obligation, there is a truly common responsibility 
to protect refugees.  After all, not sharing responsibilities for refugees will not 
severely affect all countries particularly those that are geographically insulated.843   
There seems to be today a strong international consensus that the protection 
of the world’s refugees and the resolution of protracted refugee situations is ‘a 
common concern of humankind’ and thus a responsibility of the international 
community as a whole.  The Global Compact on Refugees, even if non-binding, 
is the latest compelling evidence to this claim as it expressly acknowledges that 
the refugee challenge cannot be managed let alone be resolved without 
meaningful participation from all states.  Nevertheless, it fails to explicitly 
pronounce upon this common responsibility as well as define what this common 
responsibility entails in terms of individual state commitments.   
In sum, the normative gap of the RC remains insofar this common 
responsibility to protect refugees is not codified in international law along with a 
responsibility sharing obligation and structure.  As already argued, the Refugee 
Convention reflects and serves for the enlightened positivist a special category of 
community interests in international law these being the protection of refugees 
and the provision of durable solutions.  In light of this, the call for responsibility 
sharing in the Convention and the principle of responsibility sharing in itself 
reflects a notion of a community obligation,844 albeit not one yet codified in 
international law.  This is where the CBDRRC principle adapted for the refugee 
law can be beneficial in rooting refugee protection not only as a global common 
concern but as a common and shared responsibility of states,845 concretising the 
individual differentiated contributions.  
 
 
843 Dowd & McAdam, ‘Lessons From Climate Change’ 198. 
844 Kritzman-Amir, Community Interests in International Migration and Refugee Law, 352. 
845 Dowd & McAdam, ‘Lessons From Climate Change’, 217. 
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This Chapter is the culmination of what has been suggested thus far in the thesis, 
namely that the normative gap of the Refugee Convention cannot be satisfactorily 
and comprehensively addressed without a structural adjustment that will 
permanently institutionalise responsibility sharing in international law.  The duty 
of states to cooperate in international refugee law is vaguely worded, and despite 
numerous calls for enhanced and meaningful international cooperation, it has not 
concretised into subsequent positive obligations of responsibility sharing.  What 
is more, the current practice and policies of states aims at responsibility shifting 
rather than responsibility sharing, and most, international cooperation on 
refugees, is framed in light of externalisation, deterrence and protection elsewhere 
paradigms.  
 Despite the laudable effort and the advances in the Global Compact to put 
together responsibility sharing modalities and to frame refugee protection as a 
common responsibility, the Compact fails to bring responsibility sharing within 
international law.  Contributions to protection and solutions and even the 
participation to the Global Refugee Forums remains entirely discretionary.   
This thesis argues that a light package of responsibility sharing obligations 
is the ideal means to fill in the normative gap of the Refugee Convention that has 
had a negative impact on the quality of international protection and on interstate 
relations.  This Chapter explores de lege ferenda how the CBDRRC principle can 
be adapted to international refugee law and how a light package of responsibility 
sharing obligations could look like in international refugee law by drawing 
inspiration from the international climate change law regime.  It proposes the 
@Elizabeth Mavropoulou April 2021 All Rights Reserved. 210 
adoption of a protocol on refugee responsibility sharing that would supplement 
the Refugee Convention and institutionalise the missing responsibility sharing 
partnership between states of origins, asylum and destination in international law.  
Crucially, this de lege ferenda proposal takes the Global Compact on Refugees as 
its departure point demonstrating how the advances of the Compact can be further 
incorporated in a binding protocol.   
It is noted that the originality of this proposal is not in suggesting a binding 
instrument on responsibility sharing, as this has over the course of refugee 
protection regime been proposed or alluded to in different ways by scholars and 
hinted by policy makers when large scale refugee arrivals have put pressure on 
the existing international refugee law edifice.846   
This thesis’ contribution is an explicit discussion and adaptation of the 
principle of CBDRRC to international refugee law and its operationalisation 
under a treaty that would codify a light package of responsibility sharing 
obligations so as to enable agreement.  To put it differently, my proposal is on the 
‘art and craft’ of responsibility sharing, on finding the “sweet pot”, which goes as 
far as possible, but not beyond’. 847  It is submitted that the chances of states 
agreeing on a binding protocol would very much depend on its legal design and 
construction.  The focus therefore of the proposal is on questions of legal design 
and the structure of the legal obligations.   
Further, since fairness concerns have been integral to responsibility sharing 
CBDRRC normative nexus to notions of fairness necessitates a better 
understanding of what fairness entails in international refugee law.  Limiting the 
 
846 Türk and Garlick, ‘Prospects for Responsibility Sharing in the Refugee Context’, 45. Wall, 
‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility 
Sharing Fulfill the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 201.  Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out 
on Refugees’, 591. UNHCR Ensuring International Protection and Enhancing International 
Cooperation in Mass Influx Situations: Advance Summary Findings of the Study 
Commissioned by UNHCR (2004) EC/54/SC/CRP. (11 June 2004).  
847 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 271. 
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scope of responsibility sharing to physical and financial sharing, the light package 
of obligations reflects this baseline commitment responsibility sharing.  The quest 
for fairness however even in an enlightened positivist project such as the present 
one is limited to what international law can do and international politics allow.  
The goal is to strike a skilful compromise between the depth of the legal 
commitments and the breadth of participation that a responsibility sharing 
protocol requires. 
Against this background, this Chapter offers a concrete proposal on a 
protocol on responsibility sharing that explores in detail the legal design and the 
subsequent levels of obligation, prescription and delegation of each of the 
suggested provisions.  The concept of soft legalisation from International 
Relations is employed so as to explore what legal obligations suit the nature of 
responsibility sharing as an inherently political matter.  Finally, since international 
law can only be part of the solution to the refugee challenge, this Chapter 
concludes with ways to build the necessary sustained political will required 
towards legal obligations of responsibility sharing. 
 
5.2. Why a protocol on responsibility sharing?   
It is anticipated that a proposal on a legal instrument that codifies obligations of 
responsibility sharing will be prima facie challenged on feasibility grounds, given 
the unwillingness of states to codify anything related to responsibility sharing in 
international law.  Arguments on feasibility are now made a fortiori in light of the 
current populist and somewhat hostile climate against refugees and migrants in 
general.  It has been supported by scholars that ‘new binding obligations on 
international cooperation are not politically palatable in the refugee context at 
present’, 848  that ‘states are generally unwilling to relinquish discretion in 
 
848 Dowd and McAdam, ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 216. 
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determining the extent to which they wish to support refugees’,849 and that the 
main obstacle behind the conclusion and adoption of a protocol on responsibility 
sharing ‘is today’s political reality.’850  That said, a protocol on responsibility 
sharing has always been the ideal means to fill in the responsibility sharing gap. 
Volker Türk, former Assistant High Commissioner who led the Global 
Compact negotiations revealed in an interview before the adoption of the final 
draft of the Refugee Compact that UNHCR would like to see more resettlement 
of refugees or better family reunification but ‘at the end of the day we will need 
to present a consensus document. It is a question of strategy..’, 851  obliquely 
admitting that if it weren’t for consensus, concrete commitments to protection and 
solutions would be the suggested right way forwards.  Two years earlier, Türk, in 
an article co-authored with Garlick acknowledged that that while an additional 
protocol to the Refugee Convention would be the ideal means to fill the gap, there 
was limited scope to such a step at the time and the then proposed Global Compact 
was the feasible intermediary step.852    
Even as early as 2004, UNHCR had acknowledged the need of a second 
protocol to the Refugee Convention. A study on enhancing cooperation for mass 
influx situation, commissioned by the High Commissioner in 2004, suggested: 
 
[I]t may be worth considering an instrument on this issue, for instance, in the 
form of a Second Protocol to the 1951 Convention.  As with the 1967 
Protocol, such a Protocol could be open to accession by non-Convention 
 
849 Harley, ‘Innovations in Responsibility Sharing for Refugees’, 14. 
850 Meltem Ineli-Giger, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees and Burden Sharing: Will the 
Compact Address the Normative Gap Concerning Burden Sharing?’ (2019) 38 Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 115, 129. 
851 Volker Türk quoted in Charlotte Alfred ‘UN Official Refugee Compact Will Meat Fear 
and Ignorance with Facts’ Refugees Deeply (March 2018).  
852 Turk and Garlick ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees’, 678.  
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States, a number of which already host large numbers of refugees and would 
arguably stand to benefit from better governance of mass influxes across the 
globe. The focus of a new instrument would be on putting in place practical 
guidelines for better management of asylum demands and problems in mass 
influx situations within a burden-sharing framework.853   
 
Among the guiding parameters of such protocol, would be the ‘specific 
recognition of the differing capacities of States to contribute to assistance and 
solutions, and the need for an equitable distribution of burdens and 
responsibilities.854   
The former High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres ominously 
said in one of his speeches, ‘if there is one Protocol that is yet to be drafted to 
complement the 1951 Convention, it is one on international solidarity and burden 
sharing’.855   
 Certainly, the contemporary refugee debates are highly politicised and, 
hence, not conducive to proposals requiring multilateral law-making, in times 
where even multilateralism per se seems to be losing ground and its appeal to 
states.856  Having said this, even if multilateralism’s life cycle in the protection of 
community interests might be approaching its end as some scholars caution,857 the 
response to multilateralism’ decline as Hathaway laments is not to retreat but to 
 
853 Ensuring International Protection and Enhancing International Cooperation in Mass Influx 
Situations: Advance Summary Findings of the Study Commissioned by UNHCR (2004) 
(2004) EC/54/SC/CRP. (11 June 2004), para 12. 
854 Ibid.  
855 Opening Remarks at the 66th Session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme. António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (Geneva, 5 October 2015). 
856 Harlan G Cohen, ‘Multilateralism’s Life-Cycle’ (2018) 112 American Journal of 
International Law 47, 48.  
857 Ibid. 
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show how a multilateral responsibility sharing instrument can keep the costs of the 
agreement low and the benefits high.858   
The feasibility of a treaty on responsibility sharing lies within what is at stake 
for states in terms of legal obligations.  Secondly, it equally depends on whether 
states would be ultimately persuaded that the adoption of a binding instrument on 
responsibility sharing would be beneficial to their wider interests.  The focus of 
this contribution is on showing how international law can codify a light package 
of responsibility sharing obligations under a hybrid architecture that caters for the 
much-desired flexibility in the construct and implementation of its obligations.   
Arguments against a legal instrument on responsibility sharing have also been 
made from the perspective of effectiveness.  Betts, Costello and Zaun argue that 
effective responsibility sharing is unlikely to be achieved through a single legal 
mechanism or centralised allocation system.859  They add, that there have to be 
‘complementary, - political, analytical, and operational – mechanisms’ in place 
that will also provide for situation specific responses.860  It goes without saying 
that political, analytical and operational mechanisms are, indeed necessary, to the 
global responsibility effort but their existence can be and should be 
complementary to that of a legal arrangement at UN level.  As one commentator 
stresses: 
 
while it makes sense to negotiate situation-specific agreements in the short-
term where the political will clearly exists, doing so should not be a substitute 
for the long-term goal of negotiating a non-situation specific multilateral 
agreement on responsibility-sharing. 861  
 
858 Hathaway, ‘The Global-Cop Out on Refugees’, 596. 
859 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’, 6. 
860 Ibid., 6. 
861 Taylor ‘The Pacific Solution or Pacific Nightmare; The Difference between Burden 
Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’, 39. 
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Outside the current political climate and considerations about effectiveness, most 
objections to a legal instrument on responsibility sharing have been made in 
response to previous academic proposals that have been either overtly 
prescriptive, going too far as to suggest binding pre-determined quotas on the 
basis of various metrics - for example, GDP, land mass, population862 - or that 
have been lacking in thinking on the formal structure and the legal design.863  A 
legal instrument on responsibility sharing does not have to be equated with a 
central allocation mechanism or with pre-determined quotas.864  Experience from 
international environmental law suggests that pre-determined binding quotas do 
not suit what is politically feasible,865 nor do they guarantee compliance, let alone 
interstate fairness, as the Relocation experience under the CEAS revealed.866   
Crucially, an important distinction often neglected in de lege ferenda 
proposals is the one between the legal form of an instrument, i.e. a treaty, and the 
legal character of its constituent provisions. 867  This distinction is manifestly 
evident in the architecture of the Paris Agreement on climate change, where 
although a treaty under the definition of the VCLT, each of the Paris Agreement’s 
provisions has different normative force. 868   It is submitted that a similar 
 
862 See the proposals of Grahl-Madsen, Chimni, Gibney and Schuck, discussed in the 
Literature Review, Section 1.6. 
863 Ibid. 
864 ‘The failed European experiment with mandatory burden sharing quotas demonstrates that 
the adoption of a new convention or a protocol on burden sharing providing clear and 
predetermined quotas seems unlikely and unrealistic in the near future’. Ineli-Giger ‘The 
Global Compact on Refugees and Burden Sharing: Will the Compact Address the Normative 
Gap Concerning Burden Sharing?’, 129. 
865 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfill the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 216. 
866 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1. 
867 Abbott and Snidal ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 426. 
868 Rajamani, Bodansky, ‘The Issues That Never Die’ (2018) 12 Carbon and Climate Law 
Review 184. 
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distinction between the legal design and the subsequent levels of prescription, 
delegation and obligation thereunder869 would be key to appealing to states for a 
protocol on responsibility sharing.   
In light of this, a protocol on responsibility sharing for refugees may also be 
structured on provisions with different normative force: some that would establish 
hard obligations, some that would set normative expectations and some that would 
encourage or recommend a course of action or construct a narrative.  Most 
importantly, the protocol would and should not go too far beyond what is already 
part of global refugee policy and practice.  To this end, the Global Compact on 
Refugees is the point of departure.  The Compact as already mentioned is non-
binding,870 yet establishes certain political commitments,871 which could become 
the key provisions of a protocol on responsibility sharing.  This is a different way 
to approaching the Global Compact, as the starting point for a de lege ferenda 
exploration and incremental law making, rather than view it as a failed attempt or 
a missed opportunity.  A final reason why a legal instrument on responsibility 
sharing is necessary, is the risk that the Refugee Compact might lose the 
momentum and drive for implementation, in light of the coronavirus pandemic, 
ending up being yet another instrument just exhorting good practice.  
 
5.3. The quest for fairness in responsibility sharing: Determining a fair share  
5.3.1. Fairness between states 
Fairness considerations have perennially underpinned the debates on refugee 
responsibility sharing.  It has been the ‘urgent need’ for fairness 872, or the lack 
thereof, that have brought states to the negotiating table to discuss ways for 
sharing the collective responsibility to protect refugees more equitably and more 
 
869 Abbot and Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law’ in International Governance’, 421. 
870 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 4. 
871 Gilbert, ‘Not Bound But Committed’, 28. 
872 Global Compact on Refugees, para 1. 
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predictably.  Fairness considerations were prominent to the refugee responsibility 
sharing debate during the UNHCR Convention Plus Initiative, which framed 
responsibility sharing as a matter of North-South cooperation.873  More recently, 
‘the fundamental unfairness and inequity of the international refugee regime for 
hosts states and their communities’ 874  was the main reasons that led to the 
adoption of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, and the 
subsequent conclusion of the Global Compact on Refugees. 
Fairness and equity, as explained in the previous Chapter, have become 
synonymous in the context of North-South international cooperation for 
responsibility sharing.875  It is precisely this synonymous relationship of the two 
terms that manifests itself in the interchangeable use of the terms ‘fair’ and 
‘equitable’ responsibility sharing in refugee law and policy.  What is often, 
however, not made explicit when states debate and discuss responsibility sharing 
before international fora, is that they allude to claims of justice or, in other words, 
to conceptions of fairness.876  One may argue that the use of such words by states 
are mere perfunctory statements and correspond thus, at best, to a factual 
acknowledgement that some states host a disproportionate number of refugees 
compared to others.  Particularly with regard to responsibility sharing, an idea of 
fairness acquires salience.  As two commentators write: 
 
 
873 See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4. 
874 Harley ‘Innovations in Responsibility Sharing for Refugees’ 1. 
875 Pieter Pauw, Steffen Bauer, Carmen Richerzhagen, Clara Brandi, Hanna Schmole 
‘Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities; A State-of-the-Art Review of the 
Notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Negotiations’,(German 
Development Institute Discussion Paper 6/2014), 6. 
876 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 477. 
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‘justice would argue for no one state to be disproportionately affected by 
refugee flows because it is likely that the burdened state was not the cause 
of the flow and it is burdened simply because of propinquity’.877  
 
A notion of fairness, therefore, is not only conceptually inherent to responsibility 
sharing debates.  What does fairness entail?  To begin with, fairness can be said 
to be a contested concept,878 in the sense that multiple, and at times competing 
conceptions of fairness can derive from the broader concept.879  This is a fortiori 
the case in international law, where the international community consists of 
hundreds of sovereign states, each with its own plausible conception of fairness, 
informed and shaped by the countries’ particular economic and social 
circumstances.   
Political theorists have battled at abstract levels with different and often 
competing conceptions of fairness and have developed subsequent distributive 
principles that can resolve issues of resource or burden allocation in the provision 
of global public goods.880  Amongst the most popular are the egalitarian principle 
of per capita distribution, the needs-based principle - reflecting the conception 
that the distribution of benefits should accord priority to the poorest or most at 
risk -, the contribution to the harm/problem principle, - evident in ‘the polluter 
pays’ principle of international environmental law - and finally, the capabilities-
 
877 Aleinikoff and Poellot, ‘The Responsibility to Solve: The International Community and 
Protracted Refugee Situations’, 213. 
878 Gallie first introduced the term ‘essentially contested concepts’ as conceptual tool to 
explore the multiple understandings and interpretations certain abstract evaluative notions can 
take. WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955 - 1956) 56 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 167.  Since Gallie, the concept/conception distinction has been a popular 
one, in Political Science and International Relations.  Rawls for example in his Theory of 
Justice employs this distinction when advancing his own conception of justice as fairness. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5.  
879 Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy,144. 
880 Ibid. 
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based principle - prescribing that the greater the ability to pay/or to act, the greater 
the burden.881  
Another crucial distinction that adds more conceptual clarity to the challenge 
of institutionalising responsibility sharing in international refugee law is that 
between fairness principles and burden sharing formulae.  Fairness principles are 
the ones mentioned above which embody different conceptions of fairness.  
Burden sharing formulae, on the other hand, are methodologies or indicators that 
measure fairness against ‘objective metrics’, 882  such as GDP, landmass and 
population size.883  Schematically, on top of the pyramid sits the abstract and 
contested concept of fairness, under it sit the principles reflecting the various 
conceptions and at the bottom sit the specific burden sharing formulae or 
indicators that measure or assess a fair share.  
In international refugee law, the challenge of responsibility sharing extends 
to agreeing on the scope of what fair sharing entails and on the burden sharing 
formulae that could measure a fair share.  Here again, the study of climate change 
is illuminating.  The UNFCCC, for example, has not adopted criteria to measure 
the submitted NDC’s of the state parties against fairness because there could be 
no such agreement on a single indicator that can reflect a globally equitable 
distribution of efforts.884  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
 
881 These principles are summarized in Soltau Fairness in International Climate Change Law 
and Policy, 153. See also Ringius et al, ‘Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate 
burdens’, 781.  
882 Caution should be drawn to the presumed neutrality of economic metrics. According to 
Bregman, ‘there is no such thing as a neutral metric. Behind every statistic is a certain set of 
assumptions and prejudices.’ Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists (Bloomsbury 2017), 123. 
883 Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 163. 
884 The Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions of the Parties prepared by the UNFCC Secretariat ‘[s]ome Parties noted that no 
single indicator can reflect fairness or a globally equitable distribution of efforts’. 
FCCC/CP/2016/, para 25. 
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body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change, highlighted 
in one of its Reports: 
 
there is no absolute standard of equity, countries (like people) will tend to 
favour interpretations which will favour their interests’ and that perhaps ‘a 
basic set of shared ethical principles could limit the plausible interpretations 
in the burden sharing context by establishing expectation on what may be 
reasonably required from different actors.885   
 
This basic set of shared ethical principles that would limit plausible interpretations 
has not yet been agreed under the UNFCCC.  To overcome therefore the 
challenge, the Paris Agreement left the parties to choose their own indicators and 
methodologies when communicating their mitigation actions in light of their 
CBDRRC.   
This experience from climate change, reinforces the contested nature of 
fairness and the argument that there can be various plausible burden sharing 
formulae.  Thomas Franck also adverted to the subjective character of fairness, 
which can be best reflected and fulfilled in the reality of international law limited 
by international politics in a process of public discourse.  He writes: 
 
fairness is relative and subjective…a human, subjective contingent quality 
which merely captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning and 
negotiation leading, if successful to an agreed formula located at a 
conceptual intersection between various plausible formulas for allocation.886  
 
885 Marc Fleurbaey, Siban Kartha (Coordinating Lead Authors) ‘Sustainable Development and 
Equity’ Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
317.  
886 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 14. 
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The same sort of disagreement over fairness indicators is present in the refugee 
responsibility sharing debates.  Miller notes that states ‘can reasonably disagree’ 
on what indicators shall be used to determine a fair share of refugee protection.887  
Likewise, Owen finds that the lack of uniform agreement among states on what 
should be the criteria for a fair distribution is yet another challenge to face.888  
Gibney, on the other hand, contends that this disagreement is overrated and that 
three indicators used in UNHCR reports to appeal to states, namely GDP, 
population size and the total numbers of refugees are widely accepted by states 
and UNHCR.889  Grahl-Madsen had proposed to allocate refugee quotas in the 
European Union on the basis of the absorptive capacities of Member states.890  
Yet, capacity can be also said to be an abstract concept,891 measurable against 
different macro-economic and socio-economic criteria, and heavily influenced by 
the politicisation of the refugee challenge. 
Hathaway is also in favour of predetermined criteria for responsibility 
sharing whereby an international organisation would administer binding quotas.  
He, in contrast to other scholars, has suggested that different criteria ought to 
define a fair share for the purposes of physical - what he terms ‘human sharing’- 
and financial responsibility sharing. 892   In Hathaway’s proposal, physical 
 
887 David Miller, ‘David Owen on Global Justice, National Responsibility and Transnational 
Power: A reply (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 2029, 2033. Cf, Gibney who argues 
that GDP and population size have been the most relevant indicators to measure a fair share 
since UNHCR publishes its statistics reports on the basis of these indicators and against total 
refugee numbers. Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’, 457. 
888 David Owen ‘Refugees, fairness and taking up the slack: On justice and the International 
Refugee Regime’ (2016) 3 Moral Philosophy and Politics, 141. 
889Gibney ‘Refugee and Justice Between States’ 457. 
890 Grahl-Madsen , ‘Further Development of International Refugee Law’, 165. 
891 Tally Kritzman Amir, ‘Not in My Backyard, On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in 
Refugee Law’ (2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 355, 375. 
892 On financial sharing, he suggests the use of the UN funding model. Hathaway and Neve, 
‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again’, 207-209. 
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responsibility sharing, namely the hosting of refugees would be primarily 
provided in regions of origins.  In light of this, criteria such as physical security, 
functional compatibility, cultural harmony and geographical proximity are the 
ones suggested to share refugees among the asylum states.893  Meanwhile, extra-
regional states, mainly the Northern states, would be legally bound to contribute 
to the fiscal costs of protection on the basis of an agreed burden sharing formula  
as well as to cover residual resettlement.894  Leaving the ethical challenges with 
respect to potential commodification and the ghettoising of refugees aside, 
experience suggests that agreement on such sharing formulae would be hard, if 
not impossible, to reach.  
Interestingly, the Global Compact on Refugees does not establish a 
predetermined burden sharing formula or quotas.  Realpolitik and expediency 
dictated a bottom-up, flexible approach responsibility sharing that leaves each 
state to determine its own contributions to refugee protection and solutions.  The 
Compact does, nonetheless, acknowledge the need for indicators and an Indicators 
Framework has already been developed by UNHCR.895  The indicators, and this 
is telling, are not however macroeconomic metrics of economic growth such as 
GDP, but reflect expected outcomes, each one reflecting a key area of focus, in 
need of support.896  
Sarnata Reynolds and Juan Pablo Vacatello recently developed the first 
global model that measures the capacity of the 193 governments - the number of 
states who voted in favour of the Compact - to physically protect and financially 
 
893 Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again’, 204 - 205. 
Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 597. The authors also address some of the 
ethical objections to their proposal. See Literature Review.  
894 Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 597. 
895 Global Compact on Refugees: Indicator Framework 2019 (UNHCR) available at  
https://www.unhcr.org/5cf907854.pdf.  In total, there are 15 Indicators. 
896 Ibid. 
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support refugees and host communities.897  This model was developed with an 
aim to provide the Global Compact with a concrete model for equitable and 
predictable responsibility sharing based on each nation’s capacity to receive 
and/or care for refugees.898  Their methodology starts with data collected from 
GDP and population density, which offer a preliminary baseline number of fair 
share to each state.  This is subsequently adjusted twice, once to reflect rankings 
on the Human Development Index and the second time to reflect data from the 
Fragile States Index.899  Some states are removed altogether from receiving any 
share due to their fragility levels.  In the end, these percentages are converted to 
refugee quotas against the number of refugees in need of international protection 
provided in UNHCR statistics.900  The proposed model draws on a methodology 
of macro-economic metrics, which can be said to reflect a principle of fairness as 
proportionality.  Interestingly, under the status quo, among the G20 states, Turkey 
accounts for almost 40% of all the refugees hosted in G20 nations whilst the rest 
perform less than 15% of their fair share.901    
Having said this, the authors acknowledge that such a model cannot 
measure the quality of protection.  The challenge even with this model is securing 
the agreement of 193 states, or even a handful, to accept these quotas as 
authoritative and legitimate.  Although the authors do not explicitly advocate the 
use of their Index as a binding quota generator, they do suggest that ‘countries 
will need to agree on an equitable and predictable mechanism for sharing 
 
897 Sarnata Reynolds, Juan Pablo Vacatello, ‘Building a Lifeline: A Proposed Global Platform 
and Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees’ (2019) 21 The 
Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice 325. 
898 Reynolds and Vacatello, ‘Building a Lifeline: A Proposed Global Platform and 
Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees’, 374. 
899 Ibid., 342. 
900 Ibid., 344. 
901 Ibid., 346. (Figure 1). 
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responsibility and a new and independent body dedicated to supporting countries 
in the delivery of these responsibilities’.902   
 Experience from past responsibility sharing arrangements suggests that if 
states were to conclude a protocol on responsibility sharing, they would favour a 
certain discretion on how to contribute to the responsibility sharing efforts.  This 
is why a bottom-up approach to responsibility sharing, and hence to fairness, like 
the one taken in the Global Compact could be replicated in a protocol on 
responsibility sharing.   
In light of what has been discussed so far, it is argued that a protocol on 
responsibility sharing should endorse and build upon the current bottom-up 
approach to responsibility sharing, where states are free to choose the content of 
their contributions to protection and solutions by pledging according to their 
‘national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respective national 
policies and priorities’.903  Such bottom-up approach would endow the protocol 
with the necessary flexibility whereby states develop and determine their own 
criteria and burden sharing formulae, if wish to make use of such, rather than 
having them imposed on by mathematics.904   
That said, fairness would also warrant that every single state participates to 
the responsibility sharing effort equivalently, in some sort of proportion to its 
capabilities.  This would be crucial to ensure fairness between states as a 
normative goal of the international refugee law regime as well as fairness vis-a-
vis the refugees, the beneficiaries of international protection.  
 The discussion on responsibility sharing in the practices of states 
highlighted that when refugee-hosting states feel that they are not supported by 
the international community and faced with the structural unfairness of the 
refugee regime, they turn their back to refugees by adopting restrictive asylum 
 
902 Ibid., 374. 
903 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 4. 
904 Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not In My Backyard’, 376. 
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policies. 905   Peter Shuck’s ‘Modest Proposal for Reform’ attracted the most 
comments for its market-based approach to refugee protection because he 
introduced the trading of refugee quotas for the purposes of responsibility 
sharing.906  He sought however to structure his proposed sharing scheme on a 
conception of fairness.  He ascribed three elements to the responsibility sharing 
norm, which appear to endorse a bottom-up approach fair responsibility sharing.  
Schuck argues that the responsibility sharing norm: 
 
 should express a principle of fairness in the distribution of refugee 
protection burdens. Specifically, it should satisfy three criteria of fairness: 
consent, broad participation, and proportionality. Proportionality demands 
that a state's share of the burden be limited to its burden bearing capacity, 
relative to that of all other states in the international community.907  
 
This is where an explicit adaptation of CBDRRC in international refugee law 
would be beneficial in strengthening the responsibility sharing principle in 
international law.  Taking Schuck’s argument, a step further, a CBDRRC-guided 
protocol would satisfy all three elements.  Firstly, consent would be necessary for 
states to be bound by the protocol.  Secondly, broad participation would be 
secured since the protocol would have low barriers to entry by allowing states to 
determine their own contributions to refugee protection and solutions.  Thirdly, 
proportionality can be said to be reflected in CBDRRC’s rationale for different 
 
905 Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’, 449. 
906 Roland Smith finds such an idea of trading refugees ‘simply repugnant’, while Anker et al. 
reject it as morally troubling. Roland Smith, ‘Outsourcing Refugee Protection 
Responsibilities: the second life of an unconscionable idea’, (2004-2005) 14 Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy 137,149. Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick, Andrew 
Schacknove, ‘Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway, Neve and Schuck’ (1998) 11 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 295, 306.  
907 Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden Sharing: A Modest Proposal’ (1997) 22 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 276. 
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contributions to protection on the basis of capabilities that would be measured by 
each state individually. 
 
5.3.2. Fairness to refugees 
If one objective of responsibility sharing in international refugee law is to ease 
pressure on host states, serving thus an idea of fairness between states, however 
elemental, it should crucially also serve community interest by ensuring access to 
international protection and increasing the prospects for solutions.908  This is the 
fairness of the international protection regime vis a vis the beneficiaries of the 
community interest, the refugees.   
Noll argues that it is axiomatic, that ‘an equitable distribution of costs and 
responsibilities in protection will generate not only a maximum of fairness among 
states, but also a maximum of openness towards protection seekers’.909  Having 
said this, certain challenges do arise and relate to the morality of a responsibility 
sharing arrangement principally designed to cater for fairness between states.  The 
morality of responsibility sharing arrangements, subject to minor exceptions,910 
has not received a great deal of attention from legal positivist scholars.  
Gibney’s account of justice and refugee responsibility sharing defends that 
the preferences of refugees - with respect to the country of asylum for example - 
can be ignored in favour of the overriding goal of distributive justice between 
states which is a normative goal of the Refugee Convention.911  However, he 
cautions that states have a moral duty to send refugees to places where they are 
likely to flourish.912  Ferracioli contends in a similar spirit that: 
 
908 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’, 54. 
909 Noll, ‘Risky games? A theoretical approach to burden sharing in the asylum field’, 249. 
910 Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not in My Backyard’, 363-772. Hathaway and Schuck incidentally only 
engage with the anticipated moral objections to their respective proposals. 
911 Gibney, ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’ 457. Laura Ferracioli ‘The Appeal and 
danger of a new Refugee Convention’ (2014) 40 Social Theory and Practice 123. 
912 Gibney ‘Refugees and Justice between States’, 459- 460.   
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 While certainly not ideal, I believe it to be morally permissible to deny 
refugees the right to choose the country of final destination given the 
importance of creating a regime that fares better in terms of distributive and 
procedural fairness. If states stick to the current arrangement, those refugees 
with enough resources will in fact decide where to receive protection, but 
then the consequence of this is that fewer refugees will actually receive any 
sort of protection in the future.913 
 
Kuosmanen, arguing in the context of trading refugee quotas, contends that if a 
refugee’s preference for a particular country is not based in fundamental desires, 
such as for example, family reunification, then it is reasonable to override their 
choice. 914   Owen submits that any sharing of people between states should 
accommodate the legitimate preferences of refugees in order to be morally 
defensible.915  A whole different discussion is on what preferences can be said to 
be legitimate which Owen captures in great detail.916   
Hathaway, whose proposal has been fondly criticised for its risk of 
commodifying of refugees,917 and for treating refugee protection as an object for 
bargaining between states,918 acknowledges the ethical concern of transferring 
refugees between states but invokes in his defence a utilitarian argument: 
 
913 Ferracioli ‘The Appeal and danger of a new Refugee Convention’, 123. 
914 Jacob Kuosmanen, ‘What (If Anything) is Wrong with Trading Refugee Quotas?’ (2013) 
19 Res Publica 103, 109. 
915 David Owen ‘Refugees and Responsibilities of Justice’ (2018) 11 Global Justice: Theory 
and Practice Rhetoric 23, 37. 
916 Ibid. 
917 Juss, ‘Towards a Morally Legitimate Reform of Refugee Law: The Uses of Cultural 
Jurisprudence’, 311. Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies, a View from the South’, 
362-363. 
918 Anker, Fitzpatrick, Schacknove, ‘Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway, Neve and 
Schuck’, 300. 
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‘massive resources are now expended on the 15 per cent of refugees able to 
reach the developed world – disproportionately young, male, and mobile – 
while comparatively derisory resources are made available to the 85 per 
cent of refugees who remain closer to home.’919   
 
He has nonetheless recently stressed that there is a moral obligation to design a 
responsibility sharing regime that maximises refugees’ agency.920   
As a matter of international law, the Refugee Convention is silent as to 
whether the refugee has any choice with respect to the country of asylum.  States 
and scholars have interpreted this silence in various ways.  Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam argue that international law appears to recognise a right to at least some 
choice about where asylum is sought, in particularly when family members reside 
in another state.921  They find support for such argument in UNHCR Executive 
Committee Conclusion No.15, which states that ‘the intentions of the asylum-
seeker as regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum should as far 
as possible be taken into account.’922  In the context of effective protection in 
secondary movements, UNHCR concluded that refugees do not have an 
unfettered right to choose the country that will determine their asylum claim but 
their intentions ought to be taken into account.923 
 
919 Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 603. A similar answer to the 
commodification objection has been given by Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden Sharing: A Modest 
Proposal’, 276. 
920 Hathaway ‘The Global Co Op Out on Refugees’, 603. 
921 Goodwin-Gill, McAdam The Refugee in International Law, 392.  
922 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 15, para iii. 
923 UNHCR ‘Summary Conclusions on the Concept of "Effective Protection" in the Context 
of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers’ (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 
December 2002), para 11. 
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Hathaway seems to recognise an individual right to choose the country of 
asylum,924 but he does not base it in international law.925  Indeed, in the context of 
assigning responsibilities between states, he contends that governments can move 
refugees without their consent.   
  
Until a refugee is actually admitted to a state's status determination procedure 
- at which point he or she becomes, in the language of the treaty, lawfully 
present governments may lawfully assign their protection responsibilities to 
another country, even without the refugee's consent. 926 
 
From the above, it appears that there is no absolute right as a matter of 
international law for the refugee to choose her country of asylum.  However, 
taking into account the refugee’s preferences can be said to be a strong 
recommendation as well as a moral duty.  To this end, when refugees are 
transferred for the purposes of asylum, resettlement or complementary protection, 
a defensible moral standpoint would be to ask for their stronger preferences or 
give them a limited choice of countries.927   
A compromise between states and refugee preferences is possible as we are 
technologically equipped to be able to factor in refugees’ preferences as well as 
refugees voices more widely within states’ interests.  There have been various 
proposals in scholarship on how this can be facilitated through the use of 
 
924 James C Hathaway The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005), 324. 
925 Disagreeing with the existence of a legal right to choose the asylum country in 
international law are Jens Vedsted-Hansen ‘Non-Admission Policies and the Right to 
Protection: Refugees’ Choice versus States’ Exclusion?’ in Frances Nicholson, Patrick 
Twomey, (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press 1999), 287. 
926 Provided that it is a rights-regarding allocation of responsibility.  Hathaway ‘Why Refugee 
Law Matters’, 101. 
927 Gibney ‘Refugees and Justice between States’ 461. 
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sophisticated algorithms for refugees and states’ preference matching.928  For 
example, Will Jones and Alexander Teytelboym’s algorithm integrates the diverse 
preferences of refugees and states in relation to inclusion and integration against 
global resettlement capacity.929  Caution, however, would have to be drawn to the 
implicit moral assumptions that algorithms in general are built upon.  In the words 
of Owen, ‘there is no moral algorithm for combining contribution, benefit or 
capacity’.930   
 In a policy study for the European Commission, Guild, Costello and 
Moreno-Lax found that the voice and agency of asylum seekers could have been 
factored into the Relocation process in the context of intra-EU responsibility 
sharing, should Member states have been pledging places simultaneously so that 
effective preference matching had been possible. 931  
To sum up, the challenge of synching fairness between states and fairness to 
refugees is a difficult one.932  Gibney stresses that there is ‘a profound tension 
between doing justice to refugees and achieving justice between states’.933   
 
928 Tristan Harley, Harry Hobbs, ‘The Meaningful Participation of Refugees in Decision-
Making Processes: Questions of Law and Policy’ (2020) International Journal of Refugee 
Law (advanced copy). Kirk Bansak, Jeremy Ferwenda, Andrea Dillon, Dominik Hangartner, 
Duncan Lawrence, Jeremy Weinstein ‘Improving Refugee Integration through Data Driven 
Algorithmic Assignment’ (2018) 359 Science 325. 
929 On a UK developed algorithm see W Jones and A Teytelboym, ‘Choices, Preferences and 
Priorities in a Matching System for Refugees’ (2016) 51 Forced Migration Review 80, 80 - 
82.  
930 David Owen, What do we owe to Refugees? (Polity 2020) 92 
931 Elspeth Guild, Cathryn Costello, Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Study on Implementation of the 
2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece’ Study for the LIBE Committee (March 
2017), 8. 
932 On a comprehensive discussion on the ethical challenges, See Owen ‘Refugees and 
Responsibilities of Justice’, 23. 
933 MJ Gibney ‘Political Theory, Ethics and Forced Migration’ in Elena Fiddian - Qasmiyeh 
and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford 
University Press 2014), 54. 
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The quest for fairness pursued here is however a modest one, as it is limited 
to sketching the basic architecture and the key provisions of a protocol on 
responsibility sharing in international law.  The proposed protocol would seek to 
operationalise responsibility sharing understood through adapting the principle of 
CBDRRC to refugee protection.  In other words, focusing on procedural fairness 
through procedural obligations it is aimed that the international refugee regime 
will ensure distributive fairness by ensuring better protection to the refugees.  
 
5.4. A Protocol on responsibility sharing for refugees – A basic architecture and 
some key provisions 
5.4.1. A compromise: softening the legal arrangement 
As already alluded to, the adoption of a protocol on responsibility sharing would 
require from the outset an important compromise over great legal expectations.  
This compromise is not only a necessity of the political climate surrounding 
refugee protection, but it is dictated by the ‘inherently political’ as it has been 
described nature of responsibility sharing, as a process of balancing heterogenous 
and competing interests of states.934   
This is a fortiori the case in relation to physical responsibility sharing, a 
sensitive and sovereign matter for states since it entails the admission of refugees 
into their territories.  Given the distributional costs responsibility sharing entails, 
and the risk of losing authority over decision making, states have been naturally 
reluctant to commit to binding pre-determined refugee quotas or delegate 
authority to an international organisation that would administer such quotas. 
The study of international environmental law elucidates however that opting 
for a softer form of legalisation can facilitate agreement over matters perceived as 
highly political.  Legalisation as has been developed in International Relations 
refers to ‘a particular form of institutionalisation characterised by three elements: 
 
934 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’,18. 
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obligation, precision, and delegation’.935  Obligation means that states are legally 
bound by rules; precision that the rules authorise or prescribe concrete conduct; 
delegation ‘that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, 
and apply the rules’, for example, to resolve disputes.936  Each element of the 
definition can, nonetheless, vary across a spectrum of high to low legalisation.937   
The Paris Agreement is an example of a treaty where its provisions are 
softened or hardened against the various levels of obligation, precision and 
delegation.  This has made commentators to argue that not every provision of the 
Paris Agreement create legal obligations. 938   To the contrary, few are legal 
obligations, namely those that relate to mitigation action and transparency, and 
even these are intentionally softened and crafted as procedural obligations of 
conduct rather than result.939  Other provisions of the Paris Agreement perform a 
somewhat different role of setting expectations, guiding behaviour or constructing 
a narrative, and therefore are couched in recommendatory or hortatory 
language.940  Each element of obligation, prescription or delegation can thus be 
softened or hardened according to context and objectives.  This is why the Paris 
Agreement is a model treaty of finetuned legalisation for the purposes of securing 
consent and broad participation to a legally binding regime that advances a 
community interest. 
 
935 Kenneth W Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Duncan Snidal ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401–419. 
936 Ibid., 401. 
937 Ibid., 401– 404. 
938 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’, (2016) 25 Review of 
European Comparative and International Environmental Law 142, 155. 
939 These are the provisions relating to mitigation reflected in Article 4 of the Paris 
Agreement. 
940 Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-
Obligations’, 337. 
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Bringing responsibility sharing within international law would benefit from 
a form of soft legalisation and a focus on procedure.941  As mentioned earlier, 
there is a useful distinction to be made between the form of the instrument, a treaty 
on responsibility sharing in this case -which off course would be binding on its 
signatories- and the normative force of each of its provisions.  Although the VCLT 
provides for the contractual clause of pacta sunt servanda,942 not every provision 
in a treaty creates precise obligations for individual parties. 943  In this sense, 
certain provisions of some treaties like for example the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement have been characterised by some commentators as soft-law in 
character.  The distinction for these scholars lies ‘in the formulation of the 
provision which is decisive in determining whether it is hard or soft law’.944  That 
said, these provisions, qua treaty provisions, are still binding on the parties and 
therefore require performance in good faith, as per Article 26 of the VCLT.  It is 
the generality, imprecision or the use of qualifying language that softens the 
obligation at the level of implementation.  
Human rights treaties too, like for instance the ICESCR, are also structured 
on qualifying language.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration, in a dispute over 
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (OSPAR) between Northern Ireland and the UK referred to the concept 
 
941 Cf Ineli-Ciger who suggests that different models on how to distribute the burdens in a 
large-scale influx or any other complex situation can be introduced to as an Annex to the 
Global Compact on Refugees, arguing that soft law is easier to agree on. Ineli-Ciger, ‘The 
Global Compact on Refugees and Burden Sharing: Will the Compact Address the Normative 
Gap Concerning Burden Sharing’, 130. 
942 Article 26 stipulates that every treaty in force its binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith. VCLT, Article 26. 
943 Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’, 150. 
944 Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’ in Michael Evans (ed) International Law 
Making, 131. 
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of cascading standards of expression and levels of treaty provisions. 945  
According to the Court, the drafters of a treaty often make strategic use of 
‘differential language to provide for stipulated levels of engagement of treaty 
obligation’ to achieve the treaty objectives.946  There is, the Court continues, ‘a 
cascading standard of expression providing for the particular obligations imposed 
on a Contracting Party’. 947  In other words, some provisions of a treaty can 
prescribe conduct with high precision, aiming thus at a high level of engagement 
of obligation, while others aiming at a lesser level of engagement, recommend a 
course of action or contextualize at the level of implementation.  An example of 
this use of cascading standards of expression is found in the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which uses 
qualifying or contextual language to differentiate between the parties at the level 
of implementation of the obligations.948  Likewise, the provisions of the UN 
Charter relating to international cooperation in various areas of UN concern are 
couched in programmatic terms, hardly imposing any concrete obligations to be 
achieved by means of cooperation.949   
This type of soft legalisation, namely legal obligations that are softened 
against prescription and delegation is the one that would suit better a protocol on 
responsibility sharing.  The protocol would codify few procedural obligations, 
softened against prescription and delegation towards the objective of securing 
consent and broad participation to the treaty.  The benefits of soft legalisation as 
have been noted by Abbot and Snidal are that it facilitates compromise between 
weak and powerful states, whilst significantly limits the sovereignty costs of 
 
945 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 
9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Final Award (22 July 2013), para 
129. 
946 Ibid. para 129. 
947 Ibid. 
948 ICESCR, Article 2 (3). See also Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.  
949 Simma, UN Charter Commentary, Article 56, at 943. 
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entering into an agreement. 950   It can also be particularly beneficial for 
international cooperation and responsibility sharing in areas where actors have 
diverse interests and different powers. 951   The downside to it, is that legal 
commitments are weakened in exchange for flexibility, watering-down the 
instrument as a whole, and hence the law.  That said, there are ways in which 
states’ tendency to shirk further their already softened commitments can be 
mitigated for example by having in place a framework for international reporting 
and review, as seen in the Paris Agreement. 
Soft legalisation at the level of implementation represents the compromise 
that would have to be made in order to bring responsibility sharing from the 
exclusive realm of international politics, as it is currently under the Global 
Compact on Refugees, within international law.  Against this background, the 
next section fleshes out the key provisions of a protocol on responsibility sharing, 
which if adopted would constitute the missing formal partnership in international 
refugee law. 
 
5.4.2. Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities  
It is suggested that CBDRRC becomes the explicit guiding framework for 
responsibility sharing in international refugee law.  As already explained, the 
principle consists of two elements. Adapting the principle to international refugee 
law would entail an explicit acknowledgment of the common responsibility of 
states to protect the refugees and provide solutions.  Today there is stronger 
consensus that the refugee challenge is the ‘common concern of humankind’ and 
that refugee protection ought to be the common and shared responsibility of states, 
of which the principle of responsibility sharing is the expression.952  Translating 
 
950 Abbot and Snidal ‘Hard and Soft Law’ in International Governance’, 447. 
951 Ibid. 423. 
952 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 1, opening statement. Hurwitz, The Collective 
Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 285.  
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this common concern for refugees into a common responsibility through the use 
of CBDRRC would solidify the idea of shared responsibility by concretising the 
need for differentiation in the way this common responsibility is shared.  
The second element of differentiated responsibilities would certainly raise 
controversies in its negotiation.  As seen in international environmental law, 
differentiation manifests itself in two rationales serving two distinct fairness 
principles.  One rationale is the contribution to problem - i.e. to what extent a state 
has contributed via its conduct or omission to a common environmental problem 
- and the other is the capacity and capability to respond and take measures towards 
solving that problem.953  In the Paris Agreement, CBDRRC was recalibrated to 
focus particularly on responsibility by capability and the ever-changing national 
realities of states.954  Yet, even in this Paris version of CBDRRC, the developed 
states are normatively expected to continue to take the lead in the fight against 
climate change, due to their greater resources that determine their capacities.  
Developed countries’ greater resources also warrant the provision of support to 
the developing countries in meeting their own commitments.955  This is in simple 
terms the deal at least in international law between the Global North and the 
Global South in protecting the climate change. 
A similar agreement on responsibility sharing for refugees would need to be 
reached.  Adapting however the principle of CBDRRC to international refugee 
law raises a number of questions.  For example, should whether wealthier states 
of the Global North assume greater responsibilities in law because of their greater 
resources.  Under the current state of affairs, the Global North not only does not 
undertake responsibilities proportional to its resources, but it has put in place 
 
953 UNFCCC, Articles 3 and 4. Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Andriana Fabra, Ruth 
Mackenzie Principles of International Environmental Law, (Cambridge University Press 
2018 fourth edition) 244. 
954 Paris Agreement, Article 2 (2). 
955 Paris Agreement, Article 3 and in particular Article 9. 
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sophisticated mechanisms to further circumscribe responsibility for refugees in 
international refugee law. 
Another question the adaptation of the principle of CBDRRC would raise is 
on whether refugee producing countries, namely countries of origin, but also 
countries that have indirectly contributed to refugee flows through their foreign 
policies for example, should be responsible to compensate asylum states.  Finally, 
would developing states of the Global South, the hosts of the majority of the 
refugees, be entitled to receive additional development aid from the Global North, 
given that they are acting for the international res publica?  These questions are 
addressed next. 
 
5.4.2.1. Contribution to the refugee flows 
Refugee law scholars have argued that an adaptation of CBDRRC in international 
refugee law should only reflect the differences in capacities and resources and not 
any causal responsibility direct or indirect for the creation of refugee flows.   
Wall, who also suggests that the principle of CBDRRC should guide 
responsibility sharing in international refugee law argues that international 
refugee law ought to dispense with the ‘contribution to the problem’ rationale, as 
‘the apportionment of blame for refugee flows is neither necessary, nor 
appropriate’ to the refugee context. 956   It is rather the capacities rationale, 
responsibility by capability, that ought to determine commitments and which 
would assign special responsibilities to the developed countries.957   
Dowd and McAdam support that responsibility sharing in the international 
refugee law regime, ‘is not linked to states’ role in creating refugee movements, 
but rather on their capacity to provide protection and resources to alleviate the 
 
956 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfill the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 226, footnote 147. 
957 Ibid. 
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pressures on (mainly developing) states that host large numbers of refugees’.958  
They caution however that the adaptation of CBDRRC to international refugee 
law should not make existing refugee law obligations conditioned upon 
international assistance.959  
The Global Compact on Refugees appears to emphasise on responsibility by 
capability by stressing ‘the relative capacities of states, their levels of 
development and their respecting national priorities’,960 ascribing arguably to a 
more pragmatic and dynamic, à la Paris Agreement version of CBDRRC. 
Arguments on the direct and indirect contribution to refugee flows have been 
present in the discourse for some time and are worth rehearsing here, so as to 
assess whether they are firstly relevant, and secondly, fruitful to the conclusion of 
a protocol on responsibility sharing.   
With regard to refugee producing countries, Owen claims that they have a 
general moral responsibility to contribute to the responsibility sharing efforts, as 
well as a special one to compensate other states for their unjust conduct or 
omission.961  He explains further: 
 
States that engage in unjust conduct to another state - conduct that 
foreseeably generates refugees – should be held responsible for the 
protection of these refugees, and discharging this responsibility should not 
be seen as a contribution to their share of general responsibility.962 
 
 
958 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 182. 
959 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat 
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law’, 217. 
960 Global Compact on Refugees, para 4. 
961 Owen, What do we Owe to Refugees?, 86. Emphasis added. 
962 Owen, What do we Owe to Refugees?, 92. 
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Similarly but from a legal point of view, Goodwin-Gill and Sazak have suggested 
that refugee-creating states have as a matter of international law a legal 
responsibility to compensate asylum countries that face sometimes devastating 
financial demands.963  They suggest this can be done by UNHCR, which can make 
effective use of the UN sanctions regime and the freezing of assets , a measure 
that would ultimately generate funds, even if symbolically, for the refugee 
assistance programmes.964  Apart from a compensatory logic,  these arguments 
also serve a flight prevention logic.  Schuck has noted:  
 
The possibility that some first asylum states are complicit in refugee flows 
should surely be taken into account in designing and administering a 
reformed system of refugee protection. Indeed, imposing some obligations 
to bear some of the burdens that such a state causes might reduce its 
propensity to instigate refugee crises in the first place.965  
 
The legal arguments draw from the law of state responsibility and seek to establish 
that states responsible for creating refugee flows, have committed an 
internationally wrongful act, as defined in the International Law Commissions’ 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ARSIWA). 966  According to ARSIWA, such act must be attributable to that state, 
in accordance with the rules of attribution, as provided thereunder, and as a result 
 
963 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Movements of People between States in the 21st Century: An 
Agenda for Urgent Institutional Change’ (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 669, 
684. Guy S Goodwin-Gill, Selim Can Sazak, ‘Footing the Bill Refugee-Creating States’ 
Responsibility to Pay’ Foreign Affairs (29 July 2015). 
964 Goodwin-Gill, Sazak, ‘Footing the Bill Refugee-Creating States’ Responsibility to Pay’. 
965 Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden Sharing: A Modest Proposal’, 273. 
966 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, 
(ARSIWA), Article 2. 
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the state should be held accountable for reparation towards other states injured,967 
namely those that host the refugees.968   
It is suggested that the law on state responsibility and legal action to ensure 
accountability, even for the purposes of compensating asylum states, should 
remain outside a partnership for distributing responsibilities in international 
refugee law.  The use of the law of state responsibility for the purposes of 
attributing responsibility in the context of extra-territorial refugee policies or in 
the context of establishing responsibility for the cause of refugee flows is certainly 
critical and beneficial -both for clarifying the state of the law in relation to these 
practices,969 but also for the purposes of establishing accountability.970   
The Refugee Convention neither deals with the causes for flight nor provides 
for prevention,971 essentially delimiting the scope of international refugee law to 
palliative protection.972  Sticking to the spirit of the Refugee Convention and in 
light of the objective to create a much-needed sense of partnership between 
 
967 ARSIWA, Article 31. 
968 Compensation as one means for reparation for injury is provided in, Article 36 of 
ARSIWA that reads: ‘The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made 
good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage 
including loss of profits insofar as it is established’. 
969 As already discussed in Chapter 3, in recent years there has been a rich scholarship 
developing in relation to the law of state responsibility for the purposes of identifying the 
limits international law places on the extraterritorial practices of states.  For a comprehensive 
summary of these issues, See Isabelle Swerissen, ‘Shared Responsibility in International 
Refugee Law’ SHARES Expert Seminar Report (2011). 
970 Indicatively, jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights includes Soering v 
The United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989); Chahal v the United Kingdom 
App no 22414/93 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] 
Application no 27765/09, (ECtHR, 23 February 2012). 
971 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘International Law of Refugee Protection’ in Elena Fiddian - 
Qasmiyeh and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies 
(Oxford University Press 2014), 45. 
972 Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution Oriented Protection’, 202 
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countries of origin, transit, asylum and destination for the benefit of refugees in 
international law, I would concur with Wall that CBDRRC in international 
refugee law should dispense with the rationale for responsibility for harm.973  The 
use by UNHCR of the UN sanctions regime, although an interesting proposal, 
should likewise remain outside the scope of CBDRRC and a protocol on 
responsibility sharing.  
The Global Compact appears to emphasise on the need for partnership, since 
it includes in the modalities the provision of support to countries of origin through 
resources and expertise.974  Therefore, a true partnership in law between states, 
reflected within the principle of CBDRRC is only likely to be fruitful, if rationale 
for differentiation is delimited to states’ positive contributions to protection and 
solutions in accordance with their capacities. 
 
5.4.2.2 Contribution according to capacities 
Scholars have also supported the view that there is a moral responsibility of the 
Global North to contribute to refugee protection because of its greater resources, 
but also because of its foreign policy objectives.  Zolberg et al, hold the view that 
the Global North has a moral obligation to share asylum responsibilities because 
of its ‘enormous resource capabilities relative to those of the South,’ as well as its 
‘co-responsibility’ for upheavals and social conflicts in the Global South. 975  
Schacknove and Byrne share this view and support that the Global North has, in 
its colonial past, historically contributed to refugee flows and continues to do so 
indirectly through its foreign policy.976   
 
973 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfill the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 226. 
974 Global Compact paragraphs 87-89. 
975  Aristide R Zolberg, Astri Surkhe, Sergio Aguayo Escape from Violence, Conflict and The 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, (Oxford University Press1993), 279. 
976 Byrne and A Shacknove, ‘The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law’, 212- 213.  
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Whilst the rationale for direct or indirect contributions to refugee flows 
should fall outside the CBDRRC contours for the reasons explained above, the 
view that holds that the Global North’s greater capacities should entail special 
responsibilities977 reflects a conception of fairness at the interstate level.  The 
Global North’s responsibility to contribute to refugee protection, in accordance 
with its greater resources, is a requirement of fairness towards the developing 
countries that host the majority of the refugees.  It should thus be reflected in the 
CBDRRC principle and its operationalisation under a protocol on responsibility 
sharing.  
 This argument can be made a fortiori, in light of the non-entrée mise en 
place by the global North that arbitrarily seek to confine the locus of protection 
to the global South.  The Global Compact on Refugees stresses the need to support 
particularly the developing host countries and envisages the provision of funding 
to them - including technology and capacity building- as key areas for effective 
responsibility sharing.978   
To conclude, I suggest that adapting CBDRRC to international refugee law 
would primarily solidify refugee protection as the common and shared 
responsibility of states.  This indeed would be the most valuable asset of bringing 
the principle of CBDRRC in international refugee law.  This realisation would 
thus in turn require a baseline commitment of all states to refugee protection and 
solutions differentiated under a rationale of responsibility by capability, namely 
capacities and socioeconomic realities, including the greater capacities of the 
developed countries, would define contributions to protection and solutions.  This 
baseline commitment would truly set in motion a process fair and equitable 
 
977 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfill the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 226.  
978 Global Compact on Refugees, para 32. 
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responsibility sharing at the international plane characterised ‘by the formal 
equality of states and their inequality of material capability’.979     
Building on the language of the Global Compact for Refugees, I suggest that 
a protocol on responsibility sharing codifies the CBDRRC principle as follows: 
 
States should share the responsibility for protecting and providing solutions 
to refugees in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, and in light of their national 
realities, capacities, levels of development and respecting national policies 
and priorities.  
 
5.4.3. An obligation to participate in responsibility sharing crafted as an obligation 
of conduct 
In this section, I discuss and explore, in detail, the nature of the legal obligation 
that could be codified in the protocol, so as to operationalise the principle of 
CBDRRC as suggested above.  I propose crafting the legal obligation as bottom-
up.  Bottom-up obligations minimise the real and perceived sovereignty costs of 
joining a legally binding instrument.980  Crucially, key to the appeal of a protocol 
on responsibility sharing to states, would be the trade-offs between the breadth of 
participation and the depth of the legal commitments.  It is thus suggested that the 
obligation of each individual state party to participate in responsibility sharing is 
crafted as a procedural obligation of conduct.  A proposed wording, inspired by 
the Paris Agreement provision on mitigation is as follows: 
 
 
979 Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, 
Nicholas J Wheeler, Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), 213. 
980 Abbot and Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law’ in International Governance’, 426. 
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Each State party shall prepare and communicate its contributions to refugee 
protection and solutions in line with its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of its national realities, 
capacities, levels of development and respecting national policies and 
priorities.  
 
Each party should pledge its contributions to complementary admission 
pathways, solutions as well as to financing protection costs, to the best of its 
capabilities.  
 
Paragraph 1 codifies an obligation to contribute to responsibility sharing as one 
of conduct rather than result.  The parties to the protocol would be therefore 
obligated to participate in the responsibility sharing effort and communicate their 
contributions.  Under the status quo, participating to responsibility sharing 
through the Global Refugee Forums remains entirely discretionary, whilst under 
the suggested protocol, the state parties would be legally bound to participate in 
responsibility sharing by pledging their commitments.  Crucially, the parties 
would not be legally required to achieve their pledges.  In other words, failing to 
achieve the pledges would not incur the violation of the obligation.  The rationale 
that a treaty on responsibility sharing should have low barriers to entry to ensure 
broad participation and ratification is the correct one. 981   To this end, the breadth 
of participation trumps the depth of the legal commitments.   
Despite the low level of precision and the absence of a delegation of 
authority to a third party under the protocol, each state party would have a legal 
obligation to participate in the responsibility sharing effort that would be 
additionally bolstered by the good faith requirement to achieve the pledges under 
 
981 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 227 and 230. 
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Article 26 of the VCLT.  The emphasis of the obligation on a procedural 
requirement to participate in responsibility should not be underestimated.  As seen 
in MEAs reflecting community interests, procedural obligations serve important 
functions.  Brunnée explains the facilitating role of procedural requirements in 
contexts where agreement on substantive obligations is nearly impossible, if not 
undesirable.982 
 
5.4.3.1. A normative expectation to contribute to both physical and financial 
responsibility sharing  
Paragraph 2 of the proposed provision builds on paragraph 1 and sets a normative 
expectation - hence the recommendatory use of ‘should’ instead of the mandatory 
‘shall’ - on the part of each individual state party to contribute to both components 
of responsibility sharing, physical and financial. 
In line of the conception of responsibility sharing put forward in the thesis 
physical relocation of refugees through the institution of asylum, resettlement and 
other complementary pathways to protection, particularly when refugee host 
countries are severely encumbered and cannot guarantee refugee rights is an 
essential component of responsibility sharing.  It is the most controversial 
component as the Global North has intentionally and cautiously refrained from 
openly committing to it.983   
Betts and Collier recognise the need for a ‘baseline common commitment’ 
that symbolises participation.984  Symbolic participation, according to the authors, 
would require that every state commits to admitting at least a certain number of 
 
982 Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Community Interests Procedural Aspects’, 
175. 
983 Dowd and McAdam ‘International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Protect 
Refugees: What, Why and How?’, 892.  Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share Refugees and 
Responsibility-Sharing’, 44. 
984 Alexander Betts, Paul Collier, Refuge Transforming A Broken Refugee System (Allen 
Lane), 208. 
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refugees into its territory and, similarly, makes a minimum token of financial 
contribution.985  It is therefore crucial that such common baseline commitment is 
enshrined in a protocol and the use of qualifying language in the construct of the 
provision plays an important role.  The phrase ‘as well as’ - qualified by the phrase 
‘to the best of its capabilities’- sets a normative expectation of each state party to 
pledge not only financial contributions but also complementary admission 
pathways and solutions.   
Provisions that recommend rather than obligate lack the ‘characteristics of 
international normativity’, but nonetheless can produce ‘certain legal effects’.986  
Thus codified, the provision aims at a lesser level of engagement of obligation, 
since it recommends rather than prescribes action.  Under the proposed protocol, 
state parties, including Global North countries, would be normatively expected to 
pledge for refugee admission fulfilling the baseline commitment, but failing to do 
so, would not incur the violation.  The use of softer language here aims to secure 
agreement by states by going not too far beyond what is realistically possible.  The 
fact however that such normative expectation would be found in a legally binding 
instrument would have direct normative impact on states’ conduct and should be 
interpreted as such.   
Contributions to physical responsibility sharing would entail refugee 
admission for the purposes of access to protection and resettlement.  States would 
be free to choose from offering asylum places or using complementary admission 
pathways, such as humanitarian visas and corridors, labour mobility schemes or 
education opportunities for refugees such as academic scholarships and student 
visas.  These are all tokens of physical responsibility sharing that have already 
 
985 Ibid. 
986 WM Reisman et al, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ (1988) 82 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, Remarks by G Handl 371. Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris 
Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’, 352. 
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been agreed by states in the Global Compact. 987  Henceforth, it should not require 
extensive renegotiation and agreement.   
Most importantly, the state parties would be normatively expected to 
contribute to solutions as well.  Resettlement, in particular, although long 
recognised as a core protection tool and a durable solution,988 it still remains, 
today, critically underprovided.989  With an exception to the OAU Convention, 
there is currently no hard law on durable solutions.990  A normative expectation 
on the part of the state parties to the protocol to contribute to solutions would 
strengthen international refugee law with respect to solutions.   
Hathaway and Neve have identified a timeframe of five years after which 
‘the psychosocial need for permanence compels a durable solution’.991  Findings 
based on empirical and phycological research, such as this one, are important.  
Attention therefore should be paid to them as they can resolve protracted refugee 
stations that require active participation from the international community.   
With respect to financial responsibility sharing, each state party would 
choose whether to fund refugee assistance programmes in specific refugee 
situations, in cooperation with other humanitarian or developmental actors or 
directly establish private-public partnerships with the refugee host states.  The 
Global Compact on Refugees envisages the establishment of public-private 
 
987 Global Compact on Refugees, para 95. 
988 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, (UNHCR 2011 revised edition), 136. 
989 In 2019 UNHCR submitted nearly 82,000 refugees to 29 States for consideration, and 
some 64,000 refugees were resettled. This represented a modest increase from 2018 and 
surpassed the strategy’s target of 60,000 for the year. Nevertheless, it constitutes less than 5 
per cent of the 1.4 million refugees determined to be in need of resettlement in 2019. 
Resettlement and complementary pathways, Standing Committee 78th Meeting, 
EC/71/SC/CRP.10 30 July 2020. 
990 Türk and Dowd ‘Protection Gaps’, 284. 
991 Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’ ,182–84. Domanski, ‘Insights from 
Experience: A Background Paper on Temporary Protection’ in Hathaway (ed) Reconceiving 
International Refugee Law, 22.  
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partnerships, whereunder the private sector can invest in refugees and host 
communities through labour mobility schemes for instance. 992   
 
5.4.3.2. Bottom-Up Implementation 
Provided that states agree to codify a common baseline obligation of 
responsibility sharing, the implementation of this commitment would not differ 
too much from what the Global Compact envisages. 
 One option would be to use the existing ‘machinery’ of the Refugee 
Compact, the Global Refugee Forums, namely pledging conferences convened 
every four years, where states would be legally bound to communicate their 
commitments.  Another option would be to create a body under the protocol, a 
Conference of the Parties during the meetings of which each state would 
communicate its individual contributions.993  Wall argues that whilst the holding 
of pledging conferences are merely events, the Conference of the Parties would 
be the treaty’s governing body that would ‘set a process in motion.’994  The 
pledges and contributions would then be made available by UNHCR on a public 
registry.  This is a process already in motion under the Global Compact on 
Refugees and therefore its institutionalisation under a protocol would not 
encumber the High Commissioner’s office further. 
 
5.4.5. Developed countries’ obligation to provide financial assistance to refugee 
hosting developing states  
The operationalisation of the principle of CBDRRC in international refugee law 
would warrant that refugee hosting states, developing or least developed receive 
the necessary resources for protecting refugees, without significantly overbearing 
 
992 Global Compact on Refugees, para 42. 
993 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 230. 
994 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
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their own resources and communities.  To this end, developed states should have 
special responsibilities under the protocol.  The Global Compact stresses the need 
for supporting the developing and least developed refugee hosting countries 
through effective and efficient funding that maximises private sector contributions 
and enhances developmental assistance.995   
It is suggested that the protocol codifies an obligation for developed states to 
commit to refugee financing, including technology transfer and capacity building. 
The obligation could be structured as a collective obligation of the developed 
countries as a whole.  A suggested drafting is as follows: 
 
Given their greater capacities and resources, developed country parties 
shall provide financial resources to the developing refugee hosting 
countries, through mobilising humanitarian and development assistance, 
including technology and capacity-building in support of refugees and host 
communities. 
 
Developed country parties are encouraged to commit to multiyear, 
unearmarked funding and mobilise additional development resources, over 
and above regular development assistance. Such funding should be 
considered on a grant basis. 
 
Paragraph 1 of the suggested provision codifies a collective obligation on the part 
of the developed states only - being the major donors of humanitarian and 
developmental aid - to provide financial assistance including, technology transfer 
and capacity building, to the refugee hosting countries for the benefit of the 
refugees and host communities.  The collective nature of the obligation further 
softens the levels of prescription for it does not specify what each individual 
 
995 Global Compact on Refugees, para 32. 
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developed party is required to do.  This could be seen as a weakness of the 
provision, which paragraph 2 seeks to modestly remedy.  
Paragraph 2, addressing again the developed parties, is couched in 
recommendatory terms and essentially encourages the major donor countries of 
the Global North to commit to unearmarked development funding to host states 
for the benefit of the refugees and the local communities.  Furthermore, the 
provision also encourages the developed country parties to consider providing 
funding on a grant making basis.  
Refugee targeted development aid is a key tool towards fair and effective 
responsibility sharing.  As it became evident in the context of the UNHCR 
Convention Plus Initiative, developing host countries sought commitments by the 
developed states on refugee targeted assistance that would be additional to that 
for poverty eradication and other developmental needs.  Leah Zamore 
convincingly argues that development grants and debt cancellation should replace 
concessionary lending to developing countries for hosting refugees: 
 
Additional support to host countries should be “untied” and should come in 
the form of grants, not loans. Just a handful of host governments are home 
to a majority of the world’s refugees. Support for them should therefore be 
seen chiefly as compensation for a global public good and as a step toward 
global economic justice. It should not be a secret subsidy for donors or their 
banks. It should not leave host countries more indebted than they already 
are.996  
 
An example is Tanzania.  Tanzania, one of the largest refugee hosting countries 
in Africa, withdrew from the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework of 
 
996 Leah Zamore, ‘Refugees, Development, Debt, Austerity: A Selected History’ (2018) 6 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 26, 48-49. 
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the Global Compact (GRRF), when under the International Development 
Association (IDA), the World Bank’s fund for the poorest,997 it was offered $100 
million, split between a loan and a grant’.998  Betts explains that ‘the idea that a 
country like Tanzania should have to borrow, even at preferential rates, to host 
refugees on behalf of the international community,’ was what made President 
Magufuli withdraw from the CRRF.999 
The CBDRRC principle adapted to the refugee law context would seek to 
adjust the current unfairness by taking cognizance of the socio-economic realities 
of states, in particular, the refugee hosts developmental priorities.  Their efforts to 
refugee protection and to the community interests would thus be acknowledged 
in the legal arrangement.  Lending, as it has been rightly pointed out, even if 
concessionary, has the proclivity to encourage austerity in countries with already 
limited capacities.1000  Additional development aid given to refugee host countries 
specifically to low-income developing countries would truly reflect a sense of 
partnership between the Global North and the Global South that would ensure 
tangible benefits at the national level for both refugees and the local population. 
Regrettably, it would be unrealistic to think that such a leap of faith towards 
grant based development aid could be taken by donor states and development 
banks like the World Bank, as a matter of legal obligation.  There is already 
tension between developed and developing countries on the broader question of 
 
997 On IDA 18 and its Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities, See 
https://ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-sub-window-
for-refugees-host-communities.  
998 Alexander Betts, ‘Don’t Make African Nations Borrow Money to Support Refugees’ 
Foreign Affairs (February 21, 2018).  
999 Ibid.  
1000 Alexander T Aleinikoff, Leah Zamore ‘The Arc of Protection: Toward a New 
International Refugee Regime’, 60. Public Seminar Books, Available at 
http://www.publicseminar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Click-here-to-download-the-Arc-
of-Protection.pdf . 
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development aid, 1001  including debt cancellation and its real impact on 
development.1002  The legal design therefore would be key to balance the need for 
aid against realistic expectations.  This is why paragraph 2 on mobilizing 
additional development aid to be considered on the basis of grants is couched in 
programmatic terms, encouraging a course of action, aiming at a minimalist level 
of suggested conduct and course of action.  This is how the concept of cascading 
standards of expression and levels of engagement of obligations would play in a 
treaty that seeks to have low barriers to entry and codify a minimum of 
obligations.  
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order.  What I have suggested in terms of 
an obligation for financial assistance to the developing countries might prima 
facie oversimplify matters, by categorising the countries into developed and 
developing.  To be sure, this is not an absolute categorisation, nor a legal 
categorisation.  There are many structural differences within each category of 
developed and developing states, and this is acknowledged within the principle of 
CBDRRC that takes cognizance of the socioeconomic realties of each state 
individually.  Not all developed states, are equally wealthy and not all developing 
countries are all least developed.  The European Union and Latin America is one 
such context, where some states in the region are much wealthier than others.  The 
distinction therefore under the protocol into developed and developing is not a 
rigid one.  It is made solely as an acknowledgment of the fact that the majority of 
refugees are found in the Global South or in middle income countries, such as 
Turkey and Lebanon.   
 
1001 Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 285. 
1002 In the context of Africa, it has been argued that ‘although debt relief offers some 
prospects for development, there is little or no evidence to suggest that such an outcome is 
automatic.’ J Shola Omotolaa and Hassan Saliub, ‘Foreign Aid, Debt Relief and Africa’s 
Development: Problems and Prospects’ (2009) 16 South African Journal of International 
Affairs 87. 
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That said, under the protocol all parties, irrespective of their development 
levels, would be bound to contribute to refugee protection and solutions, in line 
with their CBDRRC.  Crucially, compliance with core protection obligations 
under the Refugee Convention would not be conditioned upon receipt of financial 
assistance under the Protocol.   
 
5.4.6. Implementation and review  
5.4.6.1. A transparency obligation to report 
When it comes to transparency and information sharing, international refugee law 
is considerably underdeveloped.  This is because there is no official reporting and 
information repository on countries’ responsibility sharing contributions. 1003  The 
Global Refugee Forum’s digital platform and dashboard,1004 which tracks the 
pledges and their implementation progress, is a laudable effort by UNHCR to keep 
the ongoing global responsibility sharing effort transparent.   
At the time of writing, the dashboard has tracked pledges and contributions 
made by states and other pledging entities at the 2019 High Level Segment on 
Statelessness and the 2019 Global Refugee Forum.1005  UNHCR has stressed 
however that the dashboard ‘is not a financial tracking or reporting tool’, as 
updates are based on voluntary reporting by pledging and recipient entities.1006  
This is where a procedural obligation of reporting on the contributions to 
 
1003 The only exception to this is found in the Refugee Convention and the Protocol requiring 
states to communicate to the UN Secretary General the laws and the regulations that may 
adopt to ensure the application of the two instruments. Refugee Convention, Article 36.  
Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees, Article III. 
1004 Online Tracking Dashboard on Pledges and Contributions, 
https://globalcompactrefugees.org/channel/pledges-contributions  
1005 UNHCR Global Refugee Forum, Concept Note Global Refugee Forum – Online Tracking 
Dashboard on Pledges and Contributions.  
1006 Ibid., 4.  
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responsibility sharing can build mutual trust between the parties, boost self-
assessment and peer review and ensure transparency.  
To this end, the protocol would codify an individual obligation for each 
state party to provide an annual report on its contributions to protection and 
solutions, as well as any other information needed to track the status of their 
implementation.1007  In the case where contributions to responsibility sharing take 
the form of joint pledges with partner organisations, be that private sector, or 
NGOs, the primary reporting obligation shall rest with the state party.  Reporting 
in the case of jointly undertaken pledges with the private sector, shall require 
detailed information on the roles and responsibilities between the partners as well 
as a guarantee that arrangements are in full respect of humanitarian and human 
rights principles.1008  The state’s obligation to report under the protocol would not, 
however, deprive non-state pledging entities from voluntarily reporting on their 
pledges and progress.  In fact, reporting from different sources could enhance the 
quality of information and data verification.   
The value of self-reporting should not be underestimated, even in the case 
where parties are not legally bound to achieve their pledged contributions.  The 
focus on procedure serves its own crucial role and self-reporting comes with 
important benefits.  Individual reporting obligations are ubiquitous in multilateral 
environmental agreements and form an integral part of their oversight 
frameworks.1009  Where reporting is an integral part of the treaty’s framework, it 
 
1007 Some reporting is also suggested by Wall in his Framework Convention but again it does 
not appear to be proposed as a matter of legal obligation. Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: 
Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 
1967 Protocol?’, 230. 
1008 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 42. Harley additionally flags that [P]rivate sector 
engagement is consistent with international human rights standards and that relationships are 
entered into transparently and with a clear understanding of respective roles and 
responsibilities. Harley, ‘Innovations in Responsibility Sharing’,10. 
1009 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 239. 
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performs an additional self-examination function, serving procedural fairness by 
enhancing transparency between the parties.1010  
 In the proposed architecture, the individual transparency obligation will 
bolster each party’s substantive obligation under the protocol to participate in the 
common baseline commitment functioning as a review mechanism.1011  Even 
when states are less than sincere, self-reporting has benefits as ‘the formal 
presentation of a report to an international organisation’, in this case the UNHCR, 
‘presents NGOs and other critics with a convenient target’.1012   It facilitates 
evaluation of a country’ performance by providing a focal point for others to 
assess and criticize the information provided’. 1013   Finally, reporting on 
responsibility sharing can also identify protection gaps, highlight progress against 
the global refugee needs and finally promote the sharing of good practices 
between the parties.  
 
5.4.6.2. A Global Stocktake 
Part of the protocol’s implementation and review framework would be a global 
stocktake.  A soft legalisation of responsibility sharing equally requires a 
departure from traditional enforcement and sanctioned-based treaty mechanisms 
towards mechanisms of facilitating compliance and dialogue.1014  The Global 
Compact on Refugees for example envisages a stocktake exercise.  The 
 
1010 Ibid. 
1011 Bodansky, Brunnée , Rajamani, International Climate Change, 242. 
1012 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 239. 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 The enforcement model can be seen in multilateral human rights treaties whereby treaty-
bodies are established, usually through an optional protocol, to interpret human rights 
provisions and hear individual complaints. A similar model can also be seen in regional 
human rights instruments that establish human rights courts such as the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both established under the 
European Convention of Human Rights and American Convention on Human Rights 
respectively.  Finally, the Refugee Convention itself has a dispute resolution clause in Article 
38. 
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stocktaking of progress is to take place during the Global Refugee Forums, during 
which stakeholders will assess progress against the objectives of the Compact.1015  
Specifically: 
 
[T]he stocktaking at the Forums will be informed by the results of the process 
coordinated by UNHCR to measure the impact arising from hosting, 
protecting and assisting refugees and a mechanism for tracking 
implementation of pledged and contributions, as well as measuring the 
impact of the global compact established by UNHCR in close consultation 
with States and other relevant stakeholders.   
 
The next Global Refugee Forum is to take place in 2023. The modalities and 
methodologies that will inform the stocktaking are, still at the time of writing, 
being developed by states and UNHCR with the technical assistance of the World 
Bank.1016   
It is suggested that such global stocktaking of progress becomes the 
protocol’s review mechanism.  In the Paris Agreement, the global stocktake is 
envisaged to take place every five years with an aim to raise ambition in the NDCs 
and assess the collective progress of the parties towards achieving the goal of the 
Agreement.1017  Not entirely dissimilar, a global stocktake under the protocol 
would take place during the Global Refugee Forums and would assess the 
collective progress of the parties against UNHCR’s international protection needs.   
 
1015 Global Compact on Refugees, paragraph 103. 
1016 UNHCR Progress Report Measuring the Impact of Hosting, Protecting and Assisting 
Refugees (July 2020). 
1017 Paris Agreement, Article 14. 
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During the stocktake exercise, the parties would be required to participate to 
this ‘collective learning process’.1018  As it has been observed by scholars in other 
areas of global governance, stocktaking functions as ‘a communicative process of 
constructing shared meanings around new concepts, including normative 
expectations and identities’.1019  To this end, the protocol could explicitly provide 
for the participation of all stakeholders to the stocktaking exercise including non-
state entities.  The transparency obligation on self-reporting and the stocktaking 
of progress could together be seen as the permanent public discourse on the 
fairness as well as effectiveness of the global responsibility sharing effort against 
projected international protection needs.   
 
5.5. Why we need a protocol with a light package of responsibility sharing 
obligations 
One could question how this model of bottom-up contributions to responsibility 
sharing communicated during pledging conferences would differ from the current 
state of affairs.   
A quick search on the global compact’s dashboard that tracks the pledges 
under the Global Compact paints a somewhat disheartening picture and reveals 
partly the answer.  As already said, the dashboard shows pledges and 
contributions made by states and other pledging entities at the 2019 High Level 
Segment on Statelessness and at the 2019 Global Refugee Forum. 
Most states’ pledges thus far have been made with regard to harmonisation 
of policy, 1020  ascension to international legal instruments and withdrawal of 
 
1018 Manjana Milkoreit, Kate Haapala, ‘Designing the Global Stocktake: A Global 
Governance Innovation’ The Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) (November 
2017), 7. 
1019 Ibid.  
1020 Noll ‘Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field’, 
243. 
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reservations.  The sharing of policies is seen by some states as falling with the 
scope of responsibility sharing.  In the EU context in particular, there has been 
extensive supranational legislation aiming at the harmonisation of asylum 
procedures across the Member states with respect to status determination and 
reception standards.1021  As already explained, harmonisation of policies can be a 
laudable effort insofar it complements and does not seek to substitute the common 
baseline commitment to physical and financial responsibility sharing.  
Very few pledges by states, as appear on the Dashboard, are made on 
complementary admission pathways, and even less on local integration or on 
state-sponsored resettlement.1022   
Another issue that has been flagged by UNHCR in relation to 
complementary pathways, is the lack of comprehensive data showing how many 
refugees benefitted in 2019.1023  This is why procedural obligations on reporting 
and information sharing are crucial to measure and review progress in the 
protection of the community interest.  
 Non-state entities, such as the private sector and NGOS appear to have 
pledged more to complementary admission pathways than states. 1024   For 
 
1021 EU Council Directive 2013/32 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing 
International protection (recast). 
1022 An exception is Denmark that explicitly pledged to resume its resettlement programme in 
2019 starting with prioritising refugees in need of medical treatment and with annual quotas 
to follow for 2020.  
1023 UNHCR ‘Resettlement and Complementary Pathways’ Standing Committee 78th Meeting. 
EC/71/SC/CRP.10 (30 July 2020). 
1024 UNHCR makes this point obvious when in a recent publication in the Journal of 
International Refugee Law, Assistant High Commissioner for International Protection Gillian 
Triggs and Associate Policy Officer Patrick Wall, extensively list all the pledges made by the 
private sector, in an effort to show progress on the Global Compact, whilst summarizing 
states pledges with a relatively brief comment. ‘A broad range of States – more than two-
thirds of the membership of the UN – participated in more than half of all pledges, but there 
was also very active participation in the pledging process by a wide range of other 
stakeholders’. Gillian D Triggs, Patrick Wall, ‘The Makings of a Success’: The Global 
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example, the Tent Partnership for Refugees, a coalition of 44 private sector 
companies including Airbnb, Adidas, H&M Group, IKEA and other 
conglomerates have pledged to hire and place more than refugees into jobs, 
support refugee-owned businesses and improve access to banking services for 
refugees.1025  Interestingly, Myanmar has pledged to facilitate voluntary returns 
of refugees, previously based in Thailand, without reporting further on what that 
entails.1026  This pledge lacks crucial information, in particular with respect to the 
‘voluntary’ nature of the repatriations, that should be made transparent to the 
international community.  Other pledges are constructively vague in their 
description and missing important information on their implementation as 
well.1027   
One positive contribution is the UK’s 2020 New Resettlement Scheme, 
under which the UK government has pledged the resettlement of 23 000 refugees, 
launching a community sponsorship programme, additional to the commitments 
of the UK government.1028  The progress and implementation of the contributions 
is, however, likely to further delay as a knock-on effect of the global coronavirus 
pandemic.  Indicatively, the High Commissioner remarked in the meeting of the 
Standing Committee in July 2020: 
 
 
Compact on Refugees and the Inaugural Global Refugee Forum’ (2020) International Journal 
of Refugee Law, (advanced copy), 45. 
1025 The Tent Partnership pledge can be found in the Dashboard. More on the Tent coalition, 
https://www.tent.org/members/  
1026 Myanmar’s pledge available at 
https://globalcompactrefugees.org/index.php/channel/pledges-contributions  
1027 China for example has pledged to continue to provide humanitarian support to multiple 
countries without further specifying details. 
1028UK Resettlement Scheme Note for Local Authorities August 2019 available at  
https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/UK%20Resettlement%20Scheme%20
Briefing%20Note%20for%20Local%20Authorities%20WEB.pdf 
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Compounding the decline in respect for the legal regime underpinning 
refugee protection are the social and economic impacts of COVID-19 upon 
the most vulnerable in our communities, especially the 26 million asylum-
seekers and refugees, the 47 million people displaced in their own country 
and unknown millions of those who are stateless.1029 
 
In light of the above, the proposed protocol, if agreed, would significantly change 
the current state of affairs.  It would be a treaty as defined in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.1030  Responsibility sharing for refugees would 
come within international refugee law as well as under a permanent institutional 
structure.  The protocol would be additional to the Refugee Convention and the 
1967 Protocol, open to accession by all countries, even those that have not ratified 
the Convention.  For the reasons explained above, it is highly unlikely that states 
would join a treaty that provides for financial and physical responsibility sharing 
obligations of result or any targets.  In light of this, pre-determined quotas would 
not be conducive to states’ agreement nor would secure compliance by states.   
Under the protocol, each state party would have a legal obligation of conduct 
to pledge its contributions according to its ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of their national realities, 
capacities, levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities’ 
(CBDRRC), turning the current policy trend into a principled legal framework.   
In addition to their individual obligation to participate in the responsibility 
sharing effort, developed states would have a collective obligation to support the 
developing host countries, by providing targeted development assistance that 
would benefit refugees and the host communities.  Further, states parties would 
 
1029 Remarks by Assistant High Commissioner for Protection Gillian Triggs at the 78th 
meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme (7 July 2020). 
1030 VCLT, Article 2 (1) (a). 
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be normatively expected to contribute to both physical and financial responsibility 
as a baseline common commitment.  The softening of the obligation in this respect 
entails that states would, however, be free to choose the content of their financial 
and refugee admission contributions i.e. financing UNHCR or refugee assistance 
programmes in the host states as well as choose between complementary 
pathways or offering resettlement places.  Nevertheless, failing to meet this 
common baseline commitment would not incur the violation of the provision, 
ensuring a certain degree of autonomy.   
Finally, over the issue of development aid - that causes tension between 
developing and developed countries - the protocol would set a course of action, 
towards targeted development assistance. This provision would hardly impose 
any concrete conduct on behalf of the developed countries but would still provide 
context and construct a narrative that would at least signal solidarity in addressing 
the problem.   
 In terms of implementation and review, the protocol would provide for a 
light oversight framework premised on transparency, self-reporting and 
stocktaking that would seek to facilitate implementation.  Each state would have 
a legal obligation to communicate its contributions and to report annually on their 
progress and implementation.  In cases of joint pledges and public-private 
partnerships, which should be explicitly provided in a protocol on responsibility 
sharing, reporting on the division of labour between the parties would be a 
mandatory requirement of the state party to the protocol.  The parties’ pledges and 
reports would be subsequently published onto the public registry established by 
the protocol and operated by UNHCR, therefore ensuring open access to all 
stakeholders.  Self-reporting under the protocol would perform a policy function 
of self-assessment for the parties and peer and public pressure for the rest of the 
stakeholders.  Finally, the global stocktake would assess the collective progress 
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against protection needs and strengthen the public discourse on the fairness as 
well as effectiveness of the global responsibility sharing effort.   
 
5.6. Building and expanding on the protocol’s edifice 
It goes without saying, that what I have proposed only constitutes - as was the 
objective - a basic legal architecture and some key provisions of a protocol on 
responsibility sharing.  In my view the proposed provisions are vital so as to 
institutionalise responsibility sharing in international refugee law and move away 
from the current voluntarist framework.  Therefore, what I have included in the 
protocol’s basic architecture by no means excludes further provisions and 
additional mechanisms that could be established thereunder, if states would 
require.   
The creation of a secretariat, for example, has been proposed by Hathaway 
and Neve who have suggested that UNHCR could serve as secretariat in a scheme 
of responsibility sharing to which states will agree to report on their responsibility 
sharing contributions.1031  Wall has likewise proposed a small secretariat that 
would be hosted within UNHCR and would be part of a binding instrument on 
responsibility sharing. 1032   Admittedly, UNHCR is already performing a 
secretariat function under the Compact as His Office is tasked with maintaining 
dashboard of contributions from the Global Refugee Forums and already 
provides, under its mandate, administrative support during international 
conferences. 
Harley has recently proposed the creation of a global refugee fund, where 
states would contribute to in accordance with their capacities to pay.1033  The 
creation of a fund could open the door to new financing models and diverse 
 
1031 Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again’, 197  
1032 Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’ 225. 
1033 Harley ‘Innovations in Responsibility Sharing’, 11. 
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funding that has been identified and used for instance in the climate change 
regime, improving the quality and quantity of refugee finance.1034   Such funding 
institution could be formally established within the architecture of the protocol. 
A responsibility sharing Index, such as the one designed by Reynolds and 
Vacatello discussed in this Chapter, could have an auxiliary function as an 
operational tool of the protocol that would guide states contributions, infusing 
more ambition and influencing state behaviour.  Betts Costello and Zaun support 
that Indexes not only offer a means to measure a states’ contributions, but can also 
be a source of normative influence over state behaviour.1035  The authors argue 
that the development of an authoritative public index on responsibility sharing 
would be extremely worthwhile, ‘both in contributing to a shared understanding 
of what responsibility-sharing means but also in creating incentives upon states to 
increase their own contributions.’ 1036   One challenge with regard to putting 
together a public Index, has been identified as the following: 
 
It would need to have legitimacy in order to have the authority to influence 
state behaviour. It would therefore need to be based on criteria that states 
found to be valid and managed by a body or a coalition of actors regarded as 
objective, rigorous and non-political, such as a university or an autonomous 
NGO regarded as beyond political influence.1037 
 
The protocol as mentioned above should further explicitly recognise the value of 
the current multi-stakeholder approach and the important contributions to 
 
1034 Betts, Collier, Refuge Transforming A Broken Refugee System, 60. A paper commissioned 
by OECD proposes seven principles that can improve the quality and quantity of financing for 
refugee situations, combining humanitarian and development aid.  OECD Financing for 
Refugee Situations, Development Policy Papers (December 2019 No. 24). 
1035 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’, 94-95. 
1036 Ibid. 
1037Ibid. 
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protection that non-state actors make.  The Global Compact has endorsed a ‘whole 
of society approach’, expanding the stakeholders of responsibility sharing beyond 
states to academics and researchers, cities, municipalities and local authorities, 
faith-based organisations, NGOs, parliaments, private sector organisations, 
refugees and diaspora and sports organisations – that can also pledge material, 
financial and other support to protection and solutions contributing to the 
responsibility sharing effort.1038   
It has been noted that NGOs can often deliver more cost-effectively to 
refugees than governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies and that are 
more attuned to refugee needs. 1039  Refugee communities and constituencies in 
particular should be advised on pledges and contributions and on where 
development aid is given, as they know better than anyone else what works. 1040   
In light of the above, a multi-stakeholder approach to refugee protection 
could be well accommodated within the protocol.  The protocol would however 
explicitly stipulate, and this is fundamental, that the contributions of non-state 
actors are supplemental and do not substitute states’ primary responsibility for the 
refugees in international law. 1041   As it has been rightly cautioned by 
commentators, increasing private sector engagement in refugee matters runs the 
risk of an incremental privatisation of the international refugee regime.1042   This 
is another compelling reason why states’ primary responsibility to protect and 
provide for the refugees needs to be solidified in international refugee law. 
 
1038 https://globalcompactrefugees.org/index.php/channel/pledges-contributions  
1039 It has been noted that NGOs can often times deliver to refugees more cost-effectively than 
governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies but also are more attuned to the need of 
refugees. Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution Oriented Protection’, 197. 
1040 Gill Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis 
(Oxford University Press1993), 177. 
1041 The Global Compact recognizes the primary responsibility and the sovereignty of states 
above all other stakeholders. Global Compact para 33-34. 
1042 Harley, Innovations in Responsibility Sharing, 11.    
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Finally, the conclusion of a protocol on responsibility sharing would not 
replace or be superior to regional responsibility sharing structures. These serve a 
context-specific purpose and operate within regional specificities and interests.  
One of the findings of this study is that when it comes to responsibility sharing 
one size does not fit all.  The protocol would not be and should not be seen as a 
one-size-fits-all answer.  Rather, it should be seen as the missing partnership 
between states of origin, asylum, destination and essentially of the international 
community of states as whole in international law that will institutionalise 
responsibility sharing, fill in the normative gap of the Refugee Convention and 
guide the responsibility sharing efforts at UN level. 
 
5.6.1. Less is more and sticking to the international refugee law nomenclature 
As mentioned earlier, Wall has put forward a proposal on a framework convention 
on responsibility sharing for refugees.  The proposed framework convention, 
based on six building blocks would not codify any legal obligations for the parties 
but would have a lean architecture, clearly stated principles and objectives and 
would set in motion a process towards improved responsibility sharing.   
Wall has also proposed the creation of three institutions under the proposed 
treaty.  A conference of the parties; a primary governing body that would meet 
every two to three years and to which states would indicate during the conference 
the contributions they would be willing to make, 1043 and two subsidiary bodies; 
one for advice in matters relating to protection and solutions and the other to 
monitor implementation.1044 
Wall’s focus is on the framework convention as a treaty model that allows 
for dynamic and incremental law making.  Framework Conventions, like the 
 
1043 Wall, A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?’, 226 
1044 Ibid., 226-227. 
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UNFCCC, do not codify concrete obligations but frame the problem and create 
the main skeletal legal and institutional framework, which then becomes the basis 
for future regulatory action through the development of subsequent protocols and 
standard setting processes.1045   
I do not disagree with Wall’s argument on the need for an institutional 
structure, namely a treaty that has low barriers to entry and accommodates the 
necessary flexibility and latitude that states require with regard to responsibility 
sharing.  I have sought to provide a principled but minimalist legal framework 
that provide such flexibility and latitude.  I share his view also of a bottom-up 
approach to responsibility sharing, although I do significantly depart by 
suggesting the codification of procedural obligations, as the only way to move 
away from the current voluntarist framework.  My objection to a framework 
convention would be down to positioning within the existing nomenclature of 
international refugee law that has the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  In 
addition, framework conventions as the study of international environmental law 
revealed, go hand in hand with institutionalisation at a number of levels, in terms 
of bodies and processes.1046   Without passing a judgement on whether such 
institutionalisation is currently required, given UNHCR’s extensive mandate 
under the international refugee law regime, a protocol sits better with the ‘protocol 
tradition’ in the progressive legal development of international refugee law. 
 
 
1045 Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 57. 
1046 Ibid. The UNFCCC established for example the permanent Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) as well 
as supreme plenary bodies such as the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the UNFCCC, 
and the COP serving as the Meeting to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
(CMA).   
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5.7. The way towards legal obligations: Building political will 
The feasibility of the proposal, as argued in the beginning of this Chapter, depends 
as much on what is at stake for states in terms of legal obligations and the balance 
between the depth and stringency of the commitments as well as on the necessary 
political will for change.  
 In relation to what is at stake, the legal design that I have proposed, 
arguably and intentionally caters primarily for the sovereignty of states over 
decision making and lowers the sovereignty costs by codifying a package of 
minimalist procedural obligations of conduct, softened further against 
prescription and delegation.   
That said, the feasibility of any such proposal cannot rest solely, on creative 
law making.  Rather, it would require active political facilitation.  Scholars have 
aptly summarized this: 
 
responsibility sharing is inherently political. It requires that regional and 
international organisations have the capacity for political engagement, 
including through brokering principled but pragmatic bargains between 
states and other actors. It is at least as much about leadership, analysis, and 
political engagement, as about rules and binding agreements.1047   
 
Betts and Collier argue that law and humanitarian assistance offer only part of the 
solution and a new overarching vision for refugee protection is urgently needed. 
1048  I would concur with the authors, but I would also add that international law 
can be part, even if a small, of the overarching vision towards successful 
protection of the community interest.  That is why this thesis sought to sketch the 
 
1047 Delmi Report, ‘A Fair Share’,18. 
1048 Betts, Collier, Refuge Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 202. 
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an international law architecture that could provide a permanent structure, - a 
foundation - for a principled, yet pragmatic, responsibility sharing arrangement.   
Political facilitation and strategic advocacy would also be required.  This is 
where the scholarship of international relations could prove fruitful to the 
endeavour, for it offers some very useful insights on the way states engage with 
one another in the context of international cooperation.  The use of issue linkages 
and cross-issue persuasion, the latter featuring seminally in Alexander Betts work 
on refugee protection, are bargaining tools that can facilitate international 
cooperation along the North-South divide.1049   
Cross-issue persuasion has been used by Betts so as to show that 
‘persuading Northern and Southern states that refugee protection is contractually 
or causally related to their wider interests in other issue areas,’ such as, for 
example, in managing migration, security, development and the environment 
(which is also termed as substantive linkages in International Relations 
scholarship) are key to overcoming the North - South impasse. 1050  Regional 
responsibility sharing arrangements are an example of the effective use of issue 
linkages in practice.  Let us take, for example, refugee protection in the context 
of Latin America, already discussed as an example of a comprehensive 
responsibility sharing policy.  The discussion revealed that refugee protection was 
once tied with the wider peace process in the region and today continues to be 
linked with regional developmental interests and values.  Northern states have 
various geopolitical, trade and cultural interests,1051 and thus linkages to southern 
countries that host large numbers of refugees.  Marshalling these existing linkages 
would be conducive to persuade Northern states, in particular to agree to a 
protocol on responsibility sharing. 
 
1049 Betts Protection by Persuasion, 187. 
1050 Ibid, 194. 
1051 Hathaway and Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution Oriented Protection’, 193-194. 
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 The political facilitation of a protocol on responsibility sharing would need 
‘a champion’, a coalition of the willing as it has been described. 1052  This could 
be a small team of developed states or individual leaders who champion 
themselves as refugee advocates, and who would strategically promote the idea 
of a protocol on responsibility sharing in various fora by dedicating time and 
resources.   
Owen observes that certain Northern countries, such as the Netherlands, or 
the Nordics, self-perceive themselves as ‘good citizens’ in the international order 
of states and this ‘good citizen mode’ could be the benefit from their active 
participation in refugee responsibility sharing.1053  I would caution that the self-
perception of some countries as human rights champions does not necessarily 
correspond to how these countries act in the refugee protection context.  The 
current state of affairs and hope would mostly point towards France or Germany 
in Europe, as the two countries mostly active in responding to emergency 
humanitarian issues in the region.  Across the pond, Canada could also be a 
friendly ally, taking heed of its past championship role in refugees.1054  
Another option for political facilitation is the formation of a negotiating 
block by the developing host countries1055 that are the most affected.  The block 
could put forward the proposal for a protocol before the UN General Assembly 
using their majority seats to their advantage.  In doing so, the southern block can 
make use of the existing issue linkages and engage the Northern states interests in 
refugee protection, by making their cooperation conditional in other areas such as 
security or development.1056   
 
1052 Hathaway, ‘The Global Co-Op Out on Refugees’, 12. 
1053 Owen, What do We Owe to Refugees?, 100-101. 
1054 It is reminded that in 1986 the people of Canada’s won the Nansen Medal for their aid to 
refugees. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-10-07-mn-5066-story.html  
1055 Aleinikoff, Zamore, ‘The Arc of Protection: Toward A New International Refugee 
Regime’, 68. 
1056 Owen, What do We Owe to Refugees?, 101. 
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Another option would be to put the request before the UNHCR Executive 
Committee.  Whatever the choice for the negotiating forum, the High 
Commissioner, would most likely assume a facilitating role in the negotiations of 
a protocol on responsibility sharing as it did in the drafting of the Global Compact 
on Refugees.   
Finally, political facilitation should be pursued by campaigning and 
lobbying at the domestic level.  Particularly, normative and domestic political 
factors also shape how states behave, ‘influencing them to join agreements even 
when they might seem better off staying out’.1057  Although international law 
tends to see the state as one unitary actor, actors at the national and local level 
may have different views on a protocol on responsibility sharing with some 
pushing the narrative that they have a moral responsibility toward refugees. 
Generating support from individuals, communities, constituencies, civil society 
and refugee circles would be crucial to drive this positive narrative on refugees in 
national and local constituencies.  NGOs have a big role to play in this regard 
through the use of strategic advocacy and education materials.  
There is no guarantee that despite all that has been argued to this point states, 
particularly of the Global North, will see the benefits of joining a protocol on 
responsibility sharing and give away a small part of their sovereignty in order to 
fill in what has been the Achilles heel of the international refugee law regime.  
Under the status quo, states are free to continue to pursue their refugee deterrence 
and externalisation policies whilst contributing well-below their resources and 
capacities.   
As with any proposal that advocates for multilateral law-making in an era of 
blatant multilateral fatigue, there would be prima facie objections on feasibility.  
The likelihood or unlikelihood of something materialising in the near future, as 
long as it is realistic, shall not, however, stop one from exploring ways to bring 
 
1057 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 164 
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about change when it is so needed.  To quote a commentator, for this would mean, 
‘to throw the role of moral and political agency out of the window’.1058  In the 
end, we are individually morally charged with the duty to reframe the narrative of 
refugees as ‘the needy others; into ‘fellow contributors’ to our society’s progress.   
 
5.8. Conclusions 
In this Chapter, I have sought to flesh out some of the key provisions and a basic 
architecture of a protocol on responsibility sharing.  Using the prescriptive lens of 
enlightened positivism, this Chapter has explored de lege ferenda a road towards 
common but differentiated legal obligations for responsibility sharing in 
international refugee law.   
The principle of CBDRRC as adapted to international refugee law warrants 
that every state participates to the responsibility sharing effort with a common 
baseline commitment to both physical and financial responsibility sharing that is 
further equivalent to its capacities and capabilities.  Fairness consideration 
encapsulated in the suggested version of CBDRRC also yield that developed 
states have special responsibilities towards the developing host countries because 
of their greater resources. Most importantly, the principle of CBDRRC would 
solidify and strengthen the common responsibility of states to protect refugees 
and provide for solutions, reinforcing the community interest.  
 Realpolitik however dictates a bottom-up implementation of CBDRRC that 
gives each state the flexibility to determine its own contributions to refugee 
protection and solutions, in light, of its CBDRRC.   
 I have sought to highlight and make use of an important distinction between 
the binding nature of the instrument and the subsequent normative force of its 
constituent provisions.  The proposed legal design, with its cascading treaty 
provisions balanced against obligation, prescription and delegation represents a 
 
1058 Ferracioli, ‘The Appeal and Anger of a New Refugee Convention’, 143. 
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softer form of legalisation suitable to frame and institutionalise responsibility 
sharing in international law.  It reflects the ‘sweet pot’, which goes as far as 
possible, but not beyond what is politically palatable.  This can be seen as a 
strength as well as a weakness.  If seen as a weakness, this softer form of 
legalisation arguably waters down legal obligations and hence the law.  If seen as 
a strength, it offers the necessary flexibility, keeps the costs of treaty participation 
low, and brings responsibility sharing within international refugee law. 
There is certainly more to be said on a protocol’s basic edifice and 
provisions.  I hope that my contribution will spark further academic and, why not, 
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6. Concluding Remarks; Responsibility Sharing, The Alpha and 
Omega for refugee protection  
 
The future is already here – 




This Thesis is an enlightened positivist study on the law of international 
cooperation and responsibility sharing for refugees both as it is and as it should be 
with a strong focus on the latter.  The essence of ‘enlightenment’ in this softer form 
of legal positivism is two-fold;  Firstly, international law cannot afford to be value 
free or disassociated with the social and political context in which it operates.  As 
a result of this position, fairness considerations are integral to international law.  
Secondly, certain issue-areas go beyond the bilateral interests of states and thus 
reflect community interests in international law.  International environmental law 
is a prominent area where community interests have been advanced within 
multilateral legal arrangements.  The parallel study of international environmental 
law is instrumental to the thesis and an integral part to its methodology.  It serves 
to gain a well-rounded understanding of the principle of CBDRRC, which is said 
to be an emerging concept in refugee law and policy at the UN level.  
The doctrinal part of the study began by examining the current state of the 
law on international cooperation and responsibility sharing.  It found that there is 
a general duty of states to cooperate to protect refugees and to manage the refugee 
problem. This duty is firmly rooted in international law.  The general duty to 
cooperate does not however further crystallise to an obligation of responsibility 
sharing; namely sharing the costs of international protection and easing pressure 
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on hosts states when necessary, through the physical relocation of refugees 
remains a voluntary undertaking.  In light of the absence of a responsibility 
sharing obligation, the legal responsibility for refugee protection and as a result 
the funding of the associated costs lie almost exclusively with the state in which 
the refugee arrives.   
A discussion of the main refugee law protection instruments at the regional 
level, both hard and soft law has shown that there are various degrees of 
institutionalisation of the principle of responsibility sharing, with some more 
positivised than others.  The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Common European Asylum 
System codifies a responsibility sharing obligation within binding instruments, 
whilst in Latin America responsibility sharing in the region is promoted through 
the Cartagena framework, a series of soft law instruments and processes.   
Looking into international cooperation and responsibility sharing in the 
practices of states one finds that it has been framed against the paradigms of 
externalisation and deterrence.  The safe third country arrangements discussed in 
the thesis constitute a bad faith implementation of the duty to cooperate to protect 
refugees and resolve refugee situations in international law going squarely against 
responsibility sharing.  Safe third country arrangements have also enhanced the 
risk of direct or indirect refoulement, contributed to indefinite prolonged 
detention, family separation, as well as other refugee rights violations.  This is 
because the true objective of the Dublin Regulation, Australia’s offshore 
processing regime, EU-Turkey Statement and the other agreements discussed in 
the context of responsibility sharing in the practices of states has been border 
control, combatting people smuggling, and control of irregular or secondary 
mixed migration movements.    
The increasing focus of the Global North on migration management and 
border control has thus had a direct impact upon the provision of international 
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protection by defining approaches to asylum.  Western states’ efforts to move 
refugees away from their borders and contain them in third countries are 
challenging the very foundations of the international refugee law regime.  An 
exception to such practice is currently seen in the context of responsibility sharing 
in Latin America.   
A further result of the STC arrangements that the thesis has stressed is the 
negative impact they have had on interstate relations.  As exemplified in the 
context of the EU, frontline Member states are disproportionately encumbered in 
times of mass influx because of the Dublin’s operation and left without support 
from their fellow central and northern Member States creating tensions in the 
region.  The STC arrangements have contributed to a glaring imbalance of refugee 
protection responsibilities between states by stressing further responsibility by 
proximity, rather than responsibility by capacity.   
The adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees represents for the 
enlightened positivist the latest evidence to the claim that the protection of 
refugees reflects a community interest in international law which is primarily 
served by the Refugee Convention and which can only be advanced through 
responsibility sharing.  This is why the Compact frames the contemporary refugee 
challenge as the ‘common concern of humankind’, whilst it emphasizes that 
refugee protection runs parallel with and depends on fair responsibility-sharing.  
Despite some positive advances of the Compact, the thesis has argued that it is 
unlikely that the Compact can fill in the normative gap of the Refugee Convention 
in relation to responsibility sharing.  This is primarily because the Compact solely 
rests on political commitments.  Contributions to protection and solutions remain 
entirely discretionary for states as does the participation to the Global Refugee 
Forums.  There is no formal structure nor an explicit responsibility sharing 
partnership between states in international law.  
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Against this background, the thesis has argued that a structural 
adjustment1059 is needed to fill in the responsibility sharing gap of the Refugee 
Convention.  This structural adjustment requires a responsibility sharing structure 
that will permanently institutionalise responsibility sharing in international law 
and put in place a partnership framework, whereby states of origin, transit and 
destination come together and contribute to protection according to their 
capacities and resources.   
To this end, the thesis has put forward a conception of responsibility sharing 
that is considerably narrower than the one currently reflected in the Global 
Compact on Refugees.  Its scope is limited to a baseline commitment to financial 
and physical responsibility sharing.  Financial sharing is understood as 
humanitarian and development assistance to refugee host countries to meet the 
rights of refugees guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and physical sharing is 
understood as the need for physical relocation of refugees through the institution 
of asylum, resettlement and other complementary pathways to protection when 
refugee host countries are severely encumbered.  These are the two modalities of 
responsibility sharing that together symbolize a baseline commitment to refugee 
protection.  
Part II of the thesis embarked on a de lege ferenda exploration of how 
international refugee law can develop to fill in the responsibility sharing gap of 
the Refugee Convention with a formal structure that codifies a light package of 
responsibility sharing obligations in international law guided by the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CBDRRC).  It became apparent that a logic of differentiated obligations in other 
areas of community interests in international law provided context and historical 
background of the various rationales for differentiation between states in different 
 
1059 Zeick, ‘Doomed to Fail from the Outset? UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative Revisited’, 
404. 
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legal regimes, evidencing that contextual, non-reciprocal commitments have long 
been a key feature of international law making.  In international environmental 
law, an idea of CBDRRC became the tool that progressively brought more and 
more developing countries onboard multilateral environmental regulatory 
agreements even when the environment was not in their top national priorities.  
CBDRRC can be seen as an application of fairness in international law, whereby 
states contribute to the protection of community interests in line with their 
contributions to a common problem and/or in line with their capacities and 
resources to address and resolve it.  
Looking in detail into international climate change law, the study identified 
key lessons on international cooperation and responsibility sharing for 
international refugee law.  It was in the climate change legal regime where the 
principle of CBDRRC was explicitly formulated and codified in treaty law for the 
first time.  Under the UNFCCC, CBDRRC is premised upon a common and 
shared responsibility of all states to protect the earth’s climate on one hand and 
the need to differentiate the individual state commitments on the basis of 
contributions to harm as well as on the basis of capacities to take remedial action.    
Two of the most widely accepted principles of fairness are obliquely embedded 
within the doctrine of CBDRRC; the contribution to the problem principle and the 
capacity or capability to respond and take measures.  An important element of the 
CBDRC’s rationale for differentiation in the climate change regime stems directly 
from notions of distributive justice across the North-South divide which thus 
endows developed states with special responsibilities of assistance owed to the 
developing states because of their greater wealth and capacities.   
Despite having been the subject of controversial and endless debates, 
CBDRRC has recalibrated and adapted over the years to reflect the ever-changing 
social and economic realities of states.  Tracing its unique trajectory from its top-
down implementation to Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to the bottom-up self-
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differentiated implementation in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the thesis has 
chartered how CBRRC has framed the North-South responsibility sharing 
partnership and dialogue between states on climate change. 
The 2015 Paris Agreement stands out as a model legal design for 
responsibility sharing in three ways.  Firstly, it is a legally binding instrument that 
represents the formal partnership of developed and developing states, emitters and 
least emitters states in international law on the fight against climate change.  The 
Paris Agreement is a treaty under international law providing a solid structure of 
procedural obligations that promote the protection of community interests in a 
solid way.  While its legal obligations are admittedly ‘softened’, the Paris 
Agreement provides for a unique oversight system in the areas of transparency, 
review and implementation that tames the parties’ increased flexibility by placing 
a strong emphasis on procedure. 
Secondly, it has a unique institutional legal design of bottom-up 
implemented obligations and a top-down oversight framework that is mainly 
facilitative in nature.  It is carefully and intentionally crafted with procedural 
obligations of conduct, which in turn ensure states’ much-wanted flexibility 
against a very ambitious, if not aspirational, goal.   
Thirdly, it has an even more unique transparency and reporting framework 
which is key in building trust between the parties and in satisfying elemental 
considerations of procedural fairness, as all parties are obliged to participate in 
the legal regime and all stakeholders, including civil society organisations can 
publicly apply pressure on states to achieve more in line with their CBDRRC.  
Last but not least, a yet important lesson drawn from the parallel study of 
CBDRRC in international environmental law is that community interests can exist 
not only in areas beyond national territories and jurisdiction, such as the deep 
seabed, Antarctica or outer space but are equally present within seemingly 
territorial activities, for example the protection of biodiversity, climate change , - 
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to the extent that actions are taken at the national and local level - and crucially the 
protection of human rights.  For the enlightened positivist these are all areas 
reflecting community interests in international law.  
 In light of this, the thesis has argued that international refugee law can also 
be seen as a manifestation of community interests in international law that has as 
an objective to restore justice towards a certain category of individuals.  The 
Refugee Convention thus reflects and serves a special category of community 
interests in international law, this being the protection of refugees.  Meanwhile, 
international refugee law perhaps more than any other human rights protection 
framework, embodies a cosmopolitan vision of hospitality towards the individual 
who has essentially lost her state’s protection, has crossed an international border 
and is now left at the good will of the international community of states.  The call 
for responsibility sharing in the Refugee Convention and the principle of 
responsibility sharing reflect a notion of a community obligation, albeit not one yet 
codified in international law.   
Importantly, not all community interests manifest themselves with the same 
degree of intensity.  In some areas the existence of community interests and thus 
the common responsibility is more expressly acknowledged than in others.  
Responsibility sharing for climate change is one such example where the potential 
ramifications of not sharing the responsibility could be detrimental to all states and 
to the entire planet.  Even in that case however, the intensity of the community 
interests and thus the impact on some countries is far worse than others.  This is 
why adaptation is also very important for states, particularly to those affected the 
most.  Having said this, the common responsibility of all states to protect the 
climate has been codified and acknowledged as such in international law through 
inter alia the principle of CBDRRC.   
In contrast, under international refugee law, the state to which the refugees 
arrive bears sole legal responsibility for their protection and its associated costs. 
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There is, however, today a strong international consensus on the part of states that 
the protection of refugees and the resolution of protracted refugee situations given 
the magnitude of the challenge, is ‘a common concern of humankind’ and as such 
a responsibility of the international community as a whole.  The Global Compact 
on Refugees is the latest compelling evidence of such consensus.  Nevertheless, 
it fails to explicitly pronounce upon this common responsibility as well as define 
what this common responsibility entails in terms of individual state commitments.  
This is where the CBDRRC principle adapted for the refugee law can be beneficial 
in rooting refugee protection not only as a global common concern but as a 
common and shared responsibility of state concretising the individual 
differentiated contributions.  
Against this background, the thesis has put forward a proposal for the 
further development of international refugee law through a protocol on 
responsibility sharing that would explicitly codify the principle of CBDRRC to 
international refugee law.  Building on the need for a true partnership between 
states as reflected in the language of the Global Compact for Refugees, the 
principle of CBDRRC if adapted to international refugee law would primarily 
reflect and solidify a common and shared responsibility of states to protect 
refugees and resolve refugee situations.  This would be the greatest asset of 
adapting CBDRRC to international refugee law.   
A responsibility sharing protocol premised on CBDRRC would necessitate 
nonetheless a baseline commitment of all state parties to both protection and 
solutions, differentiated under the rationale of responsibility by capability.  The 
protocol would endorse and build upon the current bottom-up approach to 
responsibility sharing, where states are free to choose the content of their 
contributions to protection and solutions by pledging according to their ‘national 
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realities, capacities and levels of development, and respective national policies 
and priorities’.1060   
The proposed protocol offers a basic architecture and some key provisions 
on responsibility sharing that would be vital in order to institutionalise 
responsibility sharing in international refugee law, gradually moving away from 
the current voluntarist framework.  An important distinction that has been 
highlighted and drawn in the thesis is the one between the legal form of an 
instrument i.e., a treaty and the legal character of its constituent provisions.  
Crucially, key to the appeal of a protocol on responsibility sharing to states, would 
be the trade-offs between the breadth of participation and the depth of the legal 
commitments.  Under the status quo, participation to responsibility sharing 
through the Global Refugee Forums remains entirely discretionary, whilst under 
the suggested protocol, the state parties would be legally bound to participate in 
responsibility sharing by pledging their commitments.  
Based on the aforementioned distinction, the proposed protocol would codify 
few procedural obligations, softened against prescription and delegation.  More 
specifically, each party would have a legal obligation of conduct to pledge its 
contributions, according to its CBDRRC to both physical and financial 
responsibility sharing.  This would at least ensure procedural fairness between 
states as all parties would be bound to contribute to refugee protection.    
For the purposes of securing consent however and given the controversial 
nature of physical responsibility sharing, states would only be normatively 
expected to contribute to both physical and financial responsibility, as a baseline 
common commitment. The softening of the obligation, in the suggested wording, 
entails that states would, however, be free to choose the content of their financial 
and refugee admission contributions.  
 
1060 Global Compact on Refugees, para 4. 
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Contributions to physical responsibility sharing could entail refugee 
admission for the purposes of access to protection and resettlement.  States would 
be free to choose from offering asylum places or using complementary admission 
pathways, such as humanitarian visas and corridors, labour mobility schemes or 
education opportunities for refugees such as academic scholarships and student 
visas.  These are all tokens of physical responsibility sharing that have already 
been agreed by states in the Global Compact.  Most importantly, the state parties 
would be normatively expected to contribute to solutions as well.  Resettlement, 
in particular, although long recognised as a core protection tool and a durable 
solution, it still remains, today, critically underprovided.   
With respect to financial responsibility sharing, each state party would 
choose whether to fund refugee assistance programmes in specific refugee 
situations, in cooperation with other humanitarian or developmental actors or 
directly establish private-public partnerships with the refugee host states.  The 
Global Compact on Refugees already envisages the establishment of public-
private partnerships, whereunder the private sector can invest in refugees and host 
communities through labour mobility schemes for instance.  
The operationalisation of the principle of CBDRRC in international refugee 
law would warrant that refugee hosting states, developing or least developed 
receive the necessary resources for protecting refugees, without significantly 
overbearing their own resources and communities.  To this end, the protocol, in 
addition to the individual obligation of each party to participate in the 
responsibility sharing effort, would codify a collective obligation of the developed 
state parties to support the developing host countries, by providing targeted 
development assistance that would benefit refugees and the host communities.  
Given that development aid is a vexed matter between developed and developing 
states and one that can cause tension, the proposed protocol would set a course of 
action towards refugee targeted development assistance that would benefit 
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refugees and host communities.  The suggested wording of such provision aims 
at a minimalist level of engagement of obligation that would hardly impose any 
concrete conduct on behalf of the developed countries as a whole. Having said 
this, it would nonetheless provide context and construct a narrative that signals 
solidarity and fairness in collectively addressing the refugee challenge.   
In terms of implementation and review, the protocol would provide for a 
light oversight framework premised on transparency, self-reporting and 
stocktaking, that would seek to facilitate rather than enforce implementation.   
When it comes to transparency and information sharing, international 
refugee law is considerably underdeveloped.  This is because there is no official 
reporting and information repository on countries’ responsibility sharing 
contributions.  The protocol would thus codify an individual obligation for each 
state party to communicate its contributions and to report annually on their 
progress and implementation.  Self-reporting, under the protocol, would perform 
a policy function of self-assessment for the parties, and peer and public pressure 
for the rest of the stakeholders.  In cases of joint pledges and public-private 
partnerships, which should be explicitly provided in a protocol on responsibility 
sharing, reporting on the division of labour between the parties would be a 
mandatory requirement of the state party to the protocol.   
Finally, the global stocktake would assess the collective progress against 
protection needs and strengthen the public discourse on the fairness as well as 
effectiveness of the global responsibility sharing effort.  The transparency 
obligation and the stocktaking exercise would together institutionalise a public 
discourse on the fairness as well as effectiveness of the global responsibility 
sharing effort against projected international protection needs.   
The legal design of the proposed provisions, arguably and intentionally, 
caters primarily for sovereignty, given the inherently political nature of the subject 
matter they would regulate.  The structure of the provisions seeks to lower the 
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sovereignty costs with minimalist obligations of conduct, softened against 
prescription and delegation, allowing states to retain their autonomy over decision 
making.  That said, the suggested protocol departs from the current state of affairs 
since if adopted, it would codify a light package of responsibility sharing 
obligations in international law, supplement the Refugee Convention and fill in 
what has been the Achilles heel of the international refugee law regime, the gap 
on responsibility sharing.  
 The de lege ferenda undertaking has concluded with some thoughts on 
what additional measures and actions, outside international law, would be 
required to make the proposal appealing to states.  It has been argued that the 
feasibility of the proposal and the vision on responsibility sharing it encapsulates, 
cannot rest solely on law making and flexible legal structures, creative no less.   
Despite the enlightened positivist’s vision to see international law ‘as a 
beacon of hope’,1061 and as a tool to deliver justice to the refugees, whilst serving 
fairness between states, it is acknowledged that international law cannot resolve 
the refugee problem on its own.  Building the necessary sustained political will 
across international, national and local constituencies, changing the narrative on 
refugees, as ‘future contributors’, would be crucial not only to securing consensus 
for a multilateral treaty on responsibility sharing, but also to securing the future 
of the refugee regime as a whole.  After all, refugee protection is offered at the 
national level.  In light of these findings, the parallel use of complementary 
political, analytical, and operational mechanisms on responsibility sharing would 
be key to address refugee specific situations and to strengthen the international 
refugee law regime as a whole.  
I would like to conclude this thesis with an observation.  The emerging 
fairness discourse in the refugee policy debates would only prove significant, if 
seen under the bigger picture and the wider fairness discourse that has been taking 
 
1061 Klabbers, International Law, 4. 
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place in international law.  In the words of Thomas Franck, ‘distributive justice is 
never off the agenda, whether the subject is manganese nodules on the ocean floor, 
geostationary orbits in outer space, or penguins and the Antarctic’s icecap.’1062  If 
one then looks into the Sustainable Development Goals, one can see that all areas 
of concern somehow connect or meet.  Poverty, hunger, lack of water and 
sanitation, gender inequality, climate change to name a few goals, are also well 
recognised drivers of forced displacement.  Each single driver, on its own, may 
not always satisfy the refugee definition on a given case, but it makes a compelling 
argument that the refugee regime cannot be insulated from the wider socio-
economic inequities of the international system.1063   
The journey towards differentiated legal obligations of responsibility sharing 
is going to be a long one, particularly in an era of apparent multilateral fatigue and 
distrust of institutions.  The global coronavirus pandemic is the latest addition to 
the challenges that threaten the international refugee law regime’s foundations.  It 
is hoped, however, that the Refugee Convention, which has stood the test of time 
for the past 70 years, will survive and continue to offer refuge to people around 




1062 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 436. 
1063 Responding to David Cantor who poses the question on the significance of a concept of 
fairness in the refugee regime and on whether the refugee regime can be insulated from the 
wider political, geographic, economic inequities in the international system. Cantor, ‘Fairness 
Failure and Future in the Refugee Regime’, 628. 
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